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THE NEGOTIATIONS  
FOR THE  
PEACE OF THE DARDANELLES,  
IN 1808-9:

WITH DISPATCHES AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.

BY  
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE  
SIR ROBERT ADAIR, G.C.B.

BEING A SEQUEL  
TO THE  
MEMOIR OF HIS MISSION TO VIENNA IN 1806.

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.


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## PREFACE.

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IN the strangely entangled state of European politics during the year 1806, we have seen Prussia at war at the same moment with both England and France. Early in 1807 we find England at war with Turkey; not for any wrongs of her own, but for those of Russia; and late in the same year, at war with Russia herself. We had thus completely changed sides with regard to the Turks: for, more than once, in 1809, after our footing at Constantinople had been made good, Russia offered them peace if they would send me away, and more than once I was obliged to dissuade any peace which should leave them without protection against that Power. There was a complication of accidents about this period in Continental affairs which seemed at first sight not easy to manage.

The case, shortly, with regard to Turkey, was as follows: — In 1802, a Treaty was made between Russia and the Porte, containing stipulations relative to the election, and permanence in office, of the Hospodars of Moldavia and Walachia. Towards the end of 1806, and in the midst of Napoleon's operations against Prussia and Russia in Germany, General Sebastiani, the French Ambassador at the Porte, (one of the ablest of Napoleon's officers, whether em-

not  
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ployed on diplomatic or military service,) persuaded the Turkish Government to break this Treaty with Russia, as well as that for the passage of the Bosphorus, to depose the Hospodars favourable to Russian interests, and replace them by others favourable to France.

Russia on this occasion did exactly what Sebastiani wished and foresaw. She marched an army into the Provinces. This is not the place to inquire with what justice or prudence she took such a step, after Turkey, through the mediation of Mr. Arbuthnot, had given her full satisfaction with regard to all the matters in dispute between them: suffice it that England took part with her ally, then engaged in a last effort for the independence of Europe, and sent a fleet to Constantinople to enforce the renewal of the Treaty of 1802. The event of that expedition was unfavourable, and our Ambassador left Constantinople.

In July the same year, Russia made her peace with France at Tilsit, and in December broke with England, and sent away our Ambassador from Petersburg. This rupture, among its other evils, left us with the Turkish quarrel upon our hands. Worse than this: by acceding to the French system, which excluded England from the Continent until a general peace, Russia made it, as far as it lay in her power, impossible for us to get out of it.

How this was effected will appear from the following despatches and documents relative to the negotiation of the peace signed at the Dardanelles in 1809, which I am permitted by the continued liberality of the Foreign Office to lay before the public. This

memoir may be regarded, therefore, as a sequel to that of my mission to Vienna; and I should have contented myself with simply printing the documents pertaining to it, but for the recent publication of a work entitled "Diaries and Correspondence of the Earl of Malmesbury."

There is in that work an entry conveying a censure on my appointment to both the above missions. It is as follows: —

"A\*\*\*\*, contrary to the assurances Canning had given to A'Court\*, remained at Vienna after Lord Pembroke's departure, till war was declared.† Canning then appointed him Ambassador to Turkey, though he could not but know he was attached to the Opposition, and communicated with them, and though not without abilities, such a dupe to women, that no secret was safe with him. This Fox, his intimate friend and patron, knew so well, that when he named him for Vienna, he stipulated that Mrs. A\*\*\*\* (a French woman) should not go with him, and that if ever she followed him, his mission should cease. Yet she did go after Fox's death, and Canning suffered A\*\*\*\* to remain at Vienna, and employed him elsewhere." (Diaries, &c. vol. iv. p. 406.)

Lord Malmesbury was thus pleased to write, and his grandson thinks it decorous to publish, the above passage, where an event in my private life is brought before the world as constituting an unfitness in me for public trust. I find myself, therefore, most unwillingly obliged to add a few prefatory remarks to

\* Now Lord Heytesbury.

† War was never declared. — (Note.)

this publication, and to enter more fully than it would otherwise have been fit to do, into the circumstances of my nomination to these missions.

And first, I will not be above acknowledging that when I read the above passage it gave me pain. Without knowing much of each other, Lord Malmesbury and myself had belonged at one time to the same party, and there subsisted among the Whigs of those days, to whom his Lordship had attached himself, from the first to the last, from the oldest to the youngest, an union and good understanding so cordial — such a free-masonry, it might be called — in our connection, derived from the steady and honourable pursuit of a common public object, that I almost felt myself entitled to the benefit of his good-will in after life; and little did I dream that in the interchange of mutual civilities, he was bending an evil eye upon me all the while, and fitting me for a future day “to the slider of his guillotine.”\*

As for the noble Editor, if he can reconcile the publication of this passage to what he may possess of that inward moral sense which is the foundation of all good taste as well as good breeding, I shall say nothing to him, except that I am thankful to have been brought up in a different school. But the aspersions to which he gives circulation must be repelled. Lord Malmesbury's name is considerable; especially on the Continent, where I have many friends who may be as much misled by his authority as I have myself been mistaken in the thoughts of his regard for me.

\* Regicide Peace, p. 109. Burke's Works, vol. viii.



Yet how to deal with these aspersions is no easy matter. If as they deserve, it were cutting into dead flesh : and again, what form of denial can I assume ? Where can be found words of efficacy to dispel the venom that party rancour extracts from private affliction ?

Facts, however, are better than denials ; and happily I find enough of them for my purpose in the approbation of my three successive masters, and of their advisers from all parties\*, who have trusted and rewarded me.

One of these statesmen, indeed, has incurred by so doing a severe rebuke from the author of the above work. I owe it therefore to his memory to show that his noble behaviour towards me — a determined and open political opponent — could have been dictated only by a sense of what, under the direction of his own warm and generous temper, he thought right for the public.

I begin, therefore, with the recital of my transactions with Mr. Canning ; and shall exhibit in his dealings towards me, and in mine towards him, a picture not discreditable, I trust, to either of us ; although in its colouring too quiet and too sober, perhaps, to show against that effulgence of public virtue which has burst upon the world from the pages of the Diplomatist.

I knew Mr. Canning long before Lord Malmesbury did ; not intimately, indeed, but enough to be captivated by his manners and his wit, and to anticipate

\* Mr. Fox, Lord Grey, Mr. Canning, Lord Wellesley, Lord Palmerston, the Duke of Wellington.

1804  
Wit!

with Sheridan and Fox, and every one else of our common friends, the brilliant success which followed him from his first appearance in public life.

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Much did we all hope that his abilities would be exerted on our side, and that the great cause in which the Whig party was then engaged under the Duke of Portland, as successor to Lord Rockingham, namely, that of rendering the confidence of the House of Commons, instead of the mere will of the Crown, the road to power ; — greatly, I say, did we hope that Canning would have ranged himself in the Whig ranks ; but the French Revolution came over us, and destroyed that and every pleasing hope for our party and our country.

The Whigs split among themselves on that event. With many of them there were just and honourable grounds for separation ; not perhaps for all. Passion had its full share in producing it ; clever manœuvring still more ; and if we would acquire a due knowledge of the success as well as of the variety of Lord Malmesbury's diplomacy, we may collect it from the recital of his own proceedings recorded by himself at that memorable period.

Mr. Canning at this time was free to take his line, and he took it with Mr. Pitt ; inclining, as it always appeared to me, rather to the popular opinions on Government which marked Mr. Pitt's early course, than to those of the Tories, or those of the Whig aristocracy who had joined him.

During the ten years' war which followed, I had, of course, no intercourse with Mr. Canning ; but upon the peace of Amiens, and the renewal of hostilities

some months afterwards, there arose (as stated in my narrative of those transactions\*) so general an opinion that Mr. Addington's administration would not be competent to meet the impending difficulties of the emergency, that our leading statesmen began to look about them, and consider how to get rid of it and form another. But *how* to do this was the difficulty. Mr. Addington was the King's Minister. There was no way to reach him but through the House of Commons. By the Duke of Portland's coalition with Mr. Pitt in 1795, the doctrine of the constitutional necessity of the confidence of that House to maintain a Minister in office, as well as to entitle him to aspire to it, had been virtually renounced; and there appeared but little chance that George the Third, who never felt himself so happy in his life as when he had got rid of both Pitt and Fox, would easily be induced to abandon the downy cushion on which he now reposed. Yet England had some claim on those who professed to serve her on public grounds, and who had repeatedly declared that her interests were not safe in the hands of Mr. Addington. What then was to be done? Either to bring back Mr. Pitt *gently* to the King's councils, or to revert to the Whig doctrines of 1784, and with all the inconvenience of forcing the King's hand, to set up a Parliamentary Administration.

The Diary lets us into many unsuccessful measures, to bring about the first of these alternatives; and it was soon found that for any hope of effecting the

\* Mission to the Court of Vienna, p. 28.

second, Mr. Addington's Ministry must first be put an end to by a vote of the House of Commons.

In this Mr. Canning concurred, and I well remember (and perhaps Lord Granville may remember too) the joy with which I shook hands with him in the House of Commons on the first day that was fixed for the trial of our united strength.

The circumstances which limited the success of our measures to the removal of Mr. Addington may, in some degree, be collected from the Diary, but on one important point—namely, Mr. Fox's readiness to sacrifice his own pretensions to power—there are some particulars, possibly unknown to the writer of it, which he has omitted. I will supply his silence.

It is true that Mr. Pitt, in joining his forces to ours, for the removal of Mr. Addington, and in acknowledging the necessity of his being succeeded by a Ministry which should include Mr. Fox, never engaged to press his admission upon the King as a *sine quâ non* of his own acceptance; but he did fully represent to his Majesty the importance of it, and this was the result:—

The King said that he considered Mr. Fox as a personal enemy, and that he could not consent to his holding any situation which would make a personal intercourse with him necessary. To this Mr. Pitt answered, that there could be no situation suited to Mr. Fox's rank and character in which personal intercourse would not be necessary, unless he were appointed to conduct some great foreign negotiation, of which there was no immediate prospect. To this the King said he should have no objection.

The objection being a personal one, Mr. Fox ex-

pressed his wish that his friends, if they could be admitted *as a party* to their full share of influence and power, and to rather more than if he himself were to form a part of the arrangement, should accept; and Mr. Pitt seemed inclined to discuss this proposition with him in a personal interview, but his friends unanimously refused to hear of his exclusion.

Mr. Pitt therefore returned alone to power; Lord Grenville and Mr. Fox's original Whig friends refusing to sanction by their acceptance of office a principle of personal exclusion for which they saw no constitutional reason, but against it every constitutional objection.

Lord Malmesbury, in speaking of Mr. Windham's refusal, represents it to have been a mere point of honour with him. Mr. Windham was the soul of honour; but although endowed with one of the most discriminating minds ever possessed by man, he never could understand the distinction between honour and duty in public life. His Lordship, therefore, could not have understood this straightforwardness in Mr. Windham.

We know the calamitous result of these transactions. A new confederacy to carry on the war, the discomfiture of Europe at the battle of Austerlitz, and the fatal effect of these reverses on Mr. Pitt's declining health were the consequence.

Another Ministry became indispensable. The King on this occasion, finding that he had no immediate means of maintaining his prerogative at its full height, yielded with a good grace. He accepted Mr. Fox; and it is well known that his Majesty

was not dissatisfied with his services, nor with the personal intercourse which they led to.

In another publication I have mentioned my appointment to succeed Sir Arthur Paget at Vienna; and there is here a word in the Diary, not much worth remarking perhaps, except as it denotes the sort of tone adopted by his Lordship in the representation he has chosen to make of it. *Patron and Client* was not precisely the sort of relationship which subsisted between Mr. Fox and myself. With some drops of his own blood in my veins, on my return from Germany in 1780, and under the auspices of Admiral Keppel, I naturally fell in with him, and Mr. Burke, and the other chiefs of the Rockingham party. In 1788, on the prospect of a change of Ministry in consequence of the King's illness, he had intended me for his Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, and on the footing thus established I remained with him to the day of his death.

There was nothing extraordinary, therefore, in my nomination to Vienna when he came into office, in 1806. It is true, as related in the Diary, that it was agreed "*that Mrs. Adair (a French woman) should not go out with him, and that if ever she followed him, his mission should terminate.*" The fact is so; but not for the reasons here insinuated. The injunction — why must these matters be talked of? — was at my own most earnest request, and on the representation of my family to Mr. Fox. As to the disparaging way of naming my wife, it may be well enough for a journal never intended, perhaps, to see the light; but when published in this manner, it must be noticed.

Let the Editor, then, be told that this "French woman" belonged to one of the oldest of the noble families of France; that her father, a thorough royalist, perished in that cause by the guillotine; that she herself was one of the earliest victims of the Revolution; and that at the restoration of the Bourbons, her son-in-law was placed by the Comte d'Artois himself in his garde du corps. It is true that on Mr. Fox's death she *did* come out to me at Vienna, totally without my knowledge, or that of my family, in respect to her intentions; but with this painful part of my private life the public can have nothing to do. Enough of it! — I return to Mr. Canning.

My remaining at Vienna and the cause of it, after the dismissal of my friends from office, have already been explained in my published correspondence. There is a circumstance in this case, however, which requires to be noticed a little further. On the change of administration Mr. Canning notified my recal to me in a way most sure to soften every unpleasant impression which I could receive from it. But I had already anticipated the event as a matter of course, and had informed Count Stadion that for a double reason there was an end of my mission. I will not flatter myself that the regret he expressed on that occasion arose from any other cause than an apprehension that the new ministry were likely to press him with more importunity than I had done, and with less consideration for the position in which Austria stood towards Napoleon, again to take part in the war; but on a further communication I learned that by the Emperor's commands he had written to Count

Starhemberg, ordering him to mention to the King his Sovereign's wish that I should not be removed from his court.\* It is not for me even to conjecture how far such a wish on the part of the Emperor of Austria, supposing it ever to have been conveyed to his Majesty, might have operated with his Majesty to express, at the time that the intention of recalling me was announced to him, his satisfaction with my humble services; but *of this I am sure*, that, for special reasons easily to be understood, it was determined not to press on his Majesty my recal by a regular official letter, but to supersede me, inasmuch as such a letter would require his Majesty's signature, and supersession would only need the appointment of an officer of higher rank. Lord Malmesbury — all secrets come out in time — *was the adviser of this course*; and in consequence Lord Pembroke, a nobleman in high personal favour with his Majesty, was appointed to succeed me in the character of ambassador. I never was angry with Lord Malmesbury for this proceeding, and have now no other remark to make upon it than that by an oversight, quite unaccountable in so deep a politician, he forgot that there must be two parties to such an appointment, namely, the power nominating and the power receiving. Lord Pembroke therefore, on his reaching Vienna, found the Austrian Government, as I had already informed Mr. Canning†, not disposed to accept him as ambassador.

Of this very awkward circumstance — awkward to

\* *Vide Mission to Vienna*, p. 258.

† *Ibid.*, p. 259.



all of us — to the new ministry as well as to Lord Pembroke and myself — I apprized his Lordship on our first interview ; giving up to him, of course, the cyphers and correspondence, and offering, as it was my duty to do, my humble assistance if there should be any business in which I could be useful to him.

So matters remained between us for some days, until, on his Lordship asking me at what time I proposed to quit Vienna, and on my inquiring consequently of Count Stadion on what day I could have my audience of leave of the Emperor, the explanation took place with the Austrian Minister, with regard to the respective situations of his Lordship and myself, which I have stated at large in page 257 of my Memoir.

My reasons also for not quitting Vienna without the customary audience are contained in the pages which follow that statement, together with my letter to Mr. Canning, entreating him to relieve me, and indeed himself, from an embarrassment all caused by this *école* of Lord Malmesbury. To these I refer for judgment whether any unbecoming effort was made by me to retain my situation either against the wish of the new Ministry or after the dismissal from office of my own friends. It will be judged also for Mr. Canning whether his conduct towards me, after having become acquainted, through my despatches, with my zealous efforts for the public service, deserves the sneer with which it is noticed ; and much do I mistake my countrymen if, in estimating the character of that Minister, they will not discern in this very act of re-

taining me at Vienna, the answer of a man and of a gentleman to the dark insinuations of the Diary.

It is affirmed also in that publication, that by permitting me to remain, Mr. Canning broke his promise to Mr. A'Court. I do not believe it; and for this reason, if there were no other; Lord Pembroke, after he had made up his mind to return home, sent me back the cyphers and correspondence, and *desired* me to resume my official functions, observing that I must soon receive Mr. Canning's answer to my representation of the 10th July. His Lordship therefore must have had a discretion as to this point, and his exercise of it in leaving me in office after his departure must exonerate Mr. Canning from the charge of a breach of promise to Mr. A'Court. Nothing was more easy for Mr. A'Court than to remain until Mr. Canning's answer should arrive, instead of leaving Vienna, as he did, with Lord Pembroke.

My proceedings from this time, until the whole mission came to a violent death through the overwhelming power of France, are already before the public. I come now to the circumstances which led ✓ to my being appointed to negotiate the Turkish peace.

Lord Pembroke quitted Vienna on or about the 14th of September, leaving me to resume my functions. Shortly afterwards arrived despatches announcing Sir Arthur Paget's mission to the Turkish Government to restore peace with us. In these despatches were inclosed a copy of Sir Arthur's instructions. His mission, owing to causes out of his reach,

failed of its effect, and in December he set sail for England. It so happened, that on my reaching Malta on my way home in March, I found there Captain Stewart of the Sea-Horse, whose station was in the Archipelago, and who had arrived but a few hours before me with a proposal from the Pacha of the Dardanelles to resume Sir Arthur Paget's negotiation. Captain Stewart of course lost not a moment in setting sail for Malta, thinking it might be possible to overtake Sir Arthur; but he was already gone. Sir Alexander Ball, who was anxious that the opportunity should not be lost, proposed to me on this to put myself in Sir Arthur's place, and return with Captain Stewart to the Dardanelles. That of course was impossible, as I had no commission. It occurred to me, however, that it might be possible to manage this business in such a way as to give the two countries the benefit of peace until we could hear from home;—that as the commanders-in-chief of all opposing forces are empowered to agree to a suspension of hostilities, and as I was in possession of the terms on which my Government was ready to make *peace* with Turkey, I had but to offer my services to Lord Collingwood to go up to the Dardanelles as his clerk, or in any capacity he might think fit to send me, and to settle the terms of *an armistice* according to the instructions of which I had a copy. The two Governments would then have only to turn the armistice into a treaty, and the thing was done without losing time, and risking an opportunity not easily perhaps to be recovered: as the event proved this afterwards to be.

I authorised Sir Alexander Ball, therefore, to submit my proposal to Lord Collingwood, of whom I requested at the same time, in case of his not approving it, a passage to England in any ship he might be sending home; and I wrote to Mr. Canning to tell him what I had done.

Not liking to stay at Malta until answers should arrive to these letters, I went to Sicily to wait for them. Early in May the *Superb* arrived at Palermo with orders to take me to England. On inquiring of Captain Jackson (who commanded her) whether Lord Collingwood had sent any answer to my letter containing the proposal above-mentioned, he told me that he had not seen his Lordship; that immediately after the fleet had been joined by the *Ambuscade* (by which my letter was sent), his signal was made to come to me at Palermo, and give me a passage home. There was nothing more to be said, so I embarked with him, and reached London in the month of May.

With what feelings I arrived will be understood by those who consider that, from the date of my letter to Mr. Canning of the 10th of July in the preceding year until the day on which I knocked at his door in Bruton Street, I had not heard one word from him either of praise or of blame; and that during this interval, I had taken upon myself many important acts, for which, if they were blameable, I had no right to count upon his partiality towards one so openly opposed as I was to the Government of which he made a part.

But Mr. Canning had many generous qualities. I remember his once saying in the House of Commons that his foreign policy was contained in one word — "*England.*" He saw that, with all my defects, I had served England faithfully and zealously, and all party differences were forgotten the moment he saw me.

Our conversation was therefore short, and to the purpose. On receiving my letter from Malta, he had instantly sent me full powers to open a negociation for peace with the Porte, but the frigate which brought them out crossed the *Superb* on her voyage home. He now proposed to me to return, and open the negociation. My answer was, that as he was aware of my party principles and engagements, he must give me leave first to consult my friends. Mr. Canning complied without hesitation, and the result was that I accepted the mission under an express agreement, that after having made the peace, I should be at liberty to return home, and resume my seat on the Opposition benches of the House of Commons.

He then asked me what instructions I wished to take out in addition to those which he had sent to Sir Arthur Paget. It will be seen by my Vienna letters, that before my departure from thence, some hope had presented itself of breaking up the French and Russian alliance, the chief basis of which, as Count Stadion had informed me, was the pursuit of a common system in the affairs of European Turkey. I knew that some angry discussions on other points had already taken place at Paris between Count Tolstoy and the French Government, and it appeared to me that if, after settling our own concerns with

the Porte, a peace could be effected between that Power and Russia without French intervention, there would be a fair chance for Europe of dissolving that unnatural but most formidable compact. I proposed, therefore, to Mr. Canning to add a clause to my instructions, directing me to become the mediator of such a peace, without referring home for specific powers, if an opportunity for making it should occur. He readily adopted the suggestion, and added the requisite clause.

But this was not all. It will be seen by the same letters \* that I had not left my post without establishing a correspondence through which our friendly intercourse with Austria might be resumed whenever it could be done without danger to her. On my way home I had learned at Gibraltar the gallant resistance begun by Spain to the French invasion; and soon afterwards we heard that fresh exactions and aggressions were provoking the Austrian Government to stand up once more against her tyranny. Mr. Canning was of course anxious to seize this opportunity of re-establishing, if possible, our relations with Austria, and he authorised me to make the attempt through the channel which was open for it. I wrote in consequence to Count Stadion the letter which will be found in page 6. of the present publication. It was too early to propose the measure directly, so it was done under cover of an invitation to assist us by his good offices in our impending negotiation with the Porte.

\* Mission to Vienna, p. 265.

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*Copy  
Barthold  
1808*

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A renewal of hostilities with France, on the part of Austria, must necessarily lead to the re-establishment of our diplomatic relations with her. Mr. Canning, therefore, when he gave me my credentials to the Porte, authorised me, when I should reach Malta and learn the general state of affairs, to decide upon the course most advisable to be taken for the public service — whether to proceed at once to the Dardanelles and restore peace, or to make my way to Vienna, where a commission would be sent me to re-establish in due form our relations with that Court, and to resume my functions there. I chose the former as the more urgent.

This is the whole and the very simple history of my appointment to the embassy at Constantinople.

It will be seen by the despatches of 1809, that on the breaking out of fresh hostilities between France and Austria, it was in contemplation to form a treaty of triple alliance between England, Austria, and the Porte. With the ratification of our treaty of peace with the Porte, and his Majesty's permission to resign that embassy, credentials were sent me for the Court of Vienna. But the sad events which had taken place before their arrival made it impossible to make use of them. The French armies were already in possession of Vienna, and it was as much as I could do to keep my ground at the Porte, and secure the exchange of the ratifications. The peace itself, indeed, appeared so little safe for some time after these disasters, that I thought it my duty to remain there beyond the time of my announced departure, and to do my best to confirm and consolidate it. The

general state of Europe also, especially the danger to the House of Austria from the measures in course of execution to give effect to the Russian and French alliance, induced me to stay, and endeavour to effect some diversion in her favour by occupying the Russian forces, which had marched into Galicia, and were assembling on her eastern frontier of Transylvania. European Turkey was then the only spot on the Continent from whence England could assist the House of Austria, and I was anxious to turn my position at the Porte to the best account. But the marriage of the Arch-Duchess with Napoleon was more efficacious. Sad extremity for the House of Hapsburg! but unavoidable after the treaty of Tilsit.

After this a long and dangerous illness detained me at Constantinople until the July of the following year. I then returned, *to resume my place on the Opposition benches of the House of Commons*, where I remained until the dissolution of Parliament in 1812.

R. A.

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## CORRESPONDENCE.

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*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Malta, April 8th, 1808.

SIR,

THE Sea-Horse, Captain Stewart, arrived here, yesterday, from Smyrna. Captain Stewart brings a direct and most earnest application from the Reis Efendi to Lord Collingwood to enter into immediate negotiations for the restoration of peace between his Majesty and the Porte. Having in my possession a copy of your instructions to Sir Arthur Paget, of last May, and no other copy of them being to be found in this part of the world, I have thought it my duty to communicate them to his Excellency, Sir Alexander Ball, by whom they will be forwarded to Lord Collingwood as a guide to him in any negotiation which he may think proper to undertake; and notwithstanding the many reasons I have for desiring to return to England, I have not hesitated (at the suggestion of Sir A. Ball that possibly my services might be useful) to offer myself to his Lordship to be the bearer of any answer with which he may re-despatch the Sea-Horse.

As it will not be in my power to proceed further on my way to England before the 10th of May, I might receive your directions at Gibraltar; and should

you conceive that my remaining here could be attended with the smallest public utility, I am ready on this, as on every other occasion, to sacrifice all private considerations to it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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*Translation of a Letter from the Reis Efendi to Captain Stewart, dated Constantinople, February 13th, 1808 (mentioned in the preceding Letter from Mr. Adair to Mr. Secretary Canning).*

MONSIEUR,

NOUS avons vû avec un vrai contentement, tant moi que tous les Ministres de l'Empire, dans la lettre datée le 18 Janvier, laquelle vous venez d'adresser à S. A. le Kapoudan Pacha, que dans une lettre précédente vous feriez part à S. A. que S. E. M. l'Amiral Lord Collingwood étant chargé de l'échange des prisonniers, vous étiez prêt à faire parvenir à S. E. toute communication que S. A. le Kapoudan Pacha ou la Sublime Porte voudroit bien lui faire ; et qu'actuellement il étoit bien urgent que toute proposition quelconque que la Sublime Porte auroit à faire à la cour d'Angleterre seroit adressée directement à S. E. M. l'Amiral ; qui peut donner immédiatement un effet à ces propositions.

La Sublime Porte considérant la Cour d'Angleterre, comme une Cour depuis long-tems son amie, et liée à Elle anciennement, et désirant de renouveler les nœuds de l'amitié qui ont été rompus à cause de circonstances, avoit donné ordre à feu Ismail Pacha, Seraskier des Dardanelles, de négocier la paix avec le

Plénipotentiaire Paget, sans attendre l'arrivée du nouveau négociateur, parti pour Malte — en vertu de quoi, je me suis empressé de notifier la chose, telle qu'elle est arrivée, à S. E. M. le Plénipotentiaire, par une lettre, qui lui a été expédiée par la voie de S. A. Ali Pacha, Pacha de Jannina, et qui jusqu'à présent doit lui avoir été remise.

Cependant comme il est bien certain et évident qu'il seroit difficile, à cause de la grande distance, de pouvoir retirer à tems les réponses de nos lettres, il nous a été extrêmement doux d'apprendre votre arrivée aux Dardanelles, qui a été suivie par des expressions extrêmement sincères et amicales. Comme il est certain que la S. P. se trouve actuellement dans les mêmes sentimens d'amitié et de sincérité envers la Cour d'Angleterre, et que cette Cour aussi de son côté désire en toute manière le bien et la prospérité de l'Empire Ottoman, et que par conséquent les deux parties désirent mutuellement le retour de l'ancienne et sincère amitié qui existoit entre les deux Empires, la S. P. a muni de ses pleins pouvoirs S. A. le Seraskier actuel des Dardanelles, Mahomet Yakki Pacha, pour renouveler les anciens liens d'amitié et de bonne harmonie.

Il reste donc à savoir si de la part de la Cour d'Angleterre aussi, S. E. M. l'Amiral ou quelque autre est muni des pleins pouvoirs nécessaires à cet effet ; et dans ce cas il est de la dernière importance que le Plénipotentiaire de la Cour d'Angleterre s'approche aux Dardanelles, pour que les négociations entre les deux Plénipotentiaires puissent avoir lieu au moment le plus tôt. C'est à ce but que je m'empresse à vous écrire ma présente lettre amicale en me flattant que vous vous empresserez à en faire part à S. E. M.

l'Amiral Lord Collingwood ; j'espère au même tems que vous voudriez bien lui représenter l'importance de la prompte arrivée du Plénipotentiaire de votre Cour aux Dardanelles.

Comme il est bien sûr d'ailleurs que le renouvellement de l'ancienne amitié entre les deux empires est désiré réciproquement, et que par conséquent il est certain que cette négociation aboutira à un heureux retour de l'ancienne amitié et union des deux empires, c'est de votre loyauté que nous espérons l'arrivée prompte de votre Plénipotentiaire aux Dardanelles pour donner immédiatement une fin à un ouvrage si salutaire et si désiré des deux parts.

P. S. Comme votre lettre amicale fait mention du relâchement des prisonniers, je m'empresse à vous annoncer que les prisonniers Anglais qui se trouvent ici, outre qu'ils ne sont pas traités comme prisonniers, ont été remis depuis long-tems à M. le Baron de Hubsch, et dans peu ils seront renvoyés.

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*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

H.M.S. Superb, Spithead, May 24th, 1808.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I left Palermo on the 28th ult., and arrived this morning at Spithead in H. M. S. Superb.

When Lord Collingwood sent the Superb to receive me on board, Sir A. Ball's dispatches to his Lordship relative to the intelligence received at Malta by the Sea-Horse, had not reached him\* ; and as his Lordship

\* This was a mistake. Vide Preface.

had already proceeded to resume his station off Toulon, there appeared to be very little use in my remaining at Palermo for the chance of hearing from him on the subject I mentioned to you in my letter from Malta of April 8th. I thought it best, therefore, to lose no time in embarking for England, in order to render you an account of the state in which affairs are left at Vienna, and of everything which concerns the mission in which his Majesty has been pleased to employ me.

The conclusion of the Turkish peace, however, or of an armistice which, while it gave us all the immediate advantages of peace, might contain the outline of a regular treaty, is a matter of such importance, that, although I had communicated to Lord Collingwood, through the medium of Sir A. Ball, the substance of the instructions with which you furnished Sir Arthur Paget last year, I thought it best to leave the instructions themselves in Mr. Drummond's possession at Palermo.

During my stay at Palermo I had frequent conversations both with Mr. Drummond and Admiral Thornborough, in which I took the liberty of stating to them my opinion with regard to one point of this subject which strikes me as peculiarly important. *Our* peace with the Turks is an easy matter. The great point will be to persuade them, if possible, to make peace with Russia, and this immediately, and almost at any price. The various ways in which a peace concluded in this manner, not only without the intervention of France, but in decided opposition to her views, might be rendered serviceable to our cause, will I am confident strike your mind at once. It might not only lead to a separation between Russia

and France, but it might also materially relieve Sicily from her present embarrassed situation with respect to Russia, provided those advantages were taken in the negociation which the case admits of. I will explain my meaning on this part of the subject whenever I shall have the honour of conversing with you.

What I have here written is under the supposition that the packet which left Malta on April 8th has reached England. Should that not be the case, I shall have some important intelligence to communicate to you from Sir Hew Dalrymple. The Superb passed by Gibraltar on the 11th.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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*Mr. Adair to Count Stadion.*

Londres, ce 26 Juin, 1808.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

JE me sers de cette voie pour avertir V. E. que d'après l'invitation de la Cour Ottomane les négociations pour la Paix avec l'Angleterre vont être reprises; que j'en suis chargé de la part de mon Gouvernement; et que je partirai incessamment sur la frégate Hyperion pour remplir cette mission.

Cette ouverture est datée du mois d'Avril.\* Elle est basée sur la connoissance acquise par la Porte des projets de la France, de la Russie, et (à ce qu' Elle assure) *de l'Autriche* pour le partage de ses provinces Européennes.

Vous sentez bien, M. le Comte, que tout ce qui

\* De Février.

pourroit aider à retarder la chute de ce malheureux Empire doit intéresser au plus haut point l'Autriche ; aussi je vous invite à me prêter tous les secours que vous jugerez convenables pour remplir cet objet important.

Vous me connoissez trop bien, je me flatte, pour me croire capable d'abuser de la confiance que vous pourriez me témoigner dans une conjoncture aussi délicate ; et de mon côté je vous garantis qu'il n'entre pas dans les vues de mon gouvernement d'attirer les Turcs dans aucun mauvais pas, ni de leur faire le cadeau funeste d'une paix qui feroit tomber sur eux la vengeance de Bonaparte. Les circonstances donc, telles que je les trouverai en arrivant sur les lieux, décideront de ma conduite ; mais en tout cas il me semble qu'il seroit essentiel au bien général, et que ce seroit même vous rendre un service, de désabuser les Turcs sur le rôle qu'ils vous prêtent dans le système co-partageant.

Ce que je vous proposerois donc, M. le Comte, seroit simplement de m'autoriser (sans cependant vous compromettre vis-à-vis de la France) d'assurer le Divan que l'Autriche n'a pris aucun engagement de ce genre ni avec la France, ni avec la Russie.

Cependant notre paix avec la Turquie n'est pas la seule chose qui m'occupe ; et voici ce qui exige de ma part l'ouverture la plus confidentielle : —

La Russie doit se trouver maintenant assez embarrassée de sa guerre avec nous et avec la Suède, et même de son état intérieur. Elle doit aussi être assez convaincue de la mauvaise foi de Bonaparte sur tout ce qui regarde l'exécution du Traité de Tilsit, pour se résoudre à la fin à s'arranger de bonne foi avec la Turquie. Je me propose donc (bien qu'elle

le mérite si peu) de disposer les Turcs (si la chose est possible) à signer la paix séparément avec la Russie sans attendre le consentement de la France.

Ce projet, à ce qu'il me semble, doit vous convenir sous tous les rapports. N'y auroit-il pas quelque moyen d'en faire sentir également à l'Empereur Alexandre tous les avantages ? Si vous le croyez possible je compte sur vos lumières pour en faire l'ouverture à St. Pétersbourg.

La Russie désireroit-elle s'expliquer avec nous ? On pourroit m'envoyer Pozzo ; nous nous entendons ; nous avons même discuté à fond toute cette histoire Turque, et tout ce qui restoit du système Européen, le jour avant mon départ de Vienne.

L'occasion me paroît favorable. L'Espagne occupe toute la tête de Bonaparte, et nous savons qu'il ne poursuit jamais deux objets à la fois.

Quant à l'Espagne, nous sommes résolus ici de la secourir de la bonne manière. C'est un mouvement national, et la conduite du gouvernement répond en tout au sentiment généreux qui l'inspire. Nulle demande de flottes, de forteresses, &c. &c. Notre système est renfermé dans ces deux mots du discours de M. Canning *"du moment que l'Espagne s'oppose à la France, le passé n'est plus ; elle devient de fait l'alliée de l'Angleterre."* Tous les partis se réunissent pour applaudir et pour appuyer ce principe.

La destinée qu'on vous réserve ne nous intéresse pas moins. Il nous paroît incontestable qu'après l'Espagne ce sera votre tour. Je ne doute guères que l'Archiduc Charles n'en soit convaincu lui-même ; surtout après la proposition modeste que vous a fait Bonaparte de s'établir en Moravie. C'est le cas de vous annoncer que nos dispositions envers vous sont



toujours les mêmes, et que je serai pleinement autorisé à vous en fournir les preuves les plus satisfaisantes.

Si vous juger à propos, M. le Comte, de m'honorer d'un mot de réponse votre lettre me trouvera à Palerme (sauf les accidens de mer) vers la fin du mois prochain. Vous pouvez aussi me l'adresser à Malte sous l'enveloppe du Gouverneur Ball. Dans ce dernier cas vous pourriez la confier aux soins de M. Adamoitch à Fiume, qui me l'expédiera par le Capitaine Campbell; mais également dans l'un et dans l'autre cas vous aurez la bonté de les prévenir à ces deux places de mon arrivée prochaine, afin que la lettre ne soit pas envoyée en Angleterre.

J'ai l'honneur d'être.

---

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Hyperion, off Cadiz, July 13th, 1808.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that immediately on my arrival off this place, I went on board the Ocean, in order to consult with Lord Collingwood upon those objects in my instructions in which his Lordship's co-operation might eventually become necessary.

I have great satisfaction in acquainting you that from the information his Lordship has received with regard to the dispositions of Russia towards Turkey, such is his opinion of the state in which I shall find affairs on my arrival at the Dardanelles as to render needless any offensive operations against the Russian ✓ power in the Black Sea. In the contrary supposition,

however, his Lordship is decidedly of opinion that it would be unadvisable to risk the passage into the Black Sea without previously occupying all the points from the Dardanelles onwards by British troops ; and this he fears would require a much larger force than could be spared at present from other services.

\* \* \* \* \*

I then consulted his Lordship with respect to an expedition against Corfu and the neighbouring islands, but he seems to think the chance of undertaking one to any effect too remote a contingency to justify his appropriating any part of the force now under his command to such a service.

Lord Collingwood continues to judge favourably of the dispositions of Ali Pacha, but has no hope that, under the present circumstances, that chieftain would assist in offensive measures against any of the Seven Islands, even against St. Maur. His Lordship however at the same time informed me that he had instructed Capt. Hervey, of the *Standard*, to assist in whatever enterprize it may hereafter appear advisable to attempt in that quarter.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Gibraltar, July 16th, 1808.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that I arrived this day at Gibraltar, and that I delivered to Sir Hew Dalrymple the despatches addressed to him by Lord Castlereagh, and which were entrusted to my care.

Although affairs in this part of Spain, generally speaking, wear a much more favourable appearance than they seemed to promise when I left England, the communication with Madrid is not yet open. All I could do, therefore, with the two letters for the Pope's Nuncio at Madrid, was to leave them in the care of Sir H. Dalrymple, in order to their being forwarded if an opportunity should occur.

While I was conversing with Sir Hew, he received a visit from a Monsieur Robertino, a person who calls himself the Plenipotentiary of His Sicilian Majesty to the Spanish nation, and who appears to be employed by the Court of Palermo to circulate in the interior of Spain the claims of His Sicilian Majesty to the Regency of that kingdom. At Sir Hew Dalrymple's request, I saw this gentleman, and protested strongly against his intended proceedings. I stated to him the reasons which rendered such a step highly imprudent; that I was convinced it would be disapproved by His Majesty's Government, on whom similar claims had been pressed by Prince Castelvicala; and I gave him full leave, if he thought it necessary, to state to those who had sent him the conversation he had had with me, and the conduct he intended to pursue in consequence of it.

I have the satisfaction to add that he has promised most faithfully to proceed no further in this business without the concurrence of the British Government, and I trust that Sir Hew Dalrymple will prevail upon him to return to Palermo.

I have the honour to be, &c.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

*(Private.)*

Palermo, August 5. 1808.

MY DEAR SIR,

I ARRIVED here on the 3d instant late at night. I went round by Minorca in order to speak with Admiral Martin, and to deliver him a message from Sir Hew Dalrymple respecting the garrison of that island, which Sir Hew wished very much might be sent to Rosas. Unluckily, it had already been sent in detachments to the opposite coast.

General Stuart is not just now at Palermo, but is expected every day. I shall only wait to confer with him respecting the points mentioned in my instructions, and to inform him of what I have been able to collect respecting the state of affairs in Spain, and then proceed immediately to the place of my destination.

The Queen sent for me immediately on my arrival. Her inquiries were directed very much to the intentions of His Majesty's Government with regard to Spain, and particularly to the effect which the appearance of Prince Leopold at Gibraltar would be likely to produce. I told her frankly what I had said to her agent Robertino upon the object of his mission when I met him at Gibraltar, and likewise how ill Prince Castelcicala had judged in presenting a note to you which was not simply the advancement of a claim to the Regency on the part of His Sicilian Majesty, but an actual assumption of it. I, of course, entirely confined myself on this point to the sense of the instructions I brought out from you to Mr. Drummond,

who seems to have brought her Majesty into a very tractable humour.

The rest of her conversation was the old story about Naples. I endeavoured (but most probably without effect) to make her understand that the way to Naples was through Spain.

I am, &c.

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*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Palermo, August 17. 1808.

SIR,

WHEN I arrived at this place, which, as I have already had the honour of informing you, was on the 3d instant, Sir John Stuart was expected every hour. It was not until the 6th, therefore, that, finding his journey deferred, I sent him the despatches entrusted to my care by Lord Castlereagh. I transmitted to him also an extract from such parts of my instructions as direct me to consult with his Excellency with regard to what force he might be able to spare from the army under his command for the occupation of any island or harbour which might eventually become of importance for naval operations in the Archipelago, and I stated to him my conference with Lord Collingwood on the expediency of occupying any such post, and his Lordship's opinion on that subject.

The substance of Sir John Stuart's answer to this communication, as well as that of other letters which I have received from him, and of which the last is written subsequently to his receipt of Lord Castlereagh's despatch of July 6th, is uniformly, — "That he did not think any due proportion of his army could

be spared at the present crisis, without *paralysing* (that was his word) its entire force, and rendering it inefficient for every other active operation whatsoever."

At the same time that I wrote to Sir John Stuart, I despatched the messenger Kaye to Sir Alexander Ball, in order to obtain from His Excellency such information respecting the state of affairs at Constantinople as might determine my future motions. This messenger was accompanied by Mr. Barthold, whom I had at one time thoughts of sending on privately to the Captain Pacha, in order to ascertain with precision what were the steps which the Turkish Government were disposed to take, on my arrival, to facilitate the opening of the negotiations.

The messenger returned yesterday, the 16th instant; and, by the accounts which he has brought me from Malta, I am afraid that some difficulties may occur in this business, for which I was not quite prepared.

These difficulties are principally likely to arise from the recent capture of one Turkish frigate, and the probable destruction of another, by the Sea-Horse, after a severe action, the details of which I conclude are already in the possession of His Majesty's Government.

I have also been informed by Mr. Werry, a gentleman of the highest respectability, who has resided many years at Smyrna in an official situation, that he has received letters from thence, of a very late date, to which he attaches much credit, stating that a new revolution had been effected at Constantinople, under the direction of the friends of Sultan Selim.

His Majesty's Government will at once see the embarrassment created by these events, and will excuse,

I trust, some hesitation on my part, as to the course most proper for me to pursue.

On the one hand, there is no knowing to what degree this desperate encounter with the Turkish ships, when known with all its details at Constantinople, may not alter the friendly dispositions which appear to have prevailed between His Majesty's subjects and the Turks for some months past: nor can I by any means be sure that the overture itself of the Reis Efendi, which constitutes the whole foundation of my mission, may not be considered by them as annulled by this proceeding. I am to consider too, that as the instructions for my conduct are adapted solely to meet an invitation from the Turkish Government, a frigate was deemed sufficient, in point of force, for my protection and appearance off the Dardanelles. But if this action of the Turkish ships should have had the effect which I apprehend, or (which I fear is still more probable) if the action itself should have been occasioned by a previous alteration in the Ottoman councils, and, consequently, if instead of an amicable reception I may now expect my flag of truce to be answered by the appearance of a superior force ready to avenge the recent affront to their arms, it is evident that the nature of my mission becomes changed in its very essence. It is therefore seriously to be weighed whether I ought to appear in the character of a negociator without such a force as may at least place me beyond the reach of insult, or indeed whether I ought to appear in that character at all, without a fresh invitation, or without some assurance that they still adhere to their overture of the month of February. This doubt, which at any time would have arisen in my mind

under the difference of circumstances, is most powerfully strengthened by the letter, and even by the spirit of my instructions, framed as they evidently are with a view to prevent a second unsuccessful negotiation, and directing me to remain at Palermo until a Minister shall be appointed by the Turks to treat with me, and a place named for our conferences. But on the other hand, the vast importance of the moment,—the new turn of affairs which appears every day more and more likely to arise from the continuance of the resistance of Spain,—my anxiety to get the mediation for the Russian peace with Turkey out of the hands of France, as well as to promote the several objects contained in my letter to Count Stadion (which I am not wholly without hopes of accomplishing),—all these are considerations which teach me the inestimable value of time upon the present occasion, and seem to forbid my losing an hour or a chance in promoting the main business of my mission. I cannot but think it possible, with due caution, to avoid committing H. M.'s government by any act which may be construed into an advance on the part of his Majesty, and to which, if unsuccessful, the enemy might give the turn—always humiliating to a certain degree—of a rejected overture, while the advantage of being close at hand, ready to seize those opportunities which cannot fail in some shape or other of presenting themselves when my arrival in the Archipelago shall be known, is too obvious to be overlooked, and too valuable to be thrown away.

Under the impression of these reasons, therefore, I have determined to proceed towards the straits as soon as the Sea-Horse shall arrive at Palermo.

Here it is proper for me to inform you that in my



letter to Sir Alexander Ball I had found it necessary to acquaint him that from the state of the crew of the Hyperion, and their total ignorance of the navigation of the Archipelago, my further progress to the Dardanelles might suffer considerable delay and even difficulty, if I were to remain on board that ship. I had made a similar representation to Lord Collingwood, and his Lordship was so good as to relieve me from my embarrassment as far as he could, and to write to Capt. Stewart to receive me on board the Sea-Horse. Capt. Stewart happening to be at Malta for the repair of his ship at the time of the arrival of my messenger, Sir Alexander Ball very readily made the arrangement for me which I wished, and I now only wait for Capt. Stewart to proceed towards the place of my destination.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Palermo, August 30. 1808.

SIR,

THE Sea-Horse is just arrived, and has brought me despatches from Malta confirming the accounts I had before received of the Revolution at Constantinople.

After a full consultation with Captain Stewart, and after well weighing over again all the reasons for and against my immediately going on, I have, I confess, found no cause to alter the determination I had come to when I wrote to you on the 17th instant. It is my intention, therefore, to proceed towards the Straits, and there to ascertain, under colour of

Captain Stewart's proposing an exchange of prisoners, whether, notwithstanding the recent revolution in the government, the Turks are still disposed to peace; and it is in this latter case only, proved unequivocally by their appointing a Minister to meet me, that I shall let it be known that I am on board the Sea-Horse.

Both here and at Malta measures are taken to encourage a belief which already has gained considerable ground, and which the supposed state of affairs between Austria and France renders a probable conjecture, namely, that I am going up the Adriatic.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

(*Separate. — By Mr. Barthold.*)

Palermo, August 30th, 1808.

SIR,

SINCE closing my despatch of this day's date, I have thought it most advisable, upon a thorough reconsideration of the whole subject, to send Mr. *Barthold* to England for fresh instructions with regard to the conduct I ought to pursue under the change of circumstances which has just occurred at Constantinople. As Mr. Barthold has been at Malta, and has had opportunities of conferring with Sir Alexander Ball, and with many well-informed persons resident there, also with the captain of the Turkish prize, I take the liberty of referring you to him for more ample details than it is now in my power to write.

I have the honour to be, &c.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Malta, September 9th, 1808.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that I arrived at this place on the 7th inst., and that it is my intention to proceed to Tenedos to-morrow.

By intelligence just received from Smyrna of the 27th ultimo, I am afraid that the difficulties in the way of opening a negociation with the Ottoman government, of which I was apprehensive when I wrote to you on the 17th ult., are likely to augment rather than diminish. It appears that the first step of the new Vizier has been to put all British property at Smyrna under sequestration, and likewise to stop, under severe penalties, all commercial intercourse between Smyrna and Malta.

Discouraging as this circumstance may be, added to the other events which have occurred, I by no means consider it as sufficiently so to alter my resolution of proceeding onwards, and of endeavouring to ascertain the temper of the present Ottoman government, and how far it may be disposed to adhere to its invitation of February last.

The means which I find at Malta of obtaining any knowledge on this important point, are unfortunately but scanty. There is not a man on this island who possesses one particle of authentic information respecting the internal state of Constantinople, the dispositions of the army, or of the public, or even of the causes of the late revolution. There is not a man who can tell me in what manner an intercourse can be opened with any of the leading persons, or who

are the leading persons in the present crisis. No intelligence reaches us except through the merchants, and on this it is very dangerous to depend. All I can collect is, that the author of the revolution, Mustapha Bairactar, exercises the power of the state; that hitherto he has conducted himself with impartiality in the executions he has ordered of the friends of the deposed Sultan; that two of our adherents, namely, the Captain Pacha and Chelebi Efendi \*, still survive, and even enjoy some share of credit with the new Vizier; and that the son of Ali Pacha still continues in the government of the Morea.

This is the sum of all I can collect to guide me in my first proceedings; and his Majesty's Government will see, I trust, that for the present I can determine on nothing except to proceed to Tenedos.

On mature consideration, I have not thought it expedient to address myself to Ali Pacha for his assistance in this business. Independently of the doubts which may always be entertained of his good faith, it is clear from his letter to Mr. Foresti that he is himself uncertain as to the footing on which he stands with the new Government. While this continues to be his situation, it appears to me that we should gain nothing towards peace, but that we might risk much on the score of jealousy, if by any ostensible act I should give the new Vizier reason to think that Ali Pacha was the medium through which Great Britain wished to treat with him.

The case, however, would be very different if Ali Pacha were the person through whom the Vizier should wish to treat with us. Not to lose the benefit

\* On my arrival at Constantinople, I found this person quite in the interest of France.

of his assistance, therefore, and with a view of obtaining, through his means, some insight into the intentions of the new Government, I have forwarded the two letters which were addressed to him by his messenger Seid Achmet and by Sidki Efendi\* from on board the Hyperion the 5th of July. These letters I inclosed in one from myself (of which I here send you a copy) to Captain Hervey of the Standard.

I inclose you also letters received from Constantinople and Smyrna, giving an account of some particulars which attended the late revolution.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in the preceding despatch.

*To Captain Hervey of H.M.S. Standard.*

(Secret.)

Malta, September 9. 1808.

SIR,

His Majesty having been graciously pleased to nominate me his Plenipotentiary for negotiating a peace with the Turkish Government, in consequence of their invitation of February last through the Reis Efendi, I have the honour of informing you that I arrived at Malta on the 7th instant, in my way to the Archipelago.

In passing the Bay of Biscay, I, on the 5th of July, fell in with H.M. sloop of war the Bittern, on board of which was Seid Achmet, a confidential agent of Ali Pacha. It happened that, at the same time, I had

\* Sidki Efendi was the Turkish chargé d'affaires in London, whom I was taking back to his country.

with me on board the Hyperion Sidki Efendi, the late Turkish chargé d'affaires at our Court, whom I was instructed by the Secretary of State for the Foreign Department to land at the first convenient port in the Ottoman dominions.

The two letters which I here inclose to you for Ali Pacha were written on board the Hyperion, the one by Seid Achmet, and the other by Sidki Efendi. It will be of essential public service that you immediately transmit them to Ali Pacha by a safe hand, and that in your communications with him you explain, and impress strongly on his mind, that the moment I learned that Seid Achmet was one of his confidential agents, and that the despatches, of which he was the bearer, were addressed by the Ottoman Government to their former chargé d'affaires, Sidki Efendi, I did not hesitate to send Sidki Efendi back to London, there to execute the instructions they contained: and I beg you to make Ali Pacha thoroughly sensible that by this step (which may expose me to his Majesty's displeasure for deviating so far from his commands) I wished to give a proof to the Turks of the sincere wish of his Majesty's Ministers for peace with them, as well as to testify personally to Ali Pacha my sense of the services he has rendered his Majesty's Government, of his good will towards the British nation, and of the value of his future assistance.

It appears to me, I confess, in the present distressing changes which have taken place at Constantinople, that Ali Pacha will be desirous of first seeing how he stands with the new Government before he undertakes anything towards the furtherance of objects which may be common to us both, but which might embroil him with those who at present have the ascendancy

at Constantinople. If peace, however, should be the wish of the new Government, Ali Pacha may be equally desirous of making himself the channel for opening the negociations. In either of these cases, it is evidently his interest to discover the intentions of the Divan. I take the liberty of recommending it to you to impress this consideration most forcibly on his mind; and, as soon as he shall have anything to communicate to me in return which may facilitate the object of my mission, you will have the goodness to take charge of it, and to forward it to me at Malta, under cover to his Excellency Sir Alexander Ball. It would also materially assist our common views, if Ali Pacha would at the same time send, through any of his ports in the Morea, or the Gulph of Salonica, a duplicate of such communication, addressed to me under cover to Captain Stewart of the Sea-Horse. The despatch will find Captain Stewart at Tenedos or in its neighbourhood.

For reasons which will readily occur to you, I do not intend that either Ali Pacha, or any of the members of the Turkish government, should know that I am actually on board the Sea-Horse, until I shall be previously convinced of their readiness to enter into negociation with me. You will have the goodness therefore to appear ignorant whether I am in the Archipelago, or at Malta, or in Sicily.

I take the liberty, Sir, of writing to you in this manner, and of entrusting the above-mentioned letters to your care, in preference to sending them by a special conveyance, from a thorough confidence in your zeal for the public service, and in the soundness of your judgment. The nature of this communication is, you must perceive, highly confidential, and it ap-

pears to me that I can commit the execution of what business may be connected with it to no better hands than yours.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. I. Eleven Inclosures. By the Imogene, Captain Stephens.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Barbieri Bay, Nov. 18. 1808.

SIR,

ALTHOUGH I arrived off Tenedos on the 26th of September, it has been totally impossible for me to make any progress in the execution of my mission until yesterday, when I had my conference with the plenipotentiary appointed by the Ottoman government to meet me.

Even now that progress has been so little that were it not for the state of affairs at Constantinople, where new scenes of blood and revolution are acting, and which renders it extremely doubtful to what period the conclusion of anything essential may be protracted, I should still have delayed writing until I could send you some more satisfactory account of my proceedings.

First, however, it will be necessary for me to mention the steps which I took in order to set the negociation on foot.

Having learned nothing at Malta that could be depended upon relative to the dispositions of the new government at Constantinople, the day before I came in sight of Tenedos, which was on the 23d of September, I despatched Mr. Morier in the Saracen gun brig to the Dardanelles, with a letter from Captain



Stewart, of which the inclosed (A) is a copy; and I instructed him to deliver it into the hands of the Capoudan Pacha, or if he should not be at the castles, to the Serasquier of the Dardanelles.

On the morning of the 28th, Mr. Morier had an interview with the Serasquier, Haiki Pacha, in which that officer informed him that he was himself authorised to negotiate and conclude a treaty of peace with any Plenipotentiary who should appear on the part of his Majesty. This assurance to Mr. Morier he confirmed the next day officially, in his answer to Captain Stewart, of which I also transmit a copy.

So direct an assurance from the Serasquier appeared sufficient to justify a formal notification on my part to the Turkish government of my arrival in the character of his Majesty's Plenipotentiary; but as the strong northerly winds prevented my setting sail for the Straits, I judged it would be as well to delay the communication until my intercourse with him could be regularly established, it being evident from his letter that we could proceed to no business until the return of his courier from Constantinople.

I thought it expedient, however, considering under what circumstances I came to the Dardanelles, and doubtful of the effect which might be produced on the new government by hostile demonstrations, while I was endeavouring to confirm as well as to ascertain their dispositions towards peace, to recommend to Captain Stewart to suffer the Turkish trading vessels to pass him unmolested, and also to send instructions to Milo, in order that any of his Majesty's vessels which might be coming to me with despatches might equally abstain from molesting the Turkish trade within the Archipelago.

Such also was the confidence of the Greek merchants in the continuance of the truce which they have hitherto experienced from the commanders of his Majesty's ships on this station, that the very appearance of the Serapis bearing a flag of truce, induced them to resume their commercial occupations as if peace had already been made: and I confess it appeared to me that it would be ill-timed as well as harsh to depart from this haven precisely at the moment when a servant of his Majesty was arrived in their seas charged with a pacific negotiation.

The readiness with which Captain Stewart complied with my recommendation will surprise no one who is acquainted with the disinterested character of that excellent officer and man.

This measure of indulgence was communicated the same day to the Serasquier, accompanied by a packet containing a variety of Spanish newspapers, the details of the victory obtained by General Castagnos over Dupont, the evacuation of Madrid by the French, and his Majesty's most gracious speech on closing the session of parliament.

It was not until the evening of the 10th of October that I could get up to Cape Janissary, and the next day I sent Mr. Stratford Canning on shore with the despatches of which I have the honour to inclose you copies (C, D, E, F), one addressed to the Serasquier, and three to the Reis Efendi.

Of these, as they will speak for themselves, it will be needless to trouble you with any account, except with regard to my motive for adding the letter marked E to the official notification of my arrival.

Perceiving plainly by the first communications with the Serasquier that the invitation of last February

would count for very little in our future proceedings, and that our business would be to begin *de novo*, I thought it better that the Divan should have the whole question before them at once; and thus that they, on their parts, should be enabled to come to a quick decision as to the final result, and I, on mine, have some means of finding out whether they were in earnest or not. To get rid of the preliminary difficulties which had been started in the former discussion with Sir A. Paget, I had in my letter to the Reis Efendi marked D, pointed to the resumption of the negociation where it had terminated last October, and there remaining after this nothing real to combat, except their terror of France, a fair exposition of the state of Europe, such as should be calculated to reduce that terror within the bounds of reason, seemed to me to be my shortest and my surest road to success.

It was likewise to be presumed that the Ottoman Government had been kept in ignorance with regard to the affairs of Spain; and this induced me to add to my letter marked F to the Reis Efendi, a short account of the late transactions in that country which Mr. Stratford Canning had drawn up.

I was desirous also to lay a foundation to be consulted in the negotiations going on between the Porte and Russia; as independent of the advantages which may result from it in the view pointed out in my instructions, it will be material that on the re-establishment of peace between those powers, Russia should not be permitted to assume with regard to Great Britain that tone of superiority which she is known to have adopted at Constantinople towards the embassies of all other nations.

Something too in the nature of admonition (avoid-

ing all expressions of menace) appeared expedient, in order to obviate any objections they might make on other grounds to treating with me, and to show them that in attempting, under frivolous pretences, to gain time, they might lose what was of more value.

The next day, October 12th, I received the inclosed answer (G) from the Serasquier.

Whether my appearance at the Dardanelles, in consequence of an invitation which, although not revoked, the new Government has not appeared very anxious to renew, produced debates and divisions in the Divan, as to their manner of proceeding, or whether it be merely owing to the habitual procrastination of the Turkish character, I received no answer from the Reis Efendi, until the 29th of October. I have the honour to inclose you a literal translation of it by Mr. Pisani, and for the present shall only observe that in the first letters I may have occasion to write to the Reis Efendi, I shall not fail to notice that part of it in which he refers to the conduct of Mr. Arbuthnot.

About this time I was informed that Haiki Pacha had been suddenly deprived of his government at the Dardanelles and transferred to Candia. His full powers to treat with me are, of course, annulled.

Nothing passed from the day on which I received the above letter until the 2d of November, when Vaahid Efendi, the Plenipotentiary of the Ottoman government, sent me the inclosed notification of his arrival at the Asiatic castle.

✓ Vaahid Efendi is the person who was appointed to be Minister at Paris in the year 1806; but Bonaparte being on the Vistula when he arrived at Vienna, he turned off from his road and proceeded first to the French head-quarters at Warsaw. Of this circum-

stance, also of his return from Paris through Vienna, in his way home, in order to lay before the Divan the discovery he had made of the treachery of France in the treaty of Tillsitt, I had the honour of informing you last year, in my despatch of the 21st of November, from Vienna.

In my answer annexed, I did not think proper to notice the change of phrase respecting the description of his powers, which Vaahid Efendi's letter exhibits, when compared with that of Haiki Pacha, and even with that of the Reis Efendi, although this last is far from satisfactory. This it was my intention to reserve until I should see him, as, all things considered, I did not think it prudent to start objections, the discussion of which, in the present stage, might retard our interview.

The next day, November 3d, I had the satisfaction to find that both the demands mentioned in the above letter had been attended to. Mr. Pisani was sent on board the Sea-Horse, authorised to learn my wishes, and to fix with me on a convenient place for the conferences. I made it a point that the frigate should be admitted within the castles of the Dardanelles. She is accordingly anchored in Barbieri Bay, near the castle of Chanacalis (the ancient Abydos), and a country house, about a mile from the ship's station, has been prepared for my reception.

Violent contrary winds prevented our reaching this anchorage until the 11th. Various other delays, partly arising from the celebration of the Ramazan by the Turks, and partly from Mr. Pisani's illness, prevented my entering upon business with the Turkish Plenipotentiary until yesterday. The illness of Mr. Pisani began the very evening of the day on which he

came on board the Sea-Horse, and has been of such a nature as to prevent his even translating my full powers into Turkish, or assisting in the verification of those of the Turkish Plenipotentiary. This point is much too important for me to trust to the interpreter of that Minister.

Mr. Pisani's situation being fully known to Vaahid Efendi, I was rather surprised at receiving from him yesterday morning an invitation to a conference, at which he knew that no business could be transacted. It was delivered to me at nine o'clock, and the hour appointed for our meeting was one.

A private note from Mr. Pisani informed me at the same instant that a Tartar had arrived in the middle of the preceding night, with important despatches from Constantinople, which were kept profoundly secret.

Rumours of tumults in that city had reached me before this, and particularly from the captain of a merchant vessel, who came on board the Sea-Horse, after a passage from Constantinople of eighteen hours.

Having frequently complained of delay, I could not well refuse Vaahid Efendi's invitation, particularly as it was accompanied by professions of the most earnest desire to accelerate the conclusion of the treaty, in order to enable me to go up to Constantinople. The circumstances which I have mentioned, however, were sufficient to put me upon my guard, and will account (I hope to the satisfaction of his Majesty's Government) for my having gone no further into the business than what I have now the honour to relate.

After ascertaining that he had full powers to conclude a treaty of peace, and that he now only waited

until Mr. Pisani should have translated mine, I told him that it appeared to me that the treaty could be settled in one conference, provided the Porte were disposed to renew its connections with us on the footing generally speaking, on which they had been left by Mr. Arbuthnot. To this he assented without hesitation.

I then said, that if he pleased I would draw up some articles to this effect, together with the usual articles on terminating a state of war, and produce them at our next conference, at which time I proposed that we should verify our respective full powers. To this he assented with equal readiness.

Our next meeting was fixed for Monday the 21st inst. at the particular request of Vaahid Efendi, who wished to have two days clear after the Ramazan, which ends this day.

I should of course wish to defer sending off my despatches until the result of this meeting on Monday, were I not very much inclined to think, from the present state of affairs at Constantinople, that either it will not take place, or that, if it should, nothing will be then concluded. Indeed, until the conflict of the two parties is over, the Turkish Plenipotentiary could hardly venture to sign a treaty with me (although in perfect conformity with his instructions), the effect of which, according to the menaces of the French embassy, would be an immediate war with France.

Of the proceedings of the French since my arrival at the Dardanelles, I have obtained sufficient information to be assured that no exertion is omitted on their parts to render the negotiation unsuccessful. What they may be able to effect if the Government

should be overturned, is more than I can venture to say, but the present Government is too far committed to retreat. It has offended France beyond forgiveness by sending a Minister to meet and negotiate with me on principles which imply the probability of a common European interest, after having thoroughly weighed and deliberated upon the matters contained in my letter marked E to the Reis Efendi.

Every advantage has been taken of the glorious struggle made by the Spaniards, and of the successes of His Majesty's arms in Portugal ; but my accounts from thence come down no later than the first days in September. The Turkish Government knew nothing certain about them until my arrival.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. I inclose a paper containing the particulars of the report received this morning from Constantinople.

Inclosure marked A in Mr. Adair's No. I.

*Captain Stewart to the Captain Pacha.*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Malta, Sept. 10. 1808.

SIR,

IN the letter which I had the honour to write to your Excellency from Miconi after the capture of the Badere Zaffere, I informed you that though, from the nature of my orders, I had been under the necessity of attacking the Turkish ships of war, still I did not conceive, after all that had passed, that it would make the smallest difference in the sentiments of the



British Government relative to the general question of peace or war. It however became necessary that I should proceed immediately to Malta to meet the negociator, whom I knew to be on his way from England, in consequence of the letter addressed by the Reis Efendi to me, and I am happy to say that he is still ready immediately to proceed to the adjustment of all differences, having full powers to that effect. I have seen him and his powers, and am authorised to say that the only thing which prevents his immediately approaching the Dardanelles, is his desire first to be assured that notwithstanding the late changes, the sentiments of the Ottoman Government remain unchanged, that a plenipotentiary on their part is ready to meet him in order to settle a treaty of peace, and that a convenient place has been fixed upon for the negociation.

I send this by a confidential person who has instructions to receive your Excellency's answer; and I may venture to add that upon a clear and satisfactory assurance from your Excellency that the Ottoman Government is still desirous of peace, and that either Haiki Pacha, or any other minister, is authorised to conclude it, the arrival of a British negociator at the Dardanelles will not long be delayed. Lord Collingwood still abstains from making more than demonstration of war, that there may not appear anything like menace in the business.

I have the honour to be, &c.

JOHN STEWART, Capt.

Inclosure marked C in Mr. Adair's No. I.

*Mr. Adair to Haiki Pacha.*

Du Vaisseau de Sa Majesté le Sea-Horse,  
au Cap Janissaire, ce 11 Oct. 1808.

MONSIEUR,

VOTRE Excellence ayant fait connoître au Capitaine Stewart, dans sa lettre du 29th Septembre, qu'elle étoit " autorisée de la part de la Sublime Porte et chargée des instructions nécessaires à l'effet de négocier et conclure un traité de paix avec quelconque Ministre de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne," je m'empresse de notifier à votre Excellence mon arrivée aux Dardanelles, revêtu des pleins pouvoirs de Sa Majesté pour négocier et conclure de sa part un traité de paix entre Elle et la Sublime Porte.

J'ai l'honneur en même tems d'envoyer à votre Excellence le paquet ci-inclus pour S. E. le Reis Efendi, et de la prier de l'expédier à son adresse le plus-tôt possible.

Votre Excellence me permettra de lui témoigner toute la satisfaction que j'aurai à me trouver en relation avec Elle dans cette occasion importante, et je la prie d'agréer l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée.

Inclosure marked D in Mr. Adair's No. I.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

Du Vaisseau de S.M. le Sea-Horse, au Cap  
Janissaire, ce 11 Oct. 1808.

MONSIEUR,

LE gouvernement de la Sublime Porte ayant par la voie de S. E. le Reis Efendi dans sa lettre en date

du mois de Février, et adressée par ce ministre au Capitaine Stewart commandant l'escadre Britannique dans l'Archipel, manifesté son désir de faire la paix avec Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne, et ayant notifié en même tems que S. E. Mehemed Haiki Pacha étoit revêtu de pleins pouvoirs pour négocier et conclure un traité à cet effet, je m'empresse d'annoncer à votre Excellence mon arrivée au Cap Janissaire revêtu du caractère de plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté Britannique pour négocier et conclure un traité de paix entre Elle et la Sublime Porte.

Dans cette démarche de Sa Majesté, sitôt après la rupture d'une négociation précédente, la Sublime Porte verra une nouvelle preuve des dispositions amicales que Sa Majesté n'a cessé de conserver envers Elle.

Je ne doute point que la Sublime Porte, animée des mêmes sentimens qu'Elle a montrés d'une manière si claire et si positive au mois de Février, n'ordonne la reprise immédiate des négociations là où elles finirent au mois d'Octobre dernier ; ni qu'Elle ne s'empresse de terminer une guerre sans objet dont la durée ne peut être avantageuse qu'aux ennemis reconnus des deux empires.

Aussitôt qu'un endroit convenable sera désigné pour la tenc des conférences, je m'y rendrai sans délai.

Je prie V. E. d'agréer les assurances de ma considération très distinguée.

Inclosure marked E in Mr. Adair's No. I.

*The same to the same.*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, off Cape Janissary,  
October 11th, 1808.

SIR,

To the official notification which I have the honour to make to Y. E. of my arrival at this place, I have thought it right to add this frank and confidential letter, as it strikes me that in laying before Y. E. some circumstances in the present situation of Europe, of which you may not have been exactly informed, however extensive your knowledge and your penetration are known to be, your Excellency will discover many urgent motives for inducing your Court to put an end to the strange and monstrous situation in which our two countries stand towards each other.

✓ I call it strange and monstrous, because not only this is the first time (as I believe) that Great Britain and the Sublime Porte were ever in a state of hostility towards each other, but because the Sublime Porte, originally involved in a war with Russia, in which Great Britain participated only as the ally of that Power, still continues at war both with Great Britain and Russia; while those Powers themselves, so far from having any object in common which can affect the Ottoman Empire, are actually at war with each other.

If the government of the Sublime Porte ever seriously believed that it owed any part of its safety to its refusing to make peace with Great Britain, or if it can now believe that by signing a treaty with me it would provoke France to commence hostilities, a

very slight consideration of the true state of affairs will demonstrate how greatly it is deceived.

The Ottoman Government well knows the nature of the engagements entered into between France and Russia at the peace of Tillsitt. It cannot be ignorant that through the prevalence of the influence of France, an eventual partition of European Turkey was then determined upon. The double and perfidious part acted by Bonaparte upon that occasion has long been manifest. An article in the ostensible treaty stipulated for the evacuation of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russian troops. This stipulation he boasted to the Sublime Porte that he had dictated to Russia in his quality of ally and protector of the integrity of the Ottoman empire. But the truth could not long be disguised. The secret of the engagements made at Tillsitt was communicated to your Government, and the Sublime Porte was then enabled to see that this article, which Bonaparte pretended to have extorted with so much difficulty from Russia, instead of being a stipulation to prevent the dismemberment of your provinces, was, in fact, an arrangement to regulate the manner of taking possession of them. So far from its evincing any regard for the safety of the Ottoman Empire, it was a proof of nothing more than his distrust of his new confederate Russia, whom he would not suffer to remain in possession of the provinces allotted to her in the plan of partition before he should be in a condition to seize upon those which he had allotted to himself.—Nor was this all;—the article above-named expressed that these provinces should be evacuated by both parties until the signature of your peace with Russia. Of this peace, the better to cover his designs, he procured himself to be

named the mediator, and soon after artfully obtained the removal of the negotiations for it to Paris. Thus, by rendering himself master of the conferences, he had it in his power either to accelerate or retard the treaty, just as it might suit his purpose. The event has proved that his sole object was to amuse both the Ottoman and the Russian cabinets under pretence of settling a peace, concerning which he has never once seriously occupied himself since he undertook to be the mediator of it.

These facts alone would amply prove his designs with regard to Turkey ; but fortunately for the good of the world, and for the Ottoman Empire in particular, Europe has never yet been in such a state of absolute subjection to his will as to afford him the opportunity of carrying them into execution.

This want of opportunity has arisen principally from two causes ; first, the dissatisfaction expressed by Russia in consequence of his non-execution of several other important articles of the Peace of Tillsitt, and secondly, the dangerous war in which he has involved himself with the Spanish nation.

That the Emperor of Russia, after he had signed the Treaty of Tillsitt, executed his part of it with punctuality, cannot (unhappily for Europe) be denied. He caused his armies to withdraw into the interior of his dominions ; he put France in possession of Corfu and the whole of the Republic of the Seven Islands ; and he renounced all pretence of interfering as a protecting power in the affairs of Germany, Italy, or the rest of Europe. But the ruler of France on his side has executed no part of the treaty to which he had bound himself. His armies continue to threaten the Russian frontiers on the side of

Poland. In defiance of the most positive stipulations they still occupy Silesia and the greater part of the Prussian territories; and the Prussian monarch continues an exile from his capital, while his kingdom is delivered up to lawless extortion, and every species of military violence. •

It cannot be supposed that the Emperor of Russia could remain an unconcerned spectator of these manifest infractions of the Treaty of Tilsitt; still less that he should assist France in the execution of such of its arrangements as are favourable to that power at a moment when every article favourable to Russia is either procrastinated or wholly set aside.

But independently of these difficulties, it has pleased Providence, which often delights in confounding tyrants, and in rendering them the instruments of their own punishment, to raise up in the hearts of the people of Spain that generous and courageous spirit which, when exerted in its own defence, never fails to save a nation from an invading foreign enemy, however formidable that enemy may have rendered himself by the dexterity of his intrigues, or the number and discipline of his armies.

In vain had the Spanish nation, the faithful ally of France during so many years, and which had at all times sacrificed itself for her benefit with a fidelity of which history records few examples, trusted to the faith of treaties and to the honour of the ruler of France. In vain had fortune heaped her choicest gifts upon the head of that ambitious man, and rendered him master of so many kingdoms. The unsuspecting confidence of the Spaniards tempted him but the more to invade their territory. The possession of the finest part of Europe formed in his breast but

an additional motive to seize upon what remained of it. Comparing on this occasion the danger of the enterprize with the advantage of the acquisition, it is evident that reason as well as honour, that wisdom as well as justice, would have inclined him to the side of moderation. But man cannot avoid his fate ! Infatuated by his past successes, and believing himself the master of futurity, he has precipitated himself into a detestable and disastrous war, of which the first events, already alarming to his fortunes, are, perhaps, but the forerunners of the moment marked out by Heaven as the destined end of his triumphs and of his crimes.

Your Excellency already knows that Bonaparte has attempted to seize on the monarchy of Spain, and to place the crown of that kingdom upon the head of one of his brothers.

In pursuance of a plan long formed to this effect, he introduced by degrees a large army into the heart of Spain. Under his usual pretence of friendship, he obtained possession of many of their strong places, together with the persons of the royal family, and most of the Spanish nobles, whom he detains in France, either as prisoners or as hostages.

These atrocious proceedings, followed soon after by the entrance of the usurper into Spain at the head of a numerous army, have driven the Spanish people to take up arms in their defence, and to address themselves to all the nations of Europe for protection and succour. His Majesty has been the first to listen to their just appeal ; he has made peace with the Spanish nation ; he has joined his arms to theirs — God has prospered their righteous cause. The Spanish armies have everywhere defeated those of France ; they have



forced their bravest generals and most disciplined troops to surrender; and finally, have driven the usurper Joseph, brother of Napoleon Bonaparte, with shame and disgrace from the city of Madrid.

It is in these important events rather than in any deference towards the Sublime Porte, that your Excellency will discover the real motive which induces Bonaparte to abstain for the present from any act of hostility against the Turkish provinces. With regard to his real dispositions, they are as clear as day: they have been manifested by the propositions which at all times he has made to Russia (but which that Power constantly rejected during her connection with Great Britain) for the partition of your provinces;—they have been manifested by his secret engagements at Tilsitt, and by his artful delays in concluding the peace between the Sublime Porte and Russia, of which he undertook to be the mediator.

Hence it follows that the objections to the re-establishment of our mutual relations, on the footing on which they stood before the departure of Mr. Arbuthnot from Constantinople, can have no foundation in reason; since whatever may be your course, the views of Bonaparte remain ever the same with regard to the Sublime Porte, and the execution of them, as far as it depends upon him, will neither be accelerated nor retarded one day.

On the other hand, the sacrifices which your Government would find itself obliged to make if unfortunately our negotiations should not terminate in the restoration of peace between us, are well worthy its most serious attention and consideration. If the British power has not hitherto been exerted against the dependencies of the Ottoman Empire, nor against

its capital, in any but the mildest manner, your Excellency will without difficulty perceive that the motive for this forbearance has been nothing but an extreme reluctance on the part of the King, my master, to have recourse to the extremities of war against a nation of whose friendship he is desirous, in whose preservation he feels an interest, and whose resources consequently he would be grieved to be under a necessity of impairing.

His Majesty would, on the contrary, much rather assist in augmenting and in consolidating those resources, especially when he considers the possibility (although he hopes it may be a distant one) of your being obliged to exert them against the same enemy, against which he is himself contending. He would see with satisfaction tranquillity and union restored in the interior of the Ottoman dominions. He would be well pleased that complete success should attend those measures of reform, which your government is engaged in carrying through, and which appear calculated so essentially to contribute to the stability of the Ottoman empire. But your Excellency is too well experienced in affairs, not to know that neither these nor any plans which are formed with a view to the future, and intended for your permanent advantage, can be carried into effect, so long as the commerce and revenues of your state lie, in a manner, at the mercy of a foreign enemy. Peace with your neighbours is undoubtedly necessary to give you the full effect of the good which you are attempting; and your Excellency knows that however remote may be the seat of our respective empires, England is your neighbour by sea, as by the immensity of her naval power, and by the unrivalled valour of her seamen which makes the ocean her own,

she is become the neighbour of every state whose dominions are situated on its borders.

Your Excellency must also be aware that even more than in its resources and in its commerce, the strength of an empire consists in the due obedience of its subjects. You cannot be ignorant how much it is in the power of Great Britain to cut off all intercourse between the seat of the Ottoman empire and its most valuable islands, and thus to raise and to foment a spirit of discontent in them, which must infallibly end in their total separation from the dominions of the Sublime Porte.

These considerations I have no doubt will have struck the penetrating mind of your Excellency, and that of the other enlightened members of the Ottoman government.

I need scarcely point out to your Excellency another motive for your seizing, without delay, the present moment to make peace with his Majesty, arising from the state of the pending negotiations between the Sublime Porte and Russia. There can be no doubt that when that Power shall see that you are no longer embarrassed by a war with Great Britain, she will be convinced that the time is not yet come for her to advance any new or extravagant pretensions, which may have been suggested to her by her intercourse with France.

Nor can it escape the Ottoman government, that in making peace with England at this moment, she will make it with a Power unfettered by any engagement either with Russia or with any other considerable continental state. But your Excellency has too much sagacity not to see that this is a mere accidental effect of the new and extraordinary situation of Europe, and

that before long the continental Powers, awakened by the continued aggressions of France to a sense of their immediate safety, must have recourse to Great Britain as to that Power whose aid never has been asked in vain, to defend the cause of the oppressed. Such a renewal of intercourse must lead to a renewal of our connections with the continent, nearly in their ancient form, and as they subsisted before that system of division and distraction which has produced the calamities of the world.

The government of the Sublime Porte is too wise therefore not to profit by this favourable opportunity of making peace with his Majesty. To invite your Excellency to join your endeavours to mine, in this great work, is the object of this confidential address, in which I have opened my whole mind to you without reserve. I have not hesitated to place the truth before your Excellency, in the clearest light. It is best always to be sincere even with our enemies; but it is absolutely necessary to be so with our friends. Such I am willing to persuade myself are our two nations in effect, having every possible motive to unite, and not one to divide them.

I request your Excellency to accept the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

Inclosure marked H in Mr. Adair's No. I.

*The Reis Effendi to Mr. Adair.*

HIS EXCELLENCY, our most distinguished, most noble, and most judicious friend —

After fulfilling the offices of esteem and friendship, it is sincerely notified to you as follows: —

The despatches, full of sincerity, which have been sent this time to our friendly port, have been received, and we purely understood the remarks, observations, and other details, which have been delineated by your pen.

As it is expressed and acknowledged on your Excellency's friendly part, no acts of enmity have ever passed between the Sublime Porte and the Court of England; and it is the perfect intention and effort of the Ottoman Empire, that nothing contrary (to the former amity) does happen, although the improper and causeless conduct of the former ambassador, resident at Constantinople, under an idea of acting in concert with Russia, has produced an appearance of coolness. That posture not being what either side seeks for or desires, and the mutual inclination and wish being with a sincere intention and pure disposition to see amity and sincerity restored, the moment the Sublime Porte knew of your Excellency's arrival at the Dardanelles, charged with this salutary work, H. E. the most happy Sejid Vaadid Efendi, a personage of the ministerial line, actual deputy secretary in the Ottoman treasury, and invested with the rank of "*Nichangy*,"\* has also been appointed and vested with powers upon her part.

Exclusive of the above-said Efendi's being a personage of much consideration, well-informed,—knowing how to distinguish between friends, and endowed with the most upright principles, he being entrusted with the answers to the matters contained in Y. E.

\* Drawer of the Grand Signor's Cypher, being a charge near that of Pacha in point of rank.

friendly despatches, it would be but an useless repetition to insert a detail of them in this sincere letter.

When, therefore, under the favour of Providence, Y. E. shall have had a meeting and conference with him, you will then become acquainted with the good intentions of the Ottoman Empire, and it is evident that the salutary work in point will prove successful, and will come to a conclusion in all its details and appurtenances.

Although the above Efendi is actually set out, yet, being obliged on account of the advanced season to travel by land, that Y. E. may know of this beforehand, we hasten to send off this friendly despatch by anticipation.

Upon his arrival at the Dardanelles, it is hoped for and expected from Y. E. pacific exertions, that you will follow up this friendly work by such a proper method as may (reference being made to the state of things and the exigence of circumstances with regard to the Porte) lead to the advantage of either side, and put a stop to inconvenience and mischief.

Your friend,

SEJID MEHEMMED SAYD GALIB REIS EFENDI.

No date. Received Oct. 29. 1808.

Inclosure marked I in Mr. Adair's No. I.

*Vaahid Efendi to Mr. Adair.*

Au Chateau d'Asie des Dardanelles,  
le 1<sup>er</sup> Nov. 1808.

MONSIEUR,

LA Sublime Porte ayant appris l'arrivée de V. E. dans nos parages chargée de pleins pouvoirs de la part

du Gouvernement Britannique à l'effet de traiter de l'objet salulaire de la paix, je m'empresse de notifier à V. E. mon arrivée aux Dardanelles autorisé par la Sublime Porte avec pleins pouvoirs afin d'entrer en relation et conférence avec Elle à ce sujet.

J'ai la satisfaction aussi de lui annoncer que M. Pisani le Dragoman vient de se rendre ce jour-ci sur ces lieux arrivé de Kutaha.

Inclosure marked K in Mr. Adair's No. I.

*Mr. Adair to Vaahid Efendi.*

Du Vaisseau de S.M. le Sea-Horse,  
ce 2 Nov. 1808.

MONSIEUR,

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser à V. E. la réception de la lettre qu'Elle m'a écrite annonçant son heureuse arrivée au Château de Chanacalis.

Tout en félicitant V. E. de sa nomination à un poste si honorable et si important que celui de pacificateur, j'ai à remarquer que dans sa lettre Elle n'a désigné aucun lieu pour la tenue de nos conférences.

J'espère que V. E. donnera ses ordres afin qu'un lieu convenable sous tous les rapports soit assigné à cet effet, les vaisseaux de S.M. se trouvant exposés dans cette rade aux tempêtes continuelles dont la mer est agitée dans cette saison.

Je prie aussi V. E. de donner les ordres nécessaires pour que M. Pisani puisse se rendre le plus-tôt possible à bord de mon vaisseau.

J'ai l'honneur d'assurer V. E. de ma considération très distinguée.

No. II. One Inclosure.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri, Nov. 22. 1808.

SIR,

NOTWITHSTANDING the disturbances which were raging with the utmost violence at Constantinople, my conference with Vaahid Efendi, which in my last despatch I mentioned to have been fixed for the 21st, took place according to appointment.

The first point to be settled was the verification and exchange of our respective full powers.

To those of Vaahid Efendi I had nothing to object. To mine he took exception on the ground of my being commissioned to treat for a peace between his Majesty and Sultan Mustapha, instead of Sultan Mahmoud; I need not trouble you with a detail of my answers to this objection. They were such as will obviously suggest themselves. I made him comprehend indeed that, if his reasoning was good, all treaties between states must necessarily be annulled on the demise of either of the contracting Sovereigns; and again, that it lay rather with me to object to treating with him, than for him to object to treating with me; but after a full hour's discussion he still adhered to his objection, with this curious distinction — that it was valid as far as it regarded the exchange of our full powers, although not valid as far as it regarded my competency to conclude a peace.

Our respective commissions were of course not exchanged, and, indeed, in the disturbed state in which I knew Constantinople to be, and doubtful as I was whether, at the time I was arguing this point, Sultan



Mustapha might not again be on the throne, I did not press the exchange so strongly as I should have done under other circumstances.

And here our conference might have ended, and possibly the whole negotiation, had not Vaahid Efendi most earnestly requested me to proceed to the discussion of the articles of the *Projet*, which, as we had agreed at our first meeting, I was to prepare for the business of the day.

After protesting in the strongest manner against the validity of his objection to my full powers, and putting in my claim to call for the exchange of them with his, in any stage whatsoever of the negotiation, — after remarking to him, too, that by consenting to discuss and conclude, he in fact gave up the whole substance of his argument, I consented to his proposal. It appeared to me that, by so doing, the advantage would be wholly on our side should the negotiation break off. By producing my *Projet* of a treaty, I made manifest his Majesty's extreme moderation; and although this be a point too well known to require proof, I did not deem the manifestation of it superfluous on the present occasion, as to my knowledge the French had been most active in their endeavours to make it be believed by the Ottoman Government that his Majesty had demands to make incompatible with their interests or with their honour to grant.

Another reason which induced me to bring forward my terms arose from the distinct avowal of the Reis Efendi in his letter to me "that no cause of war existed between the two Powers." Nothing after this would be wanting to put the Ottoman Government completely in the wrong according to its own

express acknowledgment, should they reject the treaty which I was about to offer them on a ground so frivolous as that which I have stated.

After recapitulating, therefore, to Vaahid Efendi some points which I had pressed upon his attention at our first interview, such as, that I came to the Dardanelles on the express invitation, again and again renewed, of the Ottoman Government—that the negotiation being to be resumed where it had been broken off last year, the points on which it had broken off must be considered as conceded by the circumstance of that invitation, and that if there were any articles to discuss, it was rather for him than for me to prepare them, I said, that in order to bring the business to a point at once, I had reduced all I had to propose to the articles I held in my hand, by which I would abide, provided he had no demands to make on his part.

He answered that he should have something to propose, but that he was not then ready with it.

The nature of this whole question is so extremely simple, and so very different from that of negotiations between Powers, where, as under the ancient European system, a variety of opposite claims and complicated interests are to be arranged, that I thought it needless to delay the discussion of the *Projet* by pressing at that moment any claim for a communication of the nature of the terms to which he alluded; more especially as I was fully prepared to meet any demand he might have to make. I went on, therefore, under the reservation already mentioned, and delivered in the inclosed *Projet* which was translated and discussed article by article.

The first difficulty he made was with respect to

the clause concerning the ambassadors. He objected to it as unnecessary, their privileges and equality being provided for by the capitulations which by the preceding article were to be re-established.

In answer to this I observed that the capitulations had been virtually departed from in the instance of General Sebastiani's reception; that Mr. Arbuthnot, having protested against the extraordinary honours paid to that ambassador, and his conduct in so doing having been approved by his Majesty, some public satisfaction was necessary; that I came to re-establish peace, and not a system of complaints and protests to which there would be no end.

We discussed this much at length without coming to any conclusion.

The rest of the clauses of this article had been made out with a view of providing some remedy for those deviations from the true meaning of the capitulations which I had observed in the late correspondence of Mr. Arbuthnot. Of these the question of protections seemed to form the most material part; but I was ignorant until my arrival here what scandalous abuses had been practised on the subject of protections by the ambassadors of some of the continental Powers. Vaahid Efendi explained them to me, and added the peremptory determination of the Porte to put an end to them altogether. I said that I was far from contending for the restoration of any abuses which the Porte had thought proper to suppress, and only required on the subject of protections that the British ambassadors should have an equal right with the ambassadors of any other nation; at the same time, I could not possibly give up the right of granting protections to

dragomans, at least to such as were so *bonâ fide*. I proposed, therefore, to limit this clause to such dragomans as should be employed by our consuls for the purpose of carrying on their commerce. This he seemed disposed to agree to, provided the dragomans should not exercise commerce themselves; a proposition to which the local information I had received upon this subject rendered it impossible for me to consent.

It was agreed that the tariff should be restored; but he objected to the stipulation for the execution of it throughout the whole extent of the Ottoman dominions. He contended that this was unnecessary in most places, and where not unnecessary that it was impracticable.

The last clause he objected to, as conveying a reflection on the administration of justice in their courts. I agreed, therefore, to withdraw it.

Having gone through this part of the subject, and discussed many other points needless to trouble you with, I then requested Vaahid Efendi, if the articles he had to propose on his part were not regularly reduced into form, to acquaint me generally with their object. He said that he wished me, against our next meeting, to consider the question of granting the Porte assistance against Russia.

I replied that I was at that moment as fully prepared to give him an answer on this point as I should be at any other time.

He then said that the wars in which the Porte found herself involved against Great Britain and Russia being both brought on at the same time, and on a ground common to both those Powers, and the Porte being extremely distressed by Russia, she was

desirous — first, that the peace between the two Powers should be made at the same time also ; and secondly, that in order to bring this about speedily, Great Britain should come forward to the assistance of the Porte. And he founded this claim on the pretence that Russia never would have commenced hostilities had she not been sure of support from Great Britain.

Desirous on every possible account to avoid such a discussion as this statement, accompanied by the demand of assistance (which evidently was meant to be pecuniary), was calculated to provoke, I replied that into the justice of the war commenced by Russia, or into the degree in which Great Britain was bound by her alliance with Russia to support her representations for the restoration of the treaties, I would not enter. It was a question on which neither of us would probably convince the other, and on which, if we should, no argument could be grounded for assistance in the present stage of our negotiations. That the only ground on which assistance could be granted was in a case of alliance ; but that peace must precede alliance. With regard to their peace with Russia, it could not be proposed to me to consent that ours should be deferred until Russia, who had put herself totally into the hands of France, should be ready to sign it ; nor could I well understand why the Porte should think it better to have two wars than one. The rupture between Great Britain and Russia appeared to afford every facility that could be desired to a peace between Great Britain and the Porte, as each of these Powers would thus have its hands free to attack Russia with better effect. This was surely the most natural way of bringing Russia

to terms. That nothing would please me more than to become the mediator of their peace with Russia, if that Power would make any opening towards it of which, consistently with my duty, I could avail myself; but that neither into this, nor into any other views for their benefit could I enter with any effect until after the signature of the Treaty of Peace.

Here it seemed to me best to leave the subject. Our next conference is fixed for the 26th inst., when Vaahid Efendi is to produce his propositions in the shape of a *Contre-Projet*.

I am sorry not to have been able to make greater progress in the negociation; but from the state of the capital, and the precarious situation of Mustapha Bairactar who is disposed in our favour, I hardly expected to have advanced even so far.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in Mr. Adair's No. II.

## PROJET.

Au nom de Dieu tout puissant :

Les circonstances qui ont produit la rupture entre la Grand Bretagne et la Sublime Porte Ottomane, ayant cessé d'exister, Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et Sa Majesté Impériale Sultan Mahmoud II., le très magnifique et très puissant Empereur Ottoman, animés du désir sincère et mutuel de rétablir la bonne intelligence, et les anciennes relations de paix et d'amitié entre leurs empires respectifs, ont nommé les Soussignés, savoir

le Roi de la Grand Bretagne de sa part  
et Sa Majesté Impériale de sa part, le très  
excellent leurs Plénipotentiaires,  
à l'effet de négocier et de conclure définitivement un  
traité de paix sur des conditions justes et équitables ;  
lesquels, après avoir réciproquement vérifié et échangé  
leurs pleins pouvoirs trouvés en bonne et due forme,  
sont convenus des Articles suivans : —

*Article I.*

Du moment de la signature du traité les hostilités  
entres les sujets de Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande  
Bretagne et les sujets de la Sublime Porte cesseront  
par terre et par mer. Les prisonniers de part et  
d'autre seront mis en liberté.

*Article II.*

Il y aura oubli et amnestie générale pour tout ce  
qui aurait été fait avant et après le commencement  
de la guerre qui vient d'être terminée.

*Article III.*

Les propriétés des sujets Britanniques qui auront  
été mis en séquestre par ordre du gouvernement de  
la Sublime Porte seront rendues aux propriétaires  
sans delai et sans aucune diminution quelconque.

*Article IV.*

Les capitulations et en général toutes les stipula-  
tions et conventions relativement au commerce qui  
subsistoient entre la Grande Bretagne et la Sublime

Porte jusqu'au moment de la rupture seront rétablies en état et forme tel que si cette rupture n'eût jamais existé.

*Article V.*

L'acte de concession plus particulièrement émané de la Sublime Porte en faveur des vaisseaux marchands Britanniques de naviguer dans la Mer Noire, sera remis en pleine vigueur et exécution; et cette navigation sera ouverte aux vaisseaux marchands Britanniques du jour de la signature du présent Traité.

*Article VI.*

La Paix et les anciennes relations d'amitié étant heureusement renouvelées entre les deux empires afin d'en mieux resserrer les liens, et d'obvier autant qu'il dépendrait de la prévoyance humaine, à tout sujet de mésintelligence future, il est convenu de la part de la Sublime Porte : —

1°. Que les ambassadeurs et ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique jouiront derechef de tous les droits et privilèges, sans exception quelconque, qu'ils possédoient en aucun tems, et que possèdent actuellement les ambassadeurs et ministres des autres nations.

2°. Que les consuls et vice-consuls Anglais reprendront l'exercice de leurs fonctions dans tous les états de la Sublime Porte; qu'ils jouiront de tous les droits et exemptions qui leur avaient été assurés par les anciens traités et conventions entre les deux empires, et qu'en général ils seront mis sur le pied des consuls et vice-consuls de la nation la plus favorisée.



3°. Les Dragomans Barataires en actualité de service dans les Echelles seront rétablis sur le même pied.

4°. Si parmi les individus jouissant ci-devant de la protection Britannique à Constantinople il s'en trouveroit qui voudroient de leur gré rentrer dans la jouissance de cette protection, il leur sera permis de le faire sans difficulté.

5°. Que les sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique exerçans le commerce dans les états de la Sublime Porte seront mis sur le pied de la nation la plus favorisée, et continueront à être ainsi regardés dans toutes les concessions que la Sublime Porte pourroit accorder dorénavant aux sujets des autres nations.

6°. Que le nouveau tarif, tel qu'il a été réglé à la satisfaction de la Sublime Porte en l'année 1805, dans la forme la plus solennelle, sera mis en vigueur ; et la Sublime Porte donnera des Firmans afin que les préposés de douane dans tous ses états aient à s'y conformer sans détour quelconque.

7°. Qu'il ne sera plus établi de monopole ou d'impôt extraordinaire, au préjudice des sujets de Sa Majesté Britannique, et qu'ils ne seront plus soumis à l'impôt connu sous le nom de " Bidaat."

8°. Les marchandises Anglaises, nommément la Bierre, le Rum, le Vin, et autres liqueurs de production étrangère, ne seront point sujettes aux réglemens ou restrictions que la Sublime Porte pourroit établir sur les productions de ses propres états ; et spécialement seront exempts de tout empêchement et demande pécuniaire de la part du Vaivode de Galata, et d'autres préposés du Gouvernement Ottoman.

9°. Au cas des contestations personnelles qui puissent arriver entre les négocians Britanniques et les sujets Ottomans, Mussulmans, ou Rajaa, dans les Echelles,

la Sublime Porte donnera les injonctions les plus strictes à tous ses magistrats et administrateurs de justice, afinque les plaintes des parties en litige soient écoutées et jugées avec impartialité, et sans prévention quelconque.

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No. III. Two Inclosures.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Port Barbieri, Nov. 26. 1808.

SIR,

My second conference with Vaahid Efendi took place this day according to appointment.

Before we entered upon business I learned from him that Mustapha Bairactar and his party had been put to death by the Janissaries, that the deposed Sultan Mustapha had been strangled, and that tranquillity was restored in the capital.

Vaahid Efendi then proceeded to state the claims he had to make on the part of the Sublime Porte, and I leave you to judge of the surprise, mixed with some disappointment, with which I listened to the demands contained in the inclosed paper (A).

Passing by for the moment all objections of a secondary nature, such as the style of the preamble, and in general the tone of the articles, the omission of that of amnesty, and other matters which you will at once perceive, I come to the great points on which our discussion turned, and on which the issue of the negotiation will depend.

When Article III. was read, I thought it necessary to reject it in a manner so positive and so peremptory as to prevent its ever being mentioned to me again.

The discussion of this Article, however, took up a considerable time, owing either to the most unaccountable mistake that ever occurred, or the most audacious fraud that ever was practised in the course of diplomatic correspondence. Vaahid Efendi expressing himself much astonished that I should object so strongly to a proposition which had been agreed to by Sir Arthur Paget, I discovered on questioning him further, that Ismail Pacha, the Serasquier who had been named plenipotentiary to negotiate with Sir Arthur Paget, had, in the report of his interview with Sir Arthur, affirmed directly that this concession had been made. In justice to Sir Arthur, I felt myself called upon not only most strenuously to deny the fact, appealing for the truth of my denial to his "Correspondence," which was fortunately in my possession, but likewise to address myself directly to the Reis Efendi upon the subject in a letter of which I here transmit you a copy (B).

Vaahid Efendi expressed great regret on finding that I refused to listen to this Article in any form, or under any modification; and seemed to think that the Porte would not recede from the demand.

I then was obliged to say that any further discussion on the other Articles would be useless. But on his desiring to refer it to his Court, I consented, under the circumstances, to proceed.

The next Article was No. VI., to which, in this report of our conference, I add No. VII., as my objections to both came under the same head.

After considering these Articles with a little attention, it really appeared to me that the Porte did not understand what it asked. I explained therefore to Vaahid Efendi so much of our navigation laws as

rendered it impossible to grant to Turkish vessels the liberty of going to the British colonies, or carrying the produce of other countries to England. But without going further into the subject I argued that neither this, nor any question of commerce, was fit to be introduced into a treaty of peace, unless in so far as the war might have had a reference to some specific objects of commerce; that the granting a right to trade, together with the adjustment of a reciprocity of duties, was the proper object of a treaty of commerce; that I could not consent to buy a peace with the promise of any concessions after the invitation I had received to restore it upon principles which implied the very reverse of concessions; and that he knew I had nothing to offer but what I had so clearly and so frequently declared, namely, the re-establishment of the relations of the two countries on the footing on which they stood before the departure of Mr. Arbuthnot.

He did not seem at all satisfied with this answer, conceiving it unjust that when the Porte granted such extensive privileges to Great Britain we should refuse to grant her any in return.

x Next came the question of the Dragomans. The Porte requires that our consuls should employ none of her subjects in that capacity, and that those whom they do employ should not trade. And this regulation they say they have been under the necessity of resorting to in order to prevent the sale of protections by foreign ministers. I said that I not only did not wish to re-establish such an abuse, but would assist them in preventing and eradicating it as much as lay in my power, but that he must see how totally impossible it was for our commerce to be carried on with-

out these dragomans, whom I was willing to limit to a definite number. That as to their not being subjects of the Porte, where could others be found who could speak the language? And how could they live unless a fair traffic were allowed them?

These were the articles of the *Contre-Projet* which occasioned the most discussion. Nothing was positively agreed to on either side, although some impression of the unreasonableness of his demands has, I think, been made on Vaahid Efendi.

After his interpreter had finished reading the *Contre-Projet*, and had delivered it into Mr. Pisani's possession to be translated, I asked if that contained the whole of what the Porte had to propose? Vaahid Efendi then said that it contained all of a public nature, but that he had something to bring forward as matter for a secret article.

He then opened the subject by premising that he considered the signature of peace with England as a declaration of war against France; and indeed he gave me to understand that the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople had announced that he should so consider it, and demand his passports in consequence. Under these circumstances, what (he asked) would be their situation? Already at war with Russia through our means, and soon to be at war with France for our sakes, what did we propose to do to succour the Ottoman Empire? The pressure of the war with Russia he stated to be most heavy, and the expences of the army eight times what they used to be in former wars. The Porte had reason to fear that the connections between Russia and France, so far as they related to the Ottoman territories, were rather drawn closer than in any way impaired, and

the meeting at Erfurt he considered as intended to settle finally their doom. Great Britain was rich: she paid subsidies to all her allies, and why refuse to succour in the same manner a friend who was about to risk so much to be at peace with her?

In answer to this overture I told him plainly that if it was at that time to be made the foundation of any proposition of the nature he alluded to, I must decline entering further into the subject than I had already done at the close of our first conference.

He said that he only wished to talk confidentially with me.

I replied that confidential discourse with any minister employed by his Majesty must be considered as no less binding on him as far as it went than the most solemn engagement. In the little I should say, therefore, I entreated him to mark distinctly that there would be nothing which was meant to alter or influence the simple question of peace as I had proposed it. I begged him not to consider what he might think favourable to his wishes as said by way of inducing his Government to sign the treaty, nor, on the contrary, the steadiness of my refusal to mix the two questions of peace and alliance, as a rejection of all succour, under any possible circumstances, to the Ottoman Empire.

After controverting the accuracy of his statement respecting the origin of the war, I reverted to my letter to the Reis Efendi of the 11th of October as containing all I could say respecting the general situation of Turkey as connected with the state of Europe. That all the subsequent information I had received confirmed the belief that Bonaparte was by no means in a situation to attack them immediately,

and that with regard to the future, and his personal dispositions towards them, Vaahid Efendi was himself the man from whom I should, if uninformed, inquire for proofs, instead of the man to whom I should think of offering any. I here stated to him, however, that there existed one proof of which he could know only a part, namely, that at the very moment that he was himself at Tillsitt, where the Emperor Alexander, in conjunction with Bonaparte, was settling the partition of the Turkish provinces, a Russian plenipotentiary\* was actually at the Dardanelles with a commission from the same Emperor to make peace, giving up Walachia and Moldavia. That commission was dated in March or April, at which time Russia was in alliance with us. Here was the difference between the Emperor Alexander influenced by England, and the Emperor Alexander influenced by France: and here was what they had got by the friendship of France! The influence of Sebastiani at Constantinople prevented the reception of the Russian negociator, and consequently the restoration of their provinces; and the influence of Bonaparte at Tillsitt prevailed on the Emperor Alexander to withdraw the powers he had given for their restoration.

Thoroughly convinced in my own mind, therefore, that the signature of their peace with England would make no difference whatever in the intentions of Bonaparte respecting the Ottoman Empire, I felt myself justified in pressing upon their consideration all the motives they had to conclude it.

In the front of these motives I placed the policy of their making peace with us before we made peace

\* Pozzo di Borgo.

with Russia. I stated, that if they neglected this opportunity, I could by no means answer that when we resumed our relations with the Court of St. Petersburg, we might not enter into engagements in which the interests of the Ottoman Empire would at the best be forgotten. What could they expect otherwise if they continued at war with us both? Whereas, if they signed a peace with Great Britain now, they would be considered and treated as a friendly state in any engagements into which we might enter either with Russia or with any other power.

I perceive that this idea has had its effect, but I shall take care, in pursuing it, to do nothing which may fetter the hands of his Majesty's Government in any negotiation which may be carrying on at St. Petersburg.

The next motive, and surely no trifling one, was peace itself. Was it nothing to possess their islands in safety? Was the revenue of the Dardanelles nothing in their present distresses, which made them even apply to England for a subsidy? What would France do for them? Would France, on a promise to admit no British Minister at Constantinople, engage within any given time to perform her own promises and oblige Russia to evacuate Walachia and Moldavia? I would be content to rest the whole on this issue.

But what so likely to bring Russia into reasonable terms as their seeing the Porte at peace with Great Britain? Distressed already in the North by the combined forces of his Majesty and the King of Sweden, what might she not apprehend for her safety in the South, if the friendship which I proposed in his Majesty's name to renew with the Sublime Porte were judiciously improved and directed to its true ends?



Remembering that the idea of mediation, which I had thrown out in our last conference, had been eagerly seized by Vaahid Efendi, I again recurred to it in this place. I observed to him that we were a great way yet from so desirable a situation as that in which my good offices could be attended with effect; but the first and most obvious of all steps was, that I should go to Constantinople to put the matter in train.

These, I said, were a few of the many motives to peace which existed, at present, between the two empires. But what he proposed in asking for subsidies was not peace simply, but alliance. Now this was certainly inadmissible by me, and I should think not advisable even for themselves; — inadmissible by me, because, if an article were offered on this subject, it must evidently be a condition of making the peace; and I could by no means consent to take the negotiation less favourably than it had been left by Sir Arthur Paget, to whom no such proposal had been mentioned; — unadvisable for themselves, because an alliance with us would instantly make them parties to the war with France, which they seemed so anxious to avoid, and which undoubtedly it was not for their interest to provoke.

They must also know that the engagements of alliances are reciprocal. Now what service did they propose to render to Great Britain in return for her subsidies?

I thought it fair to let him know that of all possible sorts of assistance that by subsidy would be the most objectionable.

I have here, in the most concise manner I am able, stated to you the substance of this conference, which

lasted during five hours. At parting, I asked when it was his intention to appoint another, assuring him that I should be ready the next day to produce an *ultimatum* founded on what had been reciprocally admitted in this and the preceding one.

Vaahid Efendi once more asked if my refusal about the ships was absolute. On my answering in the affirmative, he said that he could not name any time until he should hear from Constantinople. I then expressed a hope that our next meeting would be final, and intimated an intention of bringing the negotiation to a close as soon afterwards as possible.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A in Mr. Adair's No. III.

*Traduction du Contre-Projet remis, par S. E. Vaahid Efendi, dans la Conférence du 26 Novembre, 1808.*

Au nom de Dieu très miséricordieux :

Le sujet du présent instrument fidèle et authentique est comme suit : —

Les événemens du siècle inconstant ayant amené un éloignement apparent entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour de la Grande Bretagne, et étant le désir sincère des deux parties de renouveler l'ancienne amitié, par conséquent moi soussigné, revêtu du haut rang de Nichangy Impérial, en qualité de Plénipotentiaire de la part du très majestueux, formidable, très puissant, et très magnifique *Padishah* de la nation Ottomane, Mahmoud II., mon maître, d'un part, et le très distingué et très éclairé Robert Adair, Esq., Pléni-

potentiaire du très auguste, très respecté, et très élevé George III., *Padishah* du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, et membre distingué de son Parlement de la Grande Bretagne, de l'autre, — avons tenu un Congrès en bonne forme, où nous ayant réciproquement communiqué nos pleins pouvoirs et eu plusieurs conférences et discussions, nous avons terminé l'ouvrage salulaire de la paix entre les deux Cours, par les Articles stipulés comme ci-dessous, savoir : —

*Article I.*

Dorénavant tout acte d'éloignement et d'inimitié entre le Sublime Porte et la Cour de la Grande Bretagne cessera ; et les Traités de Capitulation stipulés en l'année Turque 1086 à la mi de la lune de Gemmaziél Ahir, ainsi que certains privilèges arrêtés par acte dans des époques subséquentes, comme le commerce de la Mer Noire, seront observés et mis en vigueur comme par le passé et comme s'ils n'avoient souffert aucune interruption.

*Article II.*

A l'échéance de trente et un jours depuis l'époque de la signature du présent Traité, s'il y auroit des endroits occupés de la part de la Cour d'Angleterre, ils seront restitués et remis à la Sublime Porte dans la même condition où ils étoient lorsqu' ils furent occupés, avec leurs canons, munition, et autres effets ;

et les prisonniers qui auroient été fait de part et d'autre seront échangés au dit terme sans hésitation.

*Article III.*

Les vaisseaux de guerre de la Sublime Porte qui ont été brûlés par les Anglois dans le Détroit de la Mer Blanche, seront indemnisés sur un pied exact; et tout bâtiment marchand, et autres effets et marchandises, qui ont été pris par les vaisseaux de guerre de la Sublime Porte, et de part et d'autre, seront entièrement remis et restitués.

*Article IV.*

Ayant toujours été interdit originairement que des vaisseaux de guerre puissent se rendre à la Rade de Constantinople, et cette ancienne maxime de l'Empire Ottoman devant être observée dorénavant en tems de paix vis-à-vis des vaisseaux de toute puissance que ce puisse être, la Cour d'Angleterre aussi s'engage de se conformer à cette règle.

*Article V.*

Le Tarif des Douanes qui a été arrangé en dernier lieu à la Porte fondé sur l'ancien principe du 3 pour cent, et surtout l'affaire du commerce intérieur devant dès à présent pour toujours être observés et servir de règle permanente, la Cour d'Angleterre aussi se contente, et promet de s'y conformer.

*Article VI.*

Etant conforme à l'amitié et sincérité que les vaisseaux marchands et négociants de la Sublime Porte puissent aller en toute liberté et faire le commerce dans les états, isles, et échelles de l'Angleterre, il est convenu, que de la même manière que les Anglois jouissent de la faveur Impériale dans les états de terre et de mer de la Sublime Porte, la Cour d'Angleterre aussi ait à accorder aux négociants de la Sublime Porte la même permission et franchises. Il sera également permis d'établir des (Shahbenders) consuls là où il sera nécessaire pour veiller aux affaires de leurs négociants; les mêmes traitemens et privilèges devant être exactement observés envers ces "Shahbenders" dont jouissent les consuls Anglois résidents dans les Etats Ottomans.

*Article VII.*

Les négociants de la Sublime Porte Ottomane payeront la même douane sur les effets et marchandises qu'ils importeront aux états Anglois, et que des états de l'Angleterre ils exporteront pour d'autres pays, que les négociants Britanniques payent sur les objets et marchandises qu'ils importent et exportent des états de la Turquie.

*Article VIII.*

L'on ne doit donner aucune patente (de protection) à aucun des individus " Rayaas," négociants ou dépendants de la Sublime Porte, et les ambassadeurs et consuls n'y délivreront des passeports sans permission.

*Article IX.*

Les ambassadeurs et consuls d'Angleterre peuvent comme à l'ordinaire employer les Dragomans qui leur sont nécessaires ; mais ayant été ci-devant convenu, avec un accord unanime, que la Sublime Porte n'accorderoit point de Barats sous le nom de Dragomans près des ambassadeurs et des consuls à des personnes que ne s'attacheroient point à cette fonction d'une manière suivie et régulière, il est arrêté que, conformément à cette règle, la légation Britannique ne demandera point l'émanation des Barats en faveur d'aucun individu de la classe de négociants et de commerçants, et ne nommera ou emploiera en aucun endroit des consuls étant des individus sujets de la Sublime Porte.

*Article X.*

Comme il est dit et spécifié dans les traités anciens dont aujourd'hui on en renouvelle la teneur, que les capitulations Impériales et autres stipulations et articles accordés aux Souverains qui sont en paix et amitié avec la Sublime Porte, doivent aussi, par ordre Impérial, être observés en faveur de l'Angleterre à l'avenir, par conséquent les ambassadeurs, consuls, et autres employés de la Cour de la Grande Bretagne, d'après la noble maxime Impériale jouiront des mêmes immunités, libertés, et sécurité comme les ambassadeurs et employés des autres Cours amies jouissent dans les états de l'Empire Ottoman.

Inclosure B in Mr. Adair's No. III.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

A bord du Vaisseau de Sa Majesté, le *Sea-Horse*,  
au Port Barbieri, ce 26 Novembre, 1808.

MONSIEUR,

Si je n'ai pas encore répondu à la lettre que Votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en réponse aux miennes du 11<sup>me</sup> Octobre, c'est qu'ayant été prévenu par V. Ex. de l'arrivée prochaine de S. E. Vaahid Efendi, muni de pleins pouvoirs pour travailler avec moi à l'ouvrage salutaire de la paix, j'ai préféré d'attendre le résultat de mes premières conférences avec ce ministre. Maintenant que je me suis expliqué avec Son Excellence sur plusieurs points importants, et que j'ai eu occasion de reconnaître en Elle les talens et les qualités les plus distingués toute correspondance directe entre V. E. et moi paroitra superflue. Cependant il est arrivé dans notre entretien d'aujourd'hui un cas si extraordinaire et si imprévu qu'il faut absolument que je m'explique là-dessus avec V. E. ; ce que je ferai de la manière la plus franche et la plus claire.

La Sublime Porte exige de la Grande Bretagne restitution et réparation au sujet des vaisseaux pris aux Dardanelles lors de l'entrée de l'Amiral Duckworth au mois de Février, 1807. Il est même dit que mon prédécesseur, le Chevalier Paget, dans ses pourparlers avec Ismail Pacha, avoit promis cette restitution et réparation à la Sublime Porte.

Je crois de mon devoir d'assurer V. E. que jamais cette promesse n'a été faite par le Chevalier Paget ; que ses instructions ne l'autorisaient point à la faire,

et que dans sa correspondance avec sa Cour, il n'est question ni d'une telle concession de sa part, ni même d'une telle demande de celle de la Sublime Porte. Le Chevalier Paget dans son entretien avec Ismail Pacha, lui a remis par écrit les bases d'un Traité pour l'arrangement de nos différens. Cet écrit doit naturellement se trouver dans la correspondance d'Ismail Pacha avec la Sublime Porte. Que Votre Excellence l'examine : Elle n'y trouvera pas un mot qui renferme une proposition de cette nature. Elle n'y verra qu'un projet pour le rétablissement pur et simple de nos relations telles qu'elles subsistoient avant le départ de M. Arbuthnot de Constantinople. Il est vrai que l'évacuation d'Alexandrie suivit de près la discussion amicale que ce Plénipotentiaire avoit entamée, mais le Gouvernement Britannique est bien loin d'attendre que la Sublime Porte se prévaille de cette preuve de sa bonne volonté pour en faire la base d'une prétention toute nouvelle, et que l'honneur du Roi rend et rendra toujours inadmissible.

Je n'examinerai point ici la solidité des principes sur lesquels la Sublime Porte paroît avoir fondé une demande pareille. Ce ne seroit que le renouvellement d'une discussion interminable sur l'origine de notre mésintelligence, et qui ne servira à rien si la paix est sérieusement désirée de part et d'autre. C'est pourquoi j'ai passé sous silence une phrase dans la lettre de V. E. au sujet de M. Arbuthnot. Il ne me seroit pas difficile de justifier la conduite d'un Ministre à qui on ne reproche rien sinon d'avoir soutenu la cause de la Russie, l'alliée alors et l'amie du Roi son maître, contre celle de la France, son ennemie jurée et implacable. Mais à quoi bon cette contestation ? Pourquoi entamer des discussions



hostiles au moment de négocier la paix ? Pourquoi envenimer et éterniser des disputes à l'instant même on l'on se propose de bon cœur de les ensevelir mutuellement dans un oubli éternel ?

Je me persuade que V. E. se rendra à l'assurance très positive que je viens de lui donner que jamais le Chevalier Paget n'a consenti à la proposition dont il est question. Elle verra de même qu'après l'invitation formelle et réitérée de la Sublime Porte pour la reprise des conférences, il m'est absolument impossible de consentir à traiter de la paix sur un autre pied que celui de l'année précédente. C'est ce que j'ai eu l'honneur d'annoncer très distinctement à V. E. dans ma première lettre, où elle trouvera ce qui suit :

“Je ne doute point que la Sublime Porte animée des mêmes sentimens qu'Elle a fait voir d'une manière si claire et si positive au mois de Février, n'ordonne la reprise immédiate des négociations là où elles finirent au mois d'Octobre dernier ; ni qu'Elle ne s'empresse de terminer une guerre sans objet, dont la durée ne peut être avantageuse qu'aux ennemis reconnus des deux Empires.”

Je prie Votre Excellence d'agréer les assurances de ma haute considération.

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No. IV. By Captain Downie.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,  
Dec. 13th, 1808.

SIR,

FROM the 26th of November, until yesterday the 12th inst., no further meeting took place between the Ottoman Plenipotentiary and myself.

This interval did not pass, however, without some communication between us. Our preceding conference had at its close impressed me with so bad an opinion of the result of this negociation, that I thought it my duty to urge every reason of a general nature, and especially such as were connected with the political situation of Europe, in order to give Vaahid Efendi the opportunity of enforcing upon his Court all those motives in favour of peace which, as I stated in my last despatch, I had endeavoured to impress upon his own mind.

The arrival of Mr. Baker in the *Success* with despatches and letters from various quarters, assisted me materially in this view. I received by him several accounts of a very satisfactory nature respecting the affairs of Spain and Portugal. Some intelligence had reached me likewise from Vienna, on which it appeared to me possible to frame a proposal that could not fail of interesting to a great degree the Ottoman Government. Accordingly, I sent Mr. Stratford Canning on shore with instructions to communicate these articles in person to Vaahid Efendi, avoiding at the same time to say more on the subject of Austria than simply to state her preparations, and the disposition which prevailed on the part of France to attack her.

The *Success* sailed again on the 2d of December with my despatches. Two days afterwards I sent notice to Vaahid Efendi that I had drawn up a treaty in a regular form which I was anxious to discuss with him during the interval which would yet elapse before he could receive an answer to the questions he had desired to refer to his Court.

This message, which was delivered to him verbally

by Mr. Pisani, drew from him an answer of which the most material part was an expression of regret at my great reserve in entering into the subject of the possible attack of France in concert with Russia, should peace be now concluded between England and the Porte.

The Ottoman Government had already, he said, been threatened with a declaration of war from Bonaparte if they signed a treaty of peace with England. They expected it, and were resolved to meet it with courage, provided England would do something towards assisting them; but that upon this subject I had refused so absolutely to enter, that he did not see how it was possible to settle a peace with me which could be satisfactory to the Porte. He then touched upon his own situation. He said that to conclude a peace upon the terms I offered, his government must give up many points to which they attached great weight and importance. That he was the channel through which those sacrifices were to be made. That if he had it in his power to hold out some prospect of real assistance on the part of Great Britain, he could then carry on the negotiation with a bolder hand, and employ a much more unreserved and persuasive language with his government than hitherto he had been enabled to adopt.

I was not sorry to have this opportunity of explaining to him in writing that I had by no means refused to enter into the question of assistance, but that all I had contended for was the necessity of keeping the two subjects of peace and alliance separate. I then stated that one of my great objects in pressing the speedy signature of the treaty, was that I might be free to confer with him most fully and

confidentially on the means of protecting the Ottoman Empire from the designs of France or Russia; but I observed at the same time, that in the situation in which I then stood, I could not be justified in revealing matters of a most confidential nature materially affecting *other Powers*, until the Ottoman Government had, by signing a treaty, placed itself in a situation to be trusted.

I then added that I had received letters of great importance from Vienna; but that neither into their contents, nor into any views which I might form for the benefit of the Ottoman Empire, could I enter, until my arrival at Constantinople.

In fine, to show him that I was in earnest, I sent him an additional article, which I proposed adding to the treaty, with a view to ulterior arrangements after its signature.

To these communications, which I instructed Mr. Pisani to read to him in private, I received an answer conveyed in the strongest terms of satisfaction. The secret article, he said, provided for what his government was then most anxiously looking forward to; and he added that the views I had opened to him gave him fresh life, and that he should now be able to proceed with alacrity and hope in the business in which he was engaged.

Mr. Pisani at this interview was instructed to fix a day for another conference, at which I should present my treaty. It was named accordingly for the 10th.

On that day, just as he was setting out to the place of meeting, his despatches arrived from Constantinople, and he requested to defer the conference until the 12th instant.

I consented of course to this request. In order, however, to confirm the favourable impression which appeared to have been made on his mind by my preceding communication, as well as to save time (and also if possible to find out the tenour of his last despatches from Constantinople) I sent Mr. Pisani again to Vaahid Efendi with a letter which I commissioned him to read, and in which I announced an anxious desire to assist in the formation of a treaty of triple alliance between Great Britain, Austria, and the Porte. I said at the same time, that these were matters which I would not enter into at our conferences, not only for the reasons I had already so frequently given, but also because at those conferences we were not sufficiently alone to talk of matters of so much delicacy in the situation in which Austria stood with regard to France.\*

Mr. Pisani's report of this interview reached me in the course of the day. He stated that immediately on his entering the room, and without waiting for the communication he had to make, Vaahid Efendi desired him to hear the contents of three papers which he had just received from Constantinople in answer to the report he had made of our two conferences.

The first was a despatch which contained the usual complaints against Great Britain for having joined Russia in the attack upon the Porte:—a refusal to restore the British property under sequestration, unless the demand about the ships were complied with:—a refusal to grant the number of Barats I had applied for:—and a parallel calculated to make out a difference between the conciliatory language

\* I suspected his interpreter.

held in London to Sidki Efendi upon the subject of assistance, and that which I had held on the same subject in my two conferences. The despatch also laments my insisting on going up to Constantinople immediately after signing the treaty, and instructs Vaahid Efendi to represent to me the inconvenience of such a step to the Porte in consequence of the menaces of France.

The next paper he read was a despatch from Sidki Efendi containing a report (as he is stated to have given) of two conferences with yourself, together with a copy of your note to him. Sidki Efendi is made to say, that when he first spoke to you about succours, you had taken time to consult about it, but that he soon after received an answer in writing, and that that answer proved of the most agreeable tenour.

The third was a note from the French chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, of which the substance is as follows :—

“ He says he has heard with great astonishment of a frigate with an English *agent* on board, having been permitted to come into harbour near the Dardanelles; that what he conceives to be still more extraordinary is, that *agent's* having been received with the greatest pomp and éclat by Emir Vaahid Efendi at his house, and that, contrary to the rules of vessels bearing flags of truce, the crew and officers of that frigate were suffered to go on shore and to walk about the town without the smallest control, — that this was a proof of great weakness on the part of the Porte, who ought by this time to know how to distinguish between the sincere and ancient friendship of France, and the false, ungenerous conduct of England towards

her ; that it was the more surprising the Porte should have chosen this moment for suffering such proceedings to take place at the Dardanelles, *when the French Government was actually engaged in carrying into effect all the promises which it had held out to this Court* ; that he understands the above agent is in the intention of going up to Constantinople with the frigate, to treat of peace directly with the ministers of the Porte ; that this last ought to recollect her promise that she was not to admit of any such thing till the time of a general peace ; that if the frigate should appear off Constantinople, with or without the Turkish Government's leave, the chargé d'affaires was determined in either case to leave the residence and return to France."

After reading the above papers to Mr. Pisani, he gave him to understand that immediately after the conferences at Erfurt, a courier had been despatched to England to propose a renewal of negociations for peace, and that an armistice had actually been signed between Great Britain and Russia. That a congress, also, was soon to be formed for a peace between the Porte and Russia, at which Galib Efendi (the present Reis Efendi) was to assist as Plenipotentiary on the part of the Porte.

After he had finished, Mr. Pisani read my letter to him (of which I have already stated the substance), and left him a copy of the Treaty.

From the complexion of the papers read to Mr. Pisani, the difficulties in the way of an amicable settlement with the Porte appeared more serious than they had ever as yet presented themselves to me. It was without surprise, therefore, that when I met Vaahid Efendi on the following day, I found him, notwithstanding all his former professions, disposed to dispute

every point of the Treaty, even those which had been in conversation already admitted. I began by telling him that as we had each received despatches of importance since our last conference, I hoped that we were each fully prepared to conclude finally all we had to treat of. To save unnecessary discussion, I had framed a Treaty consisting partly of the Articles contained in my *Projet*, and partly of those he had himself presented, from the terms of which, although I should be ready to listen to any thing he might have to suggest, I could not in substance depart. In saying this, I presented him the Articles, with which, as they may possibly receive many alterations, I think it needless here to trouble you.

Vaahid Efendi began his answer by asking me if I had maturely considered the two Articles respecting the compensation for the ships destroyed and captured, and the free trade, which I appeared so determined at our preceding conference to reject? I replied, that I had seen no reason to alter that determination, but, on the contrary had received instructions by the Success which fully confirmed me in the resolution of adhering to it.

He then began arguing (and at some length), in favour of the justice of those demands, and added, that Sidki Efendi (the result of whose pretended conferences with you, he said, had been received at the Porte) had obtained far more favourable answers to what he had proposed than the answers I had given. Among other matters he added, that you had by no means refused the demand of restitution for the ships, but had left me full powers to grant it.

In answer to this, I produced my last despatches, and said that I then held in my hand the whole of what had passed in London with Sidki Efendi. The



Ottoman Government would, therefore, gain nothing by an attempt to give a new turn to the negociation here by referring to the despatches of the chargé d'affaires in London. With regard to the three points, viz. Assistance, the Free Trade, and Restitution of the Ships and Property, either Sidki Efendi had grossly deceived the Ottoman Government, or the real tenour of his despatches had been misrepresented to me. I took occasion to observe to Vaahid Efendi that on the subject of assistance, you had promised nothing whatever to Sidki Efendi, and I had refused nothing to the Porte. As your answer to Sidki Efendi was stated to be in writing, I desired that it might be produced against my despatches, declaring myself ready to agree to whatever it might be found to contain. With regard to one of the articles concerning which he was so positive, namely, that concerning a free trade, Sidki Efendi had not even named it; and with regard to the other, namely, the ships, my instructions concurred so exactly with the reason of the thing, and with the determination I had already declared not to admit it, that it was useless discussing the matter further.

On this answer he proceeded to examine my Treaty and his own *Contre-Projet* together, and from this moment until the end of our conference, which lasted the whole day, our meeting was a scene of continued altercation. To give an idea of the captious nature of his objections, I will beg you to turn to the Article in his *Contre-Projet* in which it is required that all "places," &c., occupied by his Majesty's arms should be restored. I had altered this article merely by supplying the obvious omission of "places belonging to the Sublime Porte." To this alteration he objected

strenuously, and it was a full hour before I could obtain its admission.

You will not, therefore, be surprised that in this day's conference we proceeded no further than to discuss the preamble, the restoration of places and prisoners, and the re-establishment of the capitulations. At the close of it he proposed meeting again on the 15th. The disposition which I have already noticed to contest every point, I may almost say, every word of the Treaty with me, added to the demands from which he had not announced any intention of desisting, obliged me here to ask him at once whether it would be to any purpose to hold another meeting, and what were the real intentions of his Court.

To this question Vaahid Efendi replied frankly, that all would depend on the two Articles already mentioned; the one relating to the ships, and the other to the free trade; and he said that if I would admit those Articles he would be ready to sign the Treaty with me that very day.

ms. by 1  
I repeated all my former objections to them; and as I perceived by his perpetually adverting to my powers, and to your silence towards Sidki Efendi, that he was impressed with an idea not only of my having a large discretion upon this subject, but that my opposition to his demands proceeded from my own pertinacity, and was contrary to the sentiments of my Government, I thought fit to read him that part of your letter of the 22d of August, which declared the Article concerning the ships to be utterly inadmissible. After having done this, I said that I was afraid it would be useless discussing the matter further or meeting again on the 15th, since, once for all, I was resolved not to give way on either of the points on

which he had stated the peace to depend. If he persisted, therefore, I should be under the necessity of declaring my mission at an end ; and I begged him to tell me frankly whether it was his intention to persist, as in that case I should set sail immediately for England.

Vaahid Efendi in reply said that he would not be the person to tell me to return to England ; and after urging over again all his former arguments, grounded as he appeared to think on the principles of justice, and the duties which govern the intercourse between states really friendly towards each other, he desired that our conference might still stand for the 15th. I did not think proper to refuse his invitation, although I told him that in our respective ways of thinking it would be to very little purpose.

In the course of our discussion he said more than once, that Great Britain could entertain but little value for the friendship of the Porte, if she suffered a trifle of a few thousand purses to stand in the way of peace. A wish to understand more fully the meaning of this remark was a principal motive with me for agreeing to meet once more.

These are the difficulties which embarrass at present the negotiation. They certainly are serious ; and I judge them to be so the more from Vaahid Efendi's having declined admitting the Secret Article with which, when it was first read to him, he appeared so much pleased. What the real nature of these difficulties may be,—whether they arise from the fears or from the hopes of the Ottoman Government on the side of France,—whether from an increased obstinacy founded on the distance of their danger,—whether from a desire to delay, in spite of possible conse-

quences, the signature of a peace with England until they know how Russia, with whom they are negotiating, may feel upon it,—whether from a wish to combine it with negotiations for a general peace, which they hope the proposal sent from Erfurt may lead to,—or whether simply from a point of honour or of interest, or from an union of all these motives together, mixed up with the fickleness of the Turkish character, I hope on the 15th to ascertain. It shall be my endeavour to render that conference conclusive, although no patience that I can exert shall be spared to render the conclusion an amicable one.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. V.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

H M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,  
Dec. 16. 1808.

SIR,

My fifth conference with the Turkish Plenipotentiary took place yesterday, according to appointment.

Although the temper with which it was conducted was widely different from that which prevailed at the preceding meeting, and although the result was rather more satisfactory, I am afraid that we are still too far asunder to enable me to give hopes of an amicable conclusion.

Our conference began with Vaahid Efendi's repeating his demand of compensation for the ships. I restated my determination on this point, with a hope that it would not again be mentioned. Vaahid

Efendi then asked with what justice I could demand the restoration of British property under sequestration? I endeavoured to make him understand the difference between the property of merchants peaceably settled in the country under the protection of the laws, and the property of an enemy's state, and of enemy's goods found on the high seas, where by the custom of Europe the laws of war had a different operation. He then again reverted to the origin of this war with the Porte, into which, finding that this was his perpetual theme, and more especially as it was accompanied with a constant reproach for our preferring the interests of Russia to those of the Porte, I did at last consent in some degree to enter. Our direct alliance with Russia against France, the motives to that alliance, and the indirect but most important assistance afforded by the Porte to the common enemy, formed, as you may suppose, the chief points to which my observations were directed.

With regard to our general preference of the Russian interests, the fact I stated to be so much the reverse that it was our alliance with Russia which had inspired that Power with all the moderation it had ever shown towards the Ottoman Empire.

The conversation then turned on the general state of continental affairs, and on the mutual benefit to our two countries which would result from the re-establishment of peace at this juncture. Vaahid Efendi assured me that he was as fully impressed with the truth of what in all our conversations I had represented to him on this subject, as I could myself desire. He was equally convinced of the views of France against the independence of the Porte, but he would not disguise from me that this was not the general be-

lief of the present Ottoman administration.. It was true they wished peace with England, and for that purpose had selected him to be their plenipotentiary, whose sentiments were known to be most strongly on the same side. But with all their wishes for peace, they were not blind to what it would expose them to at the present juncture.

He then entered much further into an explanation of the reasons which induced the Ottoman Government to persist in their demands of compensation for the ships than he had ever yet attempted; and as I was anxious to afford him every means of getting over this difficulty, which it was clear to me would otherwise prove an insurmountable bar to the Treaty, I listened patiently to what he had to state.

He went on to say that the Porte could not depart from this claim without offending against its religion and its honour. Both prescribed to it restitution to the sufferers of their property taken *without a declaration of war*. He then entered largely into the pacific conduct of the Ottoman Government since the attack on their capital, their constant refusal to enter into the views of France, and their having foreborne to confiscate British property. All this was known to their own subjects, the proprietors of the ships and goods for which compensation was now asked, who had already become very troublesome at the Porte on the mere rumours of the conclusion of peace, and whose fury, if their losses were not reimbursed, would most probably excite insurrections. He added, confidentially, that these discontents would be inflamed by Seid Aly, the Captain Pacha, who had himself a great, and as I understood him, a personal interest in the affair. With regard to what was property of the

State, he said that he would find a means of modifying that demand, and he even said that if the private purse of the Sultan could reimburse the claimants on the other ground, the point would not be pressed so strenuously by his Government; but he affirmed that the Porte was too much exhausted already by the war with Russia, and foresaw so large an increase of expense by the preparations which would become necessary in order to resist France, if peace were signed with Great Britain, that it was absolutely impossible to satisfy those claims from the public treasury.

When he talked in this tone, I began (as I thought) to understand him. In my answer, therefore, I confined myself strictly to the two grounds of objection already stated, namely, those of principle and example. Repeating these grounds, and particularly resisting the doctrine attempted to be introduced by France since the Revolution, and now advanced by the Porte with respect to property taken on the high seas without a previous declaration of war, I protested once more, and for the last time, that I never would admit an Article in the Treaty, either secret or ostensible, which should in the remotest degree imply a compensation for those losses. I observed, however, that in the way in which his Excellency had just brought forward the question, there was a material deviation from that in which he had brought it forward at first. He now reduced his demand from that of a public satisfaction to the State to that of private indemnification to individuals; he had affirmed that the Porte was bound to find this indemnification for her own subjects in whatever manner our present dispute might terminate; and he declared that nothing but the inability of the Porte to satisfy these claims (an

inability arising, in part, from a foreseen increase of expense on account of military preparation against France), induced her to persist in requiring from Great Britain the advance of a certain sum of money on the present occasion. If this were really all, some method of arranging this affair might possibly be found. Great Britain was far from wishing the Porte to suffer on her account. If France, therefore, should attack the Ottoman territories in consequence of the peace now negotiating, I was confident that Great Britain would assist in defending them in a manner as efficacious as the circumstances of the extensive war she had to support would render it practicable. Such assistance on the part of Great Britain would necessarily relieve to a great degree the distressed finances of the Porte, and thus enable her, if she saw fit, to satisfy the claims on which his Excellency was instructed to press me. A proposal of this nature I should have no objection to listen to after signing the Treaty, and even to recommend to his Majesty's Government; and I made no doubt but that with the ratification of the Treaty I should receive instructions on this head which would satisfy the Ottoman Government. I again repeated, however, that I would admit no Article to this effect into the Treaty of Peace. It was simply a question of assistance, which, as it belonged to a state of alliance, must be provided for by a separate instrument.

Vaahid Efendi in his answer appeared to enter fully into the principle of this overture. He made no difficulty either in consenting to refer the whole matter to the general question of assistance, or to providing for what might be agreed upon by separate and secret Articles. But he objected (as, indeed, it was obvious



that he would) to accepting my simple recommendation as a security for the Ottoman Government to begin its disbursements to the claimants for the ships.

After we had exhausted all that could be said on this point, I again most earnestly pressed him for my final answer. With equal earnestness on his part he entreated me to devise some practicable method of settling this question, on which he again and again assured me, although in the most temperate manner, the issue of the negotiation would depend. He begged me likewise to name an early day for another conference. Notwithstanding all my objections, both public and personal, to protracting the negotiation any longer, I could not absolutely refuse his request, and I was the more inclined to a further discussion with him from having apparently made some impression in this last, and gained the renunciation of the chief objectionable grounds on which the proposition had been advanced. I accordingly consented to meet again on the 19th instant.

Of course we could make no further progress in the Treaty. I deeply regret these delays; but to those who know the nature of Turkish negotiations, they will not appear surprising. I am convinced that the difficulty is a serious, and if not obviated, that it will prove an insuperable, obstacle to peace. When to this is added the operation of general political causes, and the commencement of their negotiation with Russia (which in right reason ought rather to accelerate than retard their coming to a conclusion with me), it is impossible to say what contrivances they may not yet resort to in order to postpone a final decision.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. VI. Two Inclosures.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,  
Dec. 20. 1808.

SIR,

My last despatch must have made it clear to his Majesty's Government, that unless some method could be devised for overcoming the obstacles to peace to which I have so frequently alluded, it would be in vain to proceed any further in discussing the rest of the Treaty. It will, I trust, have appeared equally clear, that no such method could be found unless I would take upon myself so far to exceed the limits of my instructions as to enter into the general question of assistance and co-operation, even before the signature of a Treaty of Peace. This was the natural consequence of the situation in which I found matters on my arrival here. You will remember, that in the first letter I had the honour of addressing to you from this place, I noticed, notwithstanding the friendly communications of the Serasquier of the Dardanelles, and even his candid avowal of the fact of the invitation last February, a visible reluctance on the part of the Ottoman Government to proceed frankly upon that invitation in the negotiations about to be commenced. It undoubtedly did not escape me, that under these circumstances it would be the policy of the Ottoman Government to find out what I had to offer on my part before committing themselves by any proposal on theirs; but, considering the liberal views in which my instructions were framed, it did not appear to me that any moderate

overture which I might now bring forward would give an advantage to the Turkish Plenipotentiary in the conferences sufficient to counterbalance the evil of breaking off the Treaty, which would have been the sure effect of my continuing any longer silent.

This I offer as an apology for my having ventured upon a step which I can safely pronounce to have afforded the only chance of bringing the negotiation to an amicable issue, and also to have been undertaken only in the very last extremity.

Each of my two preceding despatches, but particularly the last, must have led you to remark, in my conversations with the Ottoman Plenipotentiary, an opening by which this great difficulty concerning the ships might be surmounted. Not that it could be evaded by any middle measure which should cast a doubt upon the firmness with which the demand had been resisted throughout; but that it could be got rid of by engaging the Ottoman Government itself to adopt a different course, one more consistent with the friendship it professed towards his Majesty, and even with its own real dignity, namely, that of applying frankly to his Majesty for aid in the war in which they expected to be involved with France.

At the close of my last letter, I informed you with what earnestness Vaahid Efendi had pressed me to consider of some method of reconciling the extremes of our reciprocal instructions; likewise that he fully acceded to the principle of referring all he had demanded to the general question of assistance, and of providing for what might be agreed upon by separate Articles. Considering, therefore, the importance in every point of view of finishing this treaty, and getting up to Constantinople without further loss of

time, after much anxious deliberation with myself, I gave the inclosed paper (A) to Mr. Pisani, with instructions to read it to Vaahid Efendi as a ground for discussing the subject of assistance at our next meeting.

It was my intention, after gaining his formal assent to this method of proceeding, to examine in the course of amicable explanation whether any sum could be settled between us with which I could fill up the blank, and transmit it home as an Article fit to be considered by his Majesty's Government.

At the same time that Mr. Pisani was to read this paper to Vaahid Efendi, he was instructed also to deliver the letter of which I have here the honour to inclose a copy (B).

Vaahid Efendi had two days to reflect upon the contents of these papers before our meeting, which, as already settled, took place yesterday the 19th.

Of this conference I have thus much satisfactory to report, that, having heard and thoroughly understood the nature of the communication made to him by Mr. Pisani on the 17th, Vaahid Efendi approved the mode of settling the difficulty which had been pointed out.

Thus far advanced, therefore, and the important point which had so long impeded the negotiation being now, by common consent, to be considered under the head of general assistance to the Porte in case of attack, I expected that Vaahid Efendi would have chosen the subject of pecuniary assistance for his first topic. He began, however, with a desultory conversation on other matters, some of a very general nature, and others calculated to renew those discussions respecting the origin of the war, and the justice

of the claims insisted on, to which I have already so often adverted. At length we came more to the point by my bringing under consideration the naval succours which his Majesty might be induced to employ for the protection of the Ottoman dominions. Of these at first he made but light, arguing that Great Britain would always, for her own sake, attack the fleets of France wherever she could find them; but at length he seemed satisfied with the plain statement I made to him upon this subject. I said that having, since the peace with Spain, no use for a squadron in the Mediterranean, except to defend Sicily, we should naturally, on concluding peace with the Porte, reduce our ships to a number just sufficient for that purpose. That if the Porte were to be considered as an ally, a large additional force would become necessary for the protection of the Morea, the Archipelago, Egypt, the coasts of Asia Minor, and above all, for any operations to be undertaken in concert against the French forces, or for any plan to prevent their augmentation in Dalmatia; and that if his Majesty were to take so much upon himself, the Porte would be saved the expense of fitting out its own fleet, which, but for his Majesty's friendship, would become indispensable.

When this point had been discussed, he stated that the Porte was in great want of ammunition and ordnance stores, and he asked me whether I would consent to include them under the head of assistance?

I made no difficulty of assenting to the reasonableness of such a request, under a proviso, always, that if the demand should exceed a moderate quantity, and such as might be wanted for the immediate defence of some exposed point on their frontiers, the

*quantum* should be referred to his Majesty's Government. And here I took occasion to point out to him how easily our difficulties might be settled in this mode; that both what I had thrown out respecting the employment of a naval force, and the supply of ordnance stores, was in fact a pecuniary supply, inasmuch as it would save to the Porte the money it must otherwise expend for those articles, with this additional advantage, that the articles were ready.

As Vaahid Efendi in reply again adverted to the British property under sequestration, and even proposed to let it stand as a set-off against the Turkish property captured, I repeated to him what I had before declared, that England, in none of her negotiations with other States, ever had admitted, or ever would admit, that the property of merchants peaceably settled in a country under the laws, was liable to seizure and confiscation whenever war broke out between the State in which they were settled and the State of which they were subjects. This was a doctrine which the French had been endeavouring to establish ever since the Revolution, and which England had uniformly resisted. I never would allow, therefore, the two questions to be mixed even in discussion.

After some further conversation, it was proposed in conclusion to draw up two instruments, the one to contain simply the Treaty of Peace, and the other the separate and secret arrangements, of which we were then endeavouring to settle the basis.

This was precisely what I wanted. The question would thus be cleared from all the difficulties in point of principle which encumbered it, and reduced to the *quantum* either of the sum required, or of naval force

to be employed, or of ordnance stores to be furnished in an equivalent proportion, by way of aid to the Porte. And I confess that it appeared to me practicable, through a mixture of these three modes, to fix upon some proposition fit, *after the signature of the treaty of peace*, to be submitted to the approbation of his Majesty's Government. But here I found it impossible to make Vaahid Efendi speak out. He wanted me to speak first, and to explain my own views. This I positively refused. I had already, as he knew, exceeded my instructions in conversing even upon the subject. I could only consent, therefore, to listen to a proposal from him which it was his indispensable business, as the party asking, to bring forward. The time was consumed in discussing this point without effect. At length he desired that Mr. Pisani might call on him the next day, when he has promised to explain himself fully, and, as I understand, finally.

No other Article of the Treaty was discussed, but another conference is settled for the 22d.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

*(Separate and Secret.)*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,  
Dec. 20. 1808.

SIR,

THE real motive of my sending Mr. Pisani to the Turkish Plenipotentiary on the 17th, was to find out the meaning of what he had more than once insinuated respecting the poverty of his Government. I thought it would be well to know what were his

own views (if in fact he had any) or what were those of Seid Aly, or of the other Ottoman Ministers. Whether Mr. Pisani had nothing to offer which flattered their expectations, or whether I was mistaken in my supposition, I cannot say; but nothing came out in this conversation which could help me to any conclusion.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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Inclosure A in Mr. Adair's No. VI.

*Secret Article.*

If the Sublime Porte should be attacked by France in consequence of the peace now happily re-established with Great Britain, his Majesty, as a proof of his friendship, agrees to assist the Sublime Porte with a sum not exceeding . . . . . The above sum to be paid at two separate payments at the distance of six months each from the other; the first payment to commence at the time of exchanging the ratifications of this present Treaty.

It is agreed that the departure of the French chargé d'affaires from Constantinople shall constitute a case in which the obligation of the above Article shall take effect.

Inclosure B in Mr. Adair's No. VI.

*Mr. Adair to Vaahid Efendi.*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,  
Dec. 17. 1808.

SIR,

BEFORE your Excellency shall determine finally to reject the Treaty of Peace which I have presented to



you for signature, it is my duty once more to entreat that your Excellency will seriously reflect upon the consequences.

Is it possible that your Excellency, after the experience which you have had of Bonaparte, can believe that the object of any congress he may pretend to summon for the settlement of the affairs of the Sublime Porte, is to obtain for her the restoration of Moldavia and Wallachia?

Does your Excellency believe that Russia will be induced to evacuate those provinces by other means than by force?

Does your Excellency believe that Bonaparte will employ force to procure their evacuation?

Does your Excellency believe that the armies of the Porte alone will suffice for that object?

Finally, does not your Excellency see that the only rational chance of re-obtaining possession of those provinces by force for the Sublime Porte, is through the pressure of the war on Russia by the united arms of his Majesty and the King of Sweden in the North, added to those means which the Sublime Porte will have at her disposal in the South, when the pressure of her own war against Great Britain shall be removed?

But it is rumoured that since the conferences at Erfurt, Bonaparte has proposed to open negotiations with Great Britain, and that a Congress is to be held for a general peace. Can your Excellency look to the affairs of Spain, and doubt the motive of such a proposal? Is it not, if true, the clearest demonstration of his weakness? So far from being in a situation to attack you, is it not a proof that he cannot even begin to attack Spain in earnest until he has

secured himself on the side of Poland and Germany ? And is it not most strange, after all the amicable professions of the Sublime Porte, that a circumstance which evinces how little the Sublime Porte has really to fear from France should increase the difficulties in the way of its making peace with Great Britain ?

These are questions to which your Excellency can make but one answer.

On the other hand, if the Sublime Porte should throw away the opportunity of making peace with Great Britain which now presents itself, does your Excellency think that she will ever again find one so favourable ?

Great Britain is the natural friend of Russia ; and sooner or later peace must be re-established between the two nations. That peace must be re-established on one or the other of these principles : — first, simple peace, without joining Great Britain in any league against France : — secondly, peace and alliance.

If the peace should be made on the first of these principles, does your Excellency think that, supposing the treaty I offer you to be rejected, Great Britain will interpose in any form or shape whatever to prevent Russia from occupying and uniting to her own dominions any part of the territories of the Sublime Porte which she may judge convenient for the security of her own frontiers ?

If we should make peace with her on the second principle, namely, that of alliance, would it not be natural that Great Britain should adopt measures of active co-operation with Russia, and assist her in carrying all her objects into effect, both on the Danube and in the Archipelago, against the Ottoman Porte ?

On the other hand, can your Excellency avoid seeing that Great Britain, unfettered at this moment by any engagement with Russia, must be the friend of that State with which she shall make peace first? If with Russia, the interests of that Power (so long as they are compatible with justice) will be preferred to those of the Porte. If with the Porte, not only the present interests, but the future security and independence of the Porte, will form the essential objects of her care in any treaty of peace she may make hereafter with Russia or with France.

Your Excellency asked, in our conference of the 12th instant, what the Ottoman Government would gain by such a peace as that which I propose?

After what I have here stated to your Excellency, it will be enough in answer to this question to say, that the Ottoman Government will gain *Peace*. Can your Excellency, who knows the meaning of this word, be ignorant of its value?

But may I be permitted in my turn to ask your Excellency what the Ottoman Government will gain by war? And here it becomes my duty, in obedience to the instructions I have recently received, and which were written subsequently to the conference which took place in London between Mr. Secretary Canning and Sidki Efendi, to make the following most explicit declaration to the Ottoman Government:—

“That if after being invited by the Sublime Porte to the renewal of the negociation, the British Government should find itself deceived, the war will from that moment begin to assume a serious character, and the interposition of Great Britain to save Turkey

from being dismembered will be at once and altogether withdrawn."

I am also further instructed to declare, "that the restoration of the ships of war taken or burnt in the expedition to the Dardanelles, and of merchant ships captured since the war, is inadmissible."

Having made these declarations in the name of my Sovereign, I repeat my question, — What does the Ottoman Government expect to gain by war?

Does it expect to gain the two points, or even one of the points, on which your Excellency has announced to me that peace now depends?

Does your Excellency seriously imagine that Great Britain will be compelled by force to restore, or pay a compensation for, these ships? Your Excellency may be assured, that until the fleets of the Sublime Porte shall have beaten and destroyed the fleets of Great Britain, no proposal of such a nature will ever be admitted, nor even the discussion of it be suffered, by a British Plenipotentiary.

Or does your Excellency think, that by continuing the war, we may be forced at last to purchase a peace by surrendering our Navigation Act, and violating the charter of the East India Company?

An idea so extravagant can only have been suggested to the Ottoman Government by its enemies. In effect no article of this nature was proposed by Sidki Efendi to Mr. Secretary Canning.

If, therefore, your Excellency should persist in making these two articles the conditions of peace, do you not see that you are denouncing eternal war against Great Britain? And can your Excellency hope that the Sublime Porte will gain by such a contest? Is it not likely, on the other hand, that many

more ships belonging to the Sublime Porte will be captured, and consequently that the difficulties of making peace will be more and more increased every day that the war continues ?

Your Excellency appears to think that his Majesty's Government at London has been more liberal in its offer of assistance than I have been. But your Excellency must recollect that I have not refused assistance to the Sublime Porte in the event of her being attacked by France. I have only declared, in obedience to my instructions, that I could not enter upon a subject which belongs properly to a state of alliance, until after the restoration of a state of peace.

I have proposed also, after the restoration of a state of peace, to enter into the most confidential explanations with your Excellency upon the means of forming such an alliance as in the present circumstances of Europe might most effectually contribute to the permanent security of the Ottoman Empire.

These considerations it is my absolute duty now, for the last time, to lay before your Excellency in the plain, the friendly, but at the same time the fearless language of truth. I am anxious to make this language agree as much as possible with that of conciliation, but the duty imposed upon us both at this eventful moment compels me to state without disguise, and will induce your Excellency (I hope) to consider without passion, the inevitable consequences of rejecting a peace which your own Government has desired, and which I again offer in the name of mine.

I request your Excellency to accept the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

(Signed) ROBERT ADAIR.

## No. VII.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,  
Dec. 23d. 1808.

SIR,

ACCORDING to what was settled in my conference of the 19th with the Turkish Plenipotentiary, Mr. Pisani called on his Excellency by my directions the next day, and returned to me after attending him with the following demands: —

1. The blank in the paper read to him on the 17th to be filled up with the sum of 1,000,000*l.* sterling.
2. To be an Article in the Treaty, and not a recommendation.
3. Also to be absolute and not contingent upon an attack by France.

It is scarcely necessary to acquaint you with the answer I returned to these propositions. I instructed Mr. Pisani to declare that I would not even discuss them, and that if they should be persisted in, there would be no use in my attending the conference fixed for the 22d, except for the purpose of closing the negotiation.

The very extravagance of these terms, however, convinced me that Vaahid Efendi could not be serious in proposing them; and as I felt extremely reluctant to terminate this business abruptly by any act of my own, or under any imperfect conception of his meaning, as I wished also to get through the Treaty in order to clear it of all its remaining difficulties, I did

not absolutely refuse attending on the 22d, but left it open to Vaahid Efendi to take his own course.

Hearing no further from him, I went to the meeting accordingly on the 22d. He began by asking me the astonishing question—What was the object of our meeting? I told him that it was for him to name it, as he had already received through Mr. Pisani my rejection of his most extraordinary demands. After again going over the old ground of argument until I was obliged peremptorily to declare that I would hear no more, he himself desired to discuss the remaining Articles of the Treaty. I remarked to him the total inutility of proceeding further, unless he could assure me of a reasonable probability of our agreeing upon the point which had been so long under discussion; but to prove how anxiously I held to the slightest hope of peace, and in order that not a shade of doubt or obscurity should be cast over the real grounds on which the negotiation had broken off on the part of Great Britain (if such, unhappily, should be its end), I would consent to what he proposed; specially and formally protesting, however (which the use attempted to be made of Sir Arthur Paget's conversation with Ismail Pacha obliged me to do), against drawing into precedent at any future time any modification of the Treaty I might assent to, or in short any thing whatsoever which might be said or done on the present occasion.

Under this protest, we went through the rest of the Treaty, reducing the Articles as we proceeded into regular form.

We had discussed the preamble, although without coming to any conclusion about it, in our conference of the 12th. The course of this negotiation has

abundantly proved to me the tenacity of the Turks with regard to their peculiar modes of expression, and the difficulty of making them comprehend the superiority of those simple *formulæ* in use among Christian States in all solemn transactions of business. The genius of their language, and the impossibility (almost) of conveying the sense of it through a literal translation, contributes greatly to their obstinacy on this point. On the present occasion, Vaahid Efendi earnestly requested me to adopt the Turkish preamble, and to admit also the use of expressions calculated to describe the mildest degree of warfare in reciting the late rupture. As this could in no way influence the Treaty either in principle or substance, or bear upon the justice of the war, I consented, with some alterations, to follow the form proposed.

The Article of amnesty and oblivion has at all times met with a resistance, which, considering that it is so general an Article in all treaties of peace, I confess surprised me. My motive for introducing it, besides that of observing ancient forms, was to claim under its construction pardon for the unfortunate inhabitants of Alexandria, who since the departure of the British forces have been exposed to the most tyrannical treatment from the Pacha of Egypt. I made no difficulty of avowing this motive to Vaahid Efendi, although I could not, consistently with the safety of that unfortunate class of persons, expatiate upon those additional reasons derived from the enthusiasm with which they received his Majesty's troops, which entitled them to all my exertions in their favour. Vaahid Efendi promised me (and in this what he said was confirmed by Mr. Pisani), that on my saying a word at the Porte as soon as peace should be concluded, every in-



dulgence I might ask for them would be cheerfully granted ; and he assured me likewise,—such was the jealousy of the Porte with regard to its own subjects,—that this would be a much better course for the sufferers themselves than that of attempting to provide for their security by any separate stipulations. He objected, as he said, to this Article only as one unusual in the treaties of peace between the Porte and other Powers. He said, that it was not admitted in those with Austria, or Russia, or France ; and if I had no motive, except that which I had assigned, he requested me to give it up as it would extremely embarrass the Porte, if admitted in any Treaty with Russia.

This certainly may, in some degree, be the truth, but I am persuaded that another motive to his opposition is, that he conceives that his admission of an article of oblivion would shut him out from his demand of restitution for the ships.

Having uniformly resisted this claim directly upon the principle of the claim itself, and having no other motive for pressing the Article than those already mentioned, I told Vaahid Efendi that for the present I would not insist upon it, and that if we could agree on the other points, I would relinquish it altogether.

All the points of real importance after this were conceded to me, namely, that respecting the ambassadors— which, as I mentioned in a former despatch, the conduct of the Porte in the reception of Sebastiani had rendered necessary—the re-establishment of the Dragoman Barataires without other limitation, except that they should be such *bonâ fide*, and the permission to them to exercise commerce.

The Article respecting the free trade, one of

those on which Vaahid Efendi had before stated that the peace would depend, was after much difficulty withdrawn on the following agreement:— 1st. That he should draw up an Article in such terms as I could not object to, stipulating only for general favour and protection to the Ottoman flag; and 2dly, that I would promise to enter into discussions with the ministers at Constantinople upon the means of settling, if possible, a commercial Treaty with Great Britain. I agreed to this as a shorter way of getting rid of the question than that of convincing Vaahid Efendi how difficult it would be to settle such a Treaty.

There were some other points which I laboured hard to obtain, but I found the opposition to them so strong, and indeed some of the arguments on which it was grounded so reasonable, that I gave them up. The first was to obtain permission during the war with France for his Majesty's vessels of war carrying despatches to come up to Constantinople; the next, the reinstatement of some of the Barataires whose protections had been taken away in the time of Mr. Arbuthnot, and against which he had protested; the third, an Article respecting some commercial complaints which it had been suggested to me would, if I could obtain the insertion of it, be very agreeable to the Levant Company.

The resistance to the two first of these Articles was grounded on an objection to introduce any expressions into the Treaty which should render doubtful to her own subjects the determination which the Porte had taken to abolish some long subsisting abuses. The Porte wishes to seize this opportunity of a war with Russia to put an end absolutely to the admission of the ships of war of that Power through the Darda-

nelles, and to the system of granting protections. There are, likewise, various internal reforms, particularly in the revenue department, which the Government has often meditated, but in vain endeavoured to carry into effect. For all the essential objects which Great Britain could want, Vaahid Efendi referred me to the capitulations again by a solemn and formal act to be re-established together with what had been since added to them ; also to the tariff, and to the renewed permission to navigate and trade in the Black Sea. All these advantages, in fact, are so fully expressed in the capitulations, and in the firmans subsequently issued, that provided they be duly executed, there is nothing we could require further ; and the due execution or not of these, or of any other agreements we may make with this Government, will always depend upon the station which a British minister is enabled to assume at the Porte. If Great Britain stands high in Europe, there is nothing she will not be able to effect through her minister ; if the reverse, no Treaty will be punctually observed, no past favours will be remembered.

The objection to the last Article was that the abuse complained of was too trifling to merit admission into the present Treaty ; that there were other remedies for it, of which, by the capitulations, I could insist upon the execution ; and further, that as it was a deviation from the ground of negociation on which I had so rigidly insisted, namely, the restitution of things to the state they were in under Mr. Arbuthnot, it would open the question to demands on the other side. I consented, therefore, to withdraw it.

When we had finished, I told him that as all was now reduced to the point of the ships, and as he knew

my positive and ultimate determination on that subject, it was easy for him to tell me plainly whether he would sign the Treaty? After he had once more pressed me to reconsider that determination, and not to break off the peace for what he called a trifle, and after I had repeated my former resolution, he desired to see Mr. Pisani on the following day, at which time he would give him the commercial article he had promised to draw up; and he ended by proposing another meeting on the 26th, finally to take the whole business into consideration, and to conclude it. With this I was obliged to content myself.

Just before we parted, I received an account on which I could place some dependence, that two couriers had arrived in England with proposals for peace from the Emperor Alexander and from Bonaparte, and that his Majesty had been pleased to answer them by consenting to treat in concert with his allies, reckoning Portugal and Spain among the number. I communicated this intelligence in the terms in which I received it to Vaahid Efendi, and most earnestly pressed him to seize the favourable opportunity which now offered to conclude the Treaty we had been so long discussing, and to put the Porte, in her negotiations with Russia, in a situation in which she might profit by the friendship of his Majesty. I placed before him in the strongest light the advantages which the Porte would reap by the services I should be thus empowered to render her, and by making a proper use of the good dispositions of Great Britain, without the disadvantage of being bound to us by a formal alliance. I referred to the Treaty we had just settled, and to the principles therein recognised by Great Britain, as a means of placing his country in the

proudest possible situation with respect to Russia, both in conducting the negotiations for peace, and in settling the terms of future intercourse with that Power. I told him, however, that his decision must be immediate; that he could not suppose me blind to the advantages which the Ottoman Ministers would derive in the negotiations with Russia by the very circumstance of my remaining at the Dardanelles; but that I was resolved to disappoint all schemes of double politics which might be attempted, by setting sail for England, unless the Treaty were signed without further procrastination.

From Vaahid Efendi's answers I should suppose that these observations had been attended with some effect, had I not learned to attach but little importance to what is said to me.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. VIII. By Captain Prevost.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,  
January 1st. 1809.

SIR,

On the 24th of December, two days after the conference of which I had the honour to render you an account in my last despatch, Mr. Pisani came on board the Sea-Horse in order to report to me a conversation he had had that morning with Vaahid Efendi's interpreter. The object of his visit to Mr. Pisani was to bring him a Turkish copy of the Article respecting commerce, of which Vaahid Efendi had made such a point to obtain the insertion. He took

that opportunity likewise of intimating that the demand of 1,000,000*l.* would be reduced to 300,000*l.*

The article respecting commerce I agreed to accept with a slight alteration; but the reduced demand of 300,000*l.* I declared to be just as inadmissible as the former one.

With this message Mr. Pisani went the next day to Vaahid Efendi, and he returned to me the same evening with the curious proposal that I should sign the public Treaty, including the stipulation about the ships by way of preliminary articles, and that we should add to it a secret agreement by which its execution was to be suspended until the ratification of a definitive treaty. He desired Mr. Pisani at the same time to acquaint me, that if it did not suit me to agree to this proposal, he saw no use which could result from our attending the conference fixed for the next day. The nature of this communication, accompanied by a proposal so degrading, as far as it was intelligible, appearing at least to promise a speedy issue to the negotiation, I was anxious, before I closed it, to give to this misguided Government one chance more of making peace.

I accordingly deputed Mr. Pisani the next day with an offer to sign provisionally a separate instrument for an aid of 300,000*l.* under a stipulation subjecting it to a special ratification.

He returned to me the same evening with increased demands, grounded, as you will see by the under-mentioned specification of them, on a recantation of all the principles which had been before so often and so distinctly admitted: —

1. The delivery of the four Turkish men-of-war in

our possession, either by a public or a secret Article in the Treaty, for which he would give up the claim for the ships burnt in our passage up the Dardanelles.

2. Turkish property and merchant ships destroyed or taken since the war, to be restored against that of the English merchants.

3. The indemnity claimed for the above Turkish property to be admitted under no other denomination than that of compensation, and the quantum to amount to about 600,000*l*.

Seeing that nothing more was to be done, I thought it inconsistent with his Majesty's dignity to remain any longer at this place. I accordingly commissioned Mr. Pisani to give notice to the Ottoman Plenipotentiary that I had no answer to return to his proposition, and that I should sail for England on the 31st.

On the delivery of this message great regret was expressed; but he declared his instructions to be so positive that he could not recede.

From this day until the 30th, I had no further communication with Vaahid Efendi; but I learned that he was frequently consulting with the new Serasquier of the Dardanelles, Haiki Pacha, the same whom I found on my arrival invested with full powers to treat with me, who had been deposed soon afterwards, and who was now just restored to his government.

Of course I did not neglect this opportunity of congratulating *him* \* on his return to the Dardanelles, and of expressing my regret that the Ministers of the

\* Haiki Pacha.

Porte had thrown such insurmountable difficulties in the way of peace.

On the 30th I received another pressing invitation to a conference next day. I answered that it would be to no purpose, unless Vaahid Efendi would come to it with a determination to sign the Treaty; for otherwise I was resolved positively to set sail.

Every thing on board the Sea-Horse being in readiness, and the preparations for putting to sea having been made in sight of the inhabitants of the Castles, I went once more to the place of meeting. And here it is impossible for me to describe to you the state of mind in which I found Vaahid Efendi. He fairly confessed that I could do no more than I had done to facilitate this peace; and he complained that his Government had made him responsible for its conclusion on terms which he owned I could not admit. If the peace should not be signed, therefore, he said he was a lost man, and that he must take refuge in England. I need not trouble you with the particulars of this conversation, in which I made him every offer in my power to secure him from the anger of his Government. The topics of business we discussed were only such as you know already, and with which I fear I have too often fatigued you. It was closed at last in perfect amity on my part; but with all the forms of a final interview.

On my return to the ship it was nearly a calm, and much too late to reach any anchorage beyond the Castles. But I had not been an hour on board the Sea-Horse before I received a note from Mr. Pisani, informing me that Vaahid Efendi had entreated to see him the next morning. I returned for answer



that I should certainly not delay my departure beyond 10 o'clock.

In the morning at daylight all preparations were made for getting under weigh ; the anchor was a-peak, and I only waited to settle some matters with Mr. Pisani relative to the distressed situation of our Dragomans at Constantinople, when he arrived bringing me another inadmissible proposal. In a few minutes afterwards Vaahid Efendi's interpreter came on board with something of the same nature. On this I ordered them both to leave the ship, and not to return except the offer I made on the 27th were unequivocally accepted.

In less than half an hour Mr. Pisani appeared with Vaahid Efendi's compliance.

I now regard, therefore, this tedious negotiation as concluded, and hope with my next despatch to send you the Treaty.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. IX. By Captain Prevost.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,  
Jan. 6. 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that a treaty of peace between his Majesty and Sultan Mahmoud II., was yesterday signed by the Ottoman Plenipotentiary and myself.

Captain Prevost of his Majesty's sloop, the Saracen,  
VOL. I. I

will deliver to you the Treaty, together with the additional and separate Articles belonging to it.

My despatches will explain so fully the nature of them all, that I think it unnecessary to trouble you with a repetition of the various reasons which guided me in omitting some articles in my *Projet*, and receiving others from the *Contre-Projet* of Vaahid Efendi.

The secret Articles are left to the performance of his Majesty's Government in such a manner as they may judge most consistent with the public interests. I think it my duty, however, to recommend as the best way of bringing Russia to reason, the co-operation of a British squadron in any attempt which may be judged advisable against the Crimea, and likewise that all possible encouragement be given to Ali Pacha to assist in expelling the French from Albania, Dalmatia, and the Cattaro.

The Article respecting ordnance stores may be easily fulfilled, if the case should occur, and without much expense to Government, by sending out the artillery belonging to a class of frigates, mostly French prizes, which have been deemed no longer serviceable. These are described to me as long 18 pounders, which have been changed for guns of a lighter weight, and of which considerable quantities may be found at Woolwich. Of powder I understand that the quantity at Malta is more than can possibly be wanted.

The examination of the two Conventions made on the occupation of, and retreat from, Alexandria, may give some employment to his Majesty's Minister at the Porte, but can lead to no embarrassing decision.

The separate Article concerning an aid of 300,000*l*.

is so perfectly optional, and I have spoken out to the Turkish Plenipotentiary so fairly upon it, that his Majesty's Government can be put to no difficulty in refusing its ratification. All I should wish in that case is, that the Ottoman chargé d'affaires in London should be informed of the reasons for the non-ratification, and that it should be recommended to him to state them correctly to his Court.

I cannot conclude these details of the negotiation, and of the embarrassments which attended it, without acknowledging my great obligations to Captain Stewart of the Sea-Horse, without whom I could have done nothing.

After the deposition of Sultan Mustapha, the great difficulty was to set the negotiation on foot; and to effect this I do not know in what manner I could have proceeded without Captain Stewart's assistance, and above all if I had not had the benefit of the high character he has established in these seas for lenity when it was deserved, vigour when it was wanted, and disinterestedness from first to last.

His gallant action with the Turkish frigates proved serviceable rather than hurtful to me, inasmuch as it led the way to explanations by which I greatly profited in opening the business.

I will say nothing of his attentions to the whole mission during a period of nearly five months, except that they have been unremitting. It would not become me to urge his merits any further.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P.S. I am waiting only for a firman to proceed in the frigate to Constantinople with the first favourable wind.

*Literal Translation of Vaahid Efendi's full Powers.*

To the most glorious among the noble and distinguished personages, possessed of the most virtuous and praiseworthy qualifications, and protected by the mercy of the eternal God : his Excellency Sejid Mehemmed Emin Vaahid Efendi, one of the noblemen of the Ministerial line attached to my Sublime Porte, vested with the rank of " Nishangy," of the Imperial Chancery, and now appointed Plenipotentiary on the part of my high Court (may his elevation be everlasting):

Upon the receipt of this noble, Imperial writ, be it known to you that, although in consequence of some incidents peculiar to the revolution of times a disunion has taken place between my Sublime Porte and the Court of Great Britain, without its being the choice of either party, and the restoration of peace and amity between the two Courts being the sincere desire of both sides, it is expedient and necessary that a Plenipotentiary vested with full powers be appointed on the part of my Sublime Porte, in order to hold conferences and negotiate a peace with the Plenipotentiary that has been named by the aforementioned Court of Great Britain. Wherefore, it being manifest to our Imperial knowledge that among the noblemen of the ministerial line attached to my high Court, you above-named Efendi are more particularly endowed with every quality of prudence, judgment, rectitude, and fidelity, and are known in the long course of time that you have been employed in affairs of the most important and secret nature under my Imperial Court to have given proofs of an agreeable

disposition, and the most loyal principles, it is our Imperial expectation and hope that at all times you will continue to render satisfactory services, and to give fresh proofs of the same loyal principles as duly becomes the dignity and high rank of my Sublime Porte, and the honour of my Imperial person.

My Imperial will being, therefore, fixed upon your being chosen and appointed Plenipotentiary on this important business, to act on our illustrious Imperial side, and the most glorious among Christian princes, the most eminent amidst the celebrated grandees professing the faith of the Messiah, the conciliator of the affairs of the Christian commonwealth, decorated with the marks of majesty and honour, and possessing the badges of glory and fame, the Padishah (Emperor) of the United Kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland, the most majestic and most honoured George III., whose end may be attended with happiness, having also deputed and appointed a Plenipotentiary on his side : ample permission and full undoubted powers are therefore hereby given you to hold conferences with the above Plenipotentiary, and to restore amity and peace in a manner becoming the dignity and rank of my Sublime Porte, and consistently with the honour of my Imperial person.

You are therefore to proceed (inploring first the assistance of God Almighty) to hold conferences with the Plenipotentiary appointed by the English Court as above, and to treat with him for the restoration of amity and peace, and when you will have known it to be certain and positive that whatever you may think it right and expedient to do for terminating and concluding that peace, after holding meetings

and conferences as above, shall be accepted and approved on our Imperial side, and that the ratifications shall also be sent at the time that will be appointed; this Imperial firman is issued, I giving you thereby ample power to exchange acts for the purpose of framing this salutary peace on a proper footing, and bringing it to a conclusion; further authorising you to put your seal and signature to the same purpose and effect.

I therefore hereby order and command that you shall act according to the noble tenor of these Imperial full powers issued as above; that you shall know and acknowledge the same such as they are; and that you shall place full faith in this Imperial signet.

Given at our Imperial residence of Constantinople towards the end of the moon Sciaban, in the Turkish year 1223, *i. e.* towards the end of September, 1808.

(*A true translation.*)

(Signed) B. PISANI.

*Treaty of Peace between His Majesty and the Sublime Porte, signed January 5, 1809.*

Au nom de Dieu très miséricordieux :

L'objet de cet instrument fidèle et authentique est ce qui suit :

Nonobstant les apparences d'une mésintelligence survenue à la suite des évènements du tems entre la Cour de la Grande Bretagne et la Sublime Porte Ottomane; ces deux puissances également animées du désir sincère de rétablir l'ancienne amitié qui subsistoit entre Elles, ont nommé pour cet effet leurs

Plénipotentiaires respectifs : savoir, sa Majesté le très auguste et très honoré George III., Roi (Padi-shah) du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande a nommé pour son Plénipotentiaire Robert Adair, Ecuyer, Membre du Parlement Impérial de la Grande Bretagne ; et sa Majesté le très majestueux, très puissant, et très magnifique Sultan Mahinoud Han II., Empereur des Ottomans, a nommé pour son Plénipotentiaire Sejid Mehemmed Emin Vaa hid Efendi, Directeur et Inspecteur du Département appelé Mercoufat, et revêtu du rang de Nichangi du Divan Impérial, lesquels s'étant réciproquement communiqués leurs pleins pouvoirs, ont après plusieurs conférences et discussions conclu la paix également désirée des deux puissances, et sont convenus des articles suivans :

*Article I.*

Du moment de la signature du présent Traité, tout acte d'hostilité doit cesser entre l'Angleterre et la Turquie ; et les prisonniers de part et d'autre doivent, en vertu de cette heureuse paix, être échangés sans hésitation en trente et un jours après l'époque de la signature de ce Traité ou plutôt si faire se pourra.

*Article II.*

S'il se trouvera des places appartenantes à la Sublime Porte dans l'occupation de la Grande Bretagne, elles devront être restituées et remises à la Sublime Porte avec tous les canons, munitions, et autres effets dans la même condition où elles se trouvaient lors de

leur occupation par l'Angleterre, et cette restitution devra se faire dans l'espace de trente et un jours après la signature de ce présent Traité.

*Article III.*

S'il y auraient des effets et propriétés appartenans aux négociants Anglais en séquestre sous la juridiction de la Sublime Porte ils doivent être entièrement rendus et remis aux propriétaires ; et pareillement s'il y auraient des effets, propriétés, et vaisseaux appartenans aux négociants et sujets de la Sublime Porte en séquestre à Malthe ou dans les autres isles et états de sa Majesté Britannique, ils doivent être également entièrement rendus et remis à leurs propriétaires.

*Article IV.*

Le Traité des Capitulations stipulé en l'année Turque mil quatre-vingt-six à la mi de la lune Gem-maziel Ahir, ainsi que l'acte relatif au commerce de la Mer Noire, et les autres privilèges (Imtiazat) également établis par des actes à des époques subséquentes, doivent être observés et maintenus comme par le passé, comme s'ils n'avaient souffert aucune interruption.

*Article V.*

En vertu du bon traitement et de la faveur accordé par la Sublime Porte aux négociants Anglois à l'égard de leurs marchandises et propriétés et par rapport à



tout ce dont leurs vaisseaux ont besoin, ainsi que dans tous les objets tendants à faciliter leur commerce ; l'Angleterre accordera réciproquement sa pleine faveur et un traitement amical aux pavillons sujets et négociants de la Sublime Porte qui dorénavant fréquenteront les états de sa Majesté Britannique pour y exercer le commerce.

*Article VI.*

Le Tarif de la Douane qui a été fixé à Constantinople en dernier lieu sur l'ancien taux de trois pour cent, et spécialement l'article qui regarde le commerce intérieur, seront observés pour toujours ainsi qu'ils ont été réglés ; ce à quoi l'Angleterre promet de se conformer.

*Article VII.*

Les ambassadeurs de sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande Bretagne jouiront pleinement des honneurs dont jouissent les ambassadeurs des autres nations près la Sublime Porte ; et réciproquement les ambassadeurs de la Sublime Porte près la Cour de Londres jouiront pleinement de tous les honneurs qui seront accordés aux ambassadeurs de la Grande Bretagne.

*Article VIII.*

Il sera permis de nommer des Shahbenders (consuls) à Malthe et dans les états de sa Majesté Britannique où il sera nécessaire pour gerer et inspecter les affaires et les intérêts des négociants de la Sublime Porte, et

les mêmes traitemens et immunités qui sont pratiqués envers les consuls d'Angleterre résidents dans les Etats Ottomans seront exactement observés envers les Shahbenders de la Sublime Porte.

*Article IX.*

Les ambassadeurs et consuls d'Angleterre pourront selon l'usage se servir des Dragomans dont ils ont besoin ; mais comme il a été arrêté ci-devant d'un commun accord que la Sublime Porte n'accordera point de Barât de Dragoman en faveur d'individus qui n'exerceront point cette fonction dans le lieu de leur destination, il est convenu conformément à ce principe que dorénavant il ne sera accordé de Barât à personne de la classe des artisans et banquiers, ni à quiconque tiendra de boutique et de fabrique dans les marchés publics, ou qui prêtera la main aux affaires de cette nature ; et il ne sera pas nommé non plus des consuls Anglois d'entre les sujets de la Sublime Porte.

*Article X.*

La patente de protection Anglaise ne sera accordée à personne d'entre les dépendants et négociants sujets de la Sublime Porte, et il ne sera livré à ceux-ci aucun passeport \* de la part des ambassadeurs ou consuls sans la permission préalable de la Sublime Porte.

*Article XI.*

Comme il a été de tout tems défendu aux vaisseaux de guerre d'entrer dans le Canal de Constantinople,

\* Passeport de protection.

savoir dans le détroit des Dardanelles et dans celui de la Mer Noire, et comme cette ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman doit être de même observée dorénavant en tems de paix vis-à-vis de toute puissance quelconque, la Cour Britannique promet aussi de se conformer à ce principe.

*Article XII.*

Les ratifications du présent traité de paix entre les hautes parties contractantes seront échangées à Constantinople dans l'espace de quatre-vingt-onze jours depuis la date du présent Traité ou plutôt si faire se pourra.

En foi de quoi et afin que la ratification des douze Articles de ce Traité qui vient d'être heureusement conclu avec l'assistance de Dieu, et en vertu de la sincérité et loyauté des deux parties, puisse être échangée ; Moi, Plénipotentiaire de la Sublime Porte, ai en vertu de mes pleins pouvoirs signé et cacheté cet instrument, lequel j'ai remis au Plénipotentiaire Anglais en échange contre un autre instrument tout-à-fait conforme écrit en langue Française, avec sa traduction, qui m'a été remis de sa part conformément à ses pleins pouvoirs.

Fait près des Châteaux des Dardanelles, le 5 Janvier, 1809, qui correspond à l'an de l'Hegire, 1223, le 19 de la lune Zilkaadé.

(L.S.)      SEJID MEHEMMED EMIN VAAHID EFENDI.

No. X. By Captain Prevost.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

H.M.S. Sea-Horse, Port Barbieri,  
Jan. 6. 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches of the 20th of August by Mr. Baker.

The despatches of Sir Harford Jones I have forwarded to Persia, with a letter from myself, informing him of the conclusion of peace between his Majesty and the sublime Porte.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

(*Private. — By Vienna.*)

Pera, February 10. 1809.

DEAR SIR,

I ARRIVED here in the Sea-Horse on the 26th ult. The first thing I did was to send to the Internuncio; but he had no letters for me, nor any further communications from Vienna. His last instructions enjoin him still to keep up the appearance of friendly intercourse with the French mission. This, however, has been rendered impossible by the conduct of the chargé d'affaires of France, who has broken off all intercourse with him under pretence of his having received the gentlemen of the English mission at his house.

I am glad to find that my language during the

negotiation respecting the Russian peace, and the cession of the two provinces, is precisely such as has been held here by the Court of Vienna. This, and particularly the warm interest felt at Vienna about the fate of Servia, has encouraged me to write to my correspondent a letter of which the inclosed is the substance.

No account has been received of the arrival of the Turkish Plenipotentiaries at Jassy. All rational speculation is against their obtaining the restoration of the provinces. There can be no doubt that Bonaparte will now encourage Russia to hold them.

It is believed at the Porte that the war has again broken out between Russia and Persia, that General Gardanne has withdrawn himself from the Court of Persia, and that Sir Harford Jones has been received there.

No accounts of the affairs of Spain since the entry of the French into Madrid have reached this place. I have received none even of that event.

The French mission keeps its ground notwithstanding all the threats of the chargé d'affaires. I have got possession of two notes from him of the 17th and 19th of January, requiring the Porte even then to break with England. The Porte is about to answer them, and I hope in the manner and even in the terms I have suggested. I will send these papers by a brig which is waiting at Smyrna for my despatches, as soon as I know whether I am to have an audience of the Sultan.

I have taken measures to secure a direct communication with the Ottoman Plenipotentiary at Jassy, and to act with relation to the negotiations there, in entire concert with the Court of Vienna.

I am, dear Sir, &c.

No. XI. Four Inclosures. By the Roneo.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, February 19. 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that I arrived at Constantinople in His Majesty's ship the Sea-Horse on the 26th ult.

It was not until yesterday that I could see the Caimakan, and the other officers of State. I myself deferred these visits until I could ascertain whether it was the intention of the Sultan to grant me an audience. Having no credentials except my full powers as Plenipotentiary, I had no right to demand one; but feeling it to be of the utmost importance in the present situation of affairs that this distinction should be granted to me, I let it be understood (although in the mildest manner) that it would be the condition of my transacting any official business with the Porte. The point, after some difficulty, has been conceded, and the audience is to take place within a few days.

Immediately on my arrival I had a meeting with the Internuncio. I found him very little informed either of what is transacting on the Continent, or of the general views of his own Court. I thought it best therefore to write directly to Vienna, and I inclose you a copy of my letter to Count Stadion (A).

I have taken the necessary steps to obtain intelligence of all that may be transacted at Jassy, and I rather hope to be able in some degree to influence the negotiations there.

\* \* \* \*

The three notes (B, C, D) I have here the honour of inclosing will afford a proof of the diligence of those who have engaged to serve me on these occasions.

Of the internal state of this Empire, I am not yet able to send you any detailed account. In general, I am sorry to say that the tranquillity which it now enjoys does not appear likely to last. The Sultan is a man of firmness, but no confidence subsists between him and the Janissaries. No Grand Vizier is as yet named, consequently there is no fixed administration. What is still worse, I am afraid there is no army to oppose to Russia.

I am of course without any means of knowing what effect the peace just signed with England is likely to produce on the councils of Russia. Its effect on those of France the Turks do not appear much to dread. Their army is tolerably strong on the side of Bosnia and Albania, and they rely with confidence on our keeping a sufficient number of frigates and sloops stationed off Corfu and in the Adriatic to prevent any reinforcements from reaching the French army in Dalmatia. I trust that his Majesty's Government will permit me to recommend this object to its particular attention.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A.

*Mr. Adair to Count Stadion.*

Pera, ce 9 Février, 1809.

JE saisis cette occasion, Monsieur le Comte, de vous donner des nouvelles de mon arrivée à Constantinople

dans la frégate de sa Majesté le Sea-Horse. La manière dont les relations diplomatiques de nos Cours avoient terminé l'année passée ne me paroissant pas exclure les communications intéressantes que deux Gouvernemens essentiellement amis pourroient avoir à se faire réciproquement, je me suis adressé aussitôt à Monsieur l'Internonce pour lui témoigner l'impatience avec laquelle je désirois m'entretenir avec lui sur les objets importans dont il est question dans ce moment. Il eut la bonté de m'envoyer son premier interprète dont j'ai toute raison d'être content. J'ai appris de lui que M. l'Internonce vous avoit envoyé copie de ma lettre du 6 Janvier\*, et c'est avec une satisfaction véritable que je me suis aperçu que le langage dont je me suis servi dans le cours de ma négociation a été précisément ce qui convenoit au système de la Cour de Vienne relativement à la paix entre la Porte et la Russie. Afin d'encourager les Turcs à tenir ferme contre la cession des deux provinces j'ai autorisé le négociateur Ottoman à Jassy à faire sentir aux Russes que l'Angleterre ayant fait la paix avec la Porte, s'intéressoit de la manière la plus vive à la conservation de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de son Empire; et à déclarer en même temps que j'étois muni des pouvoirs nécessaires ou pour donner la main à la confection de la paix entre eux, ou pour fournir à la Porte toute l'aide dont Elle pourroit avoir besoin pour la continuation de la guerre.

J'ai non seulement autorisé les Plénipotentiaires Ottomans à parler sur ce ton, mais je dois vous dire

\* Announcing the signature of the peace with Turkey.



que j'ai même pris un engagement avec la Porte qui témoigne l'intérêt que prend le Gouvernement de sa Majesté à son existence comme puissance Européenne. Il est vrai que cet engagement ne renferme pas, comme de raison, la garantie de ses états, mais il est d'une nature à engager la bonne foi de l'Angleterre à lui procurer, autant qu'il dépendroit d'Elle, une paix honorable, et basée sur la restitution de ses provinces. Pour m'ouvrir à vous de la manière dont il faut toujours agir en traitant des affaires de cette nature, je ne suis pas autorisé à admettre cette clause de garantie sans la concurrence de la Russie. Or, l'intention de mon Gouvernement étant claire, que par la Russie on vouloit dire *Puissance du premier ordre qui avoisine aux Etats de la Porte*, je me sens pleinement autorisé à y substituer l'Autriche en cas de nécessité. Vous jugerez d'après vos connoissances des projets de Bonaparte, si celui d'une triple alliance entre l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, et la Porte pourroit présenter quelque moyen de salut pour ce qui nous reste en Europe de liberté et d'indépendance. L'utilité d'un engagement pareil n'auroit pas sans doute de quoi mériter un examen bien profond, si ce n'est à cause des liaisons encore mystérieuses, et du système plus inexplicable que jamais, de la Russie. Sous ce rapport, et en supposant que la Russie en voudroit à l'Autriche, il me semble que l'alliance de l'Angleterre, la Suède, et la Porte pourroit vous offrir quelques avantages défensifs de ce côté là. Au reste, cette ouverture même, lors même qu'elle n'auroit pas d'autre suite, pourroit vous devenir utile dans le cas où vous trouveriez nécessaire de forcer la Cour de St. Petersbourg à se déclarer sur son système.

J'ai l'honneur d'être.

Inclosure B in Mr. Adair's No. XI.

*Translation of an official Note presented by the Porte to the French Chargé d'Affaires, resident at Constantinople, January 14th, 1809.*

*The Porte to the French Chargé d'Affaires.*

L'AFFAIRE Anglaise est une des preuves fortes et évidentes de la sincérité, de la loyauté, et de la constance des sentimens que la Sublime Porte a de tout tems professés pour le Gouvernement François. Les conférences qui ont eu lieu avec M. le Chargé d'Affaires tendent toutes à prouver qu'on n'y a point atteinte.

Il n'existoit entre la Sublime Porte et la Grande Bretagne aucun motif d'éloignement et d'animosité. Ce n'est donc que par pure complaisance pour le Gouvernement François et pour lui prouver la loyauté de ses sentimens, que la Sublime Porte s'est mise en état de guerre avec l'Angleterre, qu'Elle a éprouvé des pertes sensibles, et qu'Elle a essuyé des désagrémens sans nombre. La Sublime Porte avoit lieu de s'attendre à de la réciprocité de la part du Gouvernement François; Elle n'en a point éprouvé, et cependant Elle n'a pas été moins constante dans ses principes.

Un Plénipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne s'est rendu l'année dernière aux Dardanelles avec des offres de paix à la Sublime Porte. Comment s'en est-il retourné? M. le Chargé d'Affaires de France sait très bien comment les négociations ont été entamées. Il n'ignore point toutes les peines que l'on s'est données pour les traîner en longueur, malgré la présence aux

Dardanelles du Plénipotentiaire Britannique avec des forces maritimes Angloises. Tout homme sensé et juste conviendra que tous ces faits tendent à prouver d'une manière victorieuse la sincérité des dispositions de la Sublime Porte pour la France.

Quoique M. le Chargé d'Affaires ait officiellement annoncé à la Sublime Porte, qu' à la suite de l'entrevue des Empereurs de France et de Russie à Erfurt, des courriers ont été expédiés par ces deux Souverains en Angleterre avec des offres de paix, quoique le Plénipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne, qui se trouve depuis quelques mois aux Dardanelles, s'y fût rendu avec la commission expresse de faire des propositions pacifiques à la Sublime Porte, cependant la Sublime Porte, d'après la loyauté des sentimens qui l'animent, a fait tout son possible pour temporiser, mais il est enfin devenu impossible de prolonger davantage. Le Plénipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne a insisté sur l'option de l'un de ces deux partis—ou de conclure la paix, ou de recommencer les hostilités, et il a demandé une réponse cathégorique. Ces informations ayant été transmises à la Sublime Porte par Vaahid Efendi chargé de la négociation et ensuite par Son Excellence Hakki Pacha, il s'est aussitôt tenu chez le Scheih-ul-Islam un conseil composé des Ulemas et des Ministres de l'état. Après que la matière a été bien discutée, et qu'il a été pris en considération, que si le Plénipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne étoit dans le cas de s'en retourner sans avoir rien conclu, il en résulteroit, vû la supériorité des forces maritimes de l'Angleterre, des préjudices infinis pour les côtes de l'Empire Ottoman ; il est en conséquence émané un Fetwa qui a prononcé que la loi ne permet point de se refuser aux

propositions d'une Puissance qui ne demande que le retour de l'amitié et de la bonne harmonie. C'est d'après cela que la paix avec l'Angleterre a été arrêtée et conclue par un Instrument signé.

La paix de la Sublime Porte avec l'Angleterre est purement et simplement le renouvellement des anciens rapports réciproques d'amitié. C'est sous ce point de vue qu'il faut l'envisager, et la Sublime Porte n'entend qu'il soit porté la moindre atteinte aux sentimens qu'Elle a toujours professés pour la France.

Comme M. le Général Sebastiani pendant sa résidence à Constantinople a approuvé la paix de la Sublime Porte avec la Grande Bretagne, convenant de la supériorité de cette Puissance sur mer, et de tout le mal qu'Elle pouvoit faire à la Sublime Porte, comme M. le Chargé d'Affaires de son côté a déclaré plus d'une fois que si la paix générale venoit à se conclure à la suite des propositions faites à l'Angleterre par la France et la Russie, la Sublime Porte y seroit infailliblement comprise, et comme enfin il seroit impossible de traîner les négociations en longueur jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix générale pendant que le Plénipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne attend aux Dardanelles, la Sublime Porte est justifiée par toutes ces considérations, et Elle a été forcée de terminer. Il se trouve ainsi qu'un des obstacles pour la conclusion de la paix générale est aplani. On ne peut pas désapprouver que la Sublime Porte ait de cette manière rétabli ses anciennes relations avec la Grande Bretagne. Sa Majesté l'Empereur Napoléon connu par ses sentimens de modération et de générosité et tous les ministres de France en conviendront infailliblement. La Sublime Porte a tout lieu de s'y attendre d'après

les sentimens qu'Elle professe pour le Gouvernement François ; ses dispositions sincères et amicales n'ont jamais variées ; elles seront inaltérables et Elle se flatte que la France usera de réciprocité à son égard.

C'est dans cette vue que la présente note a été remise à M. le Chargé d'Affaires.

Inclosure C in Mr. Adair's No. XI.

*Copy of a Note from the Chargé d'Affaires of France at the Ottoman Court to His Excellency the Reis Efendi, dated Constantinople, Jan. 17th, 1809.*

*The French Chargé d'Affaires to the Reis Efendi.*

LE Soussigné Auditeur au Conseil d'Etat, Chargé d'Affaires de S. M. l'Empereur des François, Roi d'Italie, et protecteur de la Confédération du Rhin, près la Porte Ottomane, a lu avec beaucoup de chagrin le contenu de la Note officielle qui lui a été remise par la Sublime Porte le 28 de Zilkaadé, pour lui annoncer le rétablissement de la paix entre la Sublime Porte et l'Angleterre. Les événemens qui se sont passés en Europe depuis plusieurs années, et les communications du Soussigné avec les Ministres, ont dû assez leur faire connaître que dans le système actuel de l'Europe, un Etat qui contracte amitié avec l'Angleterre rompt par ce fait même toute amitié avec la France. Le Soussigné, dont le premier devoir est de resserrer les liens qui unissent la Sublime Porte et la France, n'a donc pu apprendre sans une vive douleur

un acte de la Sublime Porte aussi opposé à l'objet de sa mission.

La Sublime Porte a porté atteinte d'une manière bien sensible à son ancienne union avec la France. Mais ce qui aggrave singulièrement ses torts et qui leur donne un caractère qu'il sera désormais bien difficile d'effacer, c'est que par cette funeste décision Elle a violé des promesses solennelles souvent réitérées. La Porte n'a pas seulement blessé l'amitié de la France — Elle a manqué de foi à un grand et puissant Souverain ; Elle l'a offensé, et le Soussigné, accoutumé par sentiment et par devoir à faire les vœux les plus sincères et les plus ardents pour la prospérité de la Sublime Porte, ne prévoit pas sans frémir les résultats déplorables que doit avoir cette offense, *faite à un prince qui n'a jamais laissé une injure impunie et que le soin de sa propre gloire oblige à venger les outrages d'une manière éclatante.*

La Sublime Porte atteste dans sa Note son amitié pour la France, et Elle apporte pour preuve de cette amitié l'affaire même de l'Angleterre. Elle affirme qu'Elle n'a continué sa guerre avec l'Angleterre, (guerre selon Elle désastreuse pour l'Empire,) qu'Elle n'a renvoyé le premier négociateur Anglois, qu'Elle n'a trompé pendant trois mois celui-ci que par égard pour la France, et pour entretenir son amitié avec Elle. Mais comment la Sublime Porte ne voit-Elle pas que si Elle a fait des sacrifices si grands, selon sa Note, seulement pour entretenir l'amitié de la France, il a fallu qu'Elle fut convaincue que ces sacrifices étoient nécessaires pour que l'amitié subsistât, et qu'ainsi, au moment où ces prétendus sacrifices cessent, l'amitié est détruite ? C'est donc à tort que

la Sublime Porte réclame cette amitié précisément au moment qu'Elle vient de l'anéantir.

La Sublime Porte reconnoît qu'Elle avoit donné à la France la promesse de ne point faire avant Elle la paix avec l'Angleterre, puisque dans sa Note Elle s'appuie, pour rompre cette promesse, sur ce qu'Elle a attendu vainement jusqu'ici la compensation qu'Elle avoit lieu d'espérer de la France. Mais une semblable excuse est misérable. Car en supposant que la France eût promis cette compensation dont parle la Sublime Porte, rien n'a prouvé jusqu'à présent que cette compensation ne sera pas donnée. Les choses en sont maintenant à cet égard dans le même état qu'elles étoient lorsque la guerre de la Porte avec l'Angleterre a commencé. Des troupes étrangères occupoient plusieurs provinces Ottomanes ; elles les occupent encore à la vérité, mais rien n'a été statué sur le sort des provinces, et rien n'indique que cette compensation ait été refusée. Ainsi dans le cas même où il auroit été donné entre les deux états des promesses réciproques, il est évident que la Porte romproit sa promesse tandis que la France n'a point rompu la sienne.

Mais il est ridicule, lorsqu'il s'agit de la destinée des Empires, de s'appuyer sur des chicanes pueriles ; et la Sublime Porte, au lieu de chercher de fausses excuses, et de mauvaises raisons pour l'encourager à faire une faute qui peut la précipiter dans des malheurs incalculables, auroit dû s'élever à de grandes idées.

Elle auroit dû voir que l'Empereur Napoléon est un homme extraordinaire envoyé par la Providence pour changer la face de l'Europe, et la délivrer du joug maritime de l'Angleterre. Elle auroit dû sentir

la sublimité du système de l'Empereur qui consiste à exclure les Anglois du Continent pour les forcer à rendre au Continent les droits qu'il a aussi bien qu'eux à la navigation des Mers. Elle auroit dû se rappeler que pour l'établissement de ce système les batailles memorables d'Austerlitz, de Jena, de Friedland ont été livrées, et que pour le même objet l'Empereur a planté de sa propre main ses aigles victorieuses dans Vienne, dans Berlin, et jusque sur les frontières de la Russie ; que pour s'être opposés à ce système plusieurs états ont perdu leurs plus belles provinces, et plusieurs Souverains leur couronne. Elle auroit dû considérer que l'Espagne est dans ce moment ravagée pour s'être détachée de ce système que l'Europe demande, et qui est conservateur de sa liberté ; enfin Elle auroit dû sentir que ce système est établi au prix du sang précieux des François, et qu'ainsi tout état qui le rompt et qui s'en détache doit être considéré comme l'ennemi mortel et déclaré de la France.

La Porte auroit dû ne pas oublier qu'Elle a de puissants et de redoutables ennemis ; que ces ennemis peuvent profiter de l'état de désordre et de faiblesse où se trouve l'Empire pour y faire une invasion et en prendre possession ; que jusqu'à présent ils n'ont été retenus que par l'amitié de la France pour la Porte ; qu'ainsi cette amitié devoit être précieusement conservée ; que l'Empereur ne demandoit pour l'entretenir et pour garantir la Porte contre cette invasion et cette prise de possession (ainsi que le Soussigné l'a déclaré à la Sublime Porte) que la continuation de la guerre entre la Porte et l'Angleterre ; que du moment où l'obstacle posé par l'amitié de l'Empereur



pour les Turcs sera levé, rien ne sauroit plus défendre les Turcs contre leurs ennemis, et que même il est possible que le ressentiment de l'Empereur, et le besoin de venger sa dignité outragée, le portent à se joindre à ces ennemis. Quel secours donnera alors l'Angleterre à la Sublime Porte ?

C'est en vain que la Porte prétend justifier sa défection par sa faiblesse et par la force des Anglois. Les Anglois n'ont que des vaisseaux, lesquels ne peuvent rien contre la Terre-ferme. Quelques villes peuvent souffrir ; mais ne vaut-il pas mieux s'exposer à un mal partiel, qu'à des maux qui peuvent accabler à la fois tout l'Empire ? Le Dannemarc a été attaqué par l'Angleterre à cause de son amitié pour la France : ses villes, ses ports ont souffert ; mais au lieu de se soumettre à l'Angleterre, il lui fait depuis lors une guerre active ; et cependant le Dannemarc est un état dont le territoire est dix fois moindre que celui de l'Empire Ottoman. Pourquoi montre-t-il plus de force et de fermeté dans ses promesses ?

D'ailleurs l'excuse tirée de la faiblesse n'est rien aux yeux d'un grand Prince comme l'Empereur, qui ne veut que des amis forts et fermes dans leur système. Il faut à l'Empereur des alliés sûrs, et qui ne l'exposent point par une défection imprévue à voir déranger les vastes plans qu'il médite. L'Empereur qui forme et soutient un immense Empire, qui se voit conduit pas à pas par un génie supérieur, et favorisé par le ciel dans toutes ses entreprises, peut-il souffrir patiemment qu'un acte misérable de faiblesse trouble ses grands desseins ?

Je sou mets à la Sublime Porte ces réflexions importantes pour Elle. J'ai toujours eu pour le nom

Musulman un zèle véritable, et je dois convenir que les Ministres m'ont toujours rendu la justice de le reconnoître. Je leur ai dit toujours la vérité, et la vérité toute entière. Je l'ai dû faire plus que jamais dans une occasion aussi décisive pour le salut de l'état.

Si la Sublime Porte a quelque amour pour ses intérêts, Elle doit rompre sans délai avec l'Angleterre. Elle peut le faire maintenant sans danger, et le parti contraire l'expose à de grands désastres.

Avant de terminer cette Note le Soussigné relevera une erreur qui est contenue dans celle de la Sublime Porte. Il est dit que S. E. le Général Sebastiani avoit lui-même conseillé à la Sublime Porte en diverses occasions de faire la paix avec l'Angleterre. Cet ambassadeur est trop éclairé et s'est montré toujours trop attaché aux intérêts de la Sublime Porte pour avoir pu lui conseiller de prendre un parti aussi dangereux pour Elle. Le Soussigné a eu connoissance de toutes les Notes que S. E. le Général Sebastiani a remises à la Sublime Porte pendant le cours de sa mission ; il a assisté à toutes les conférences qu'il a eues avec le Ministère, et il peut certifier que jamais un conseil aussi pernicieux et aussi contraire à la prospérité de l'Empire Ottoman n'a été donné par lui à la Sublime Porte.

Le Soussigné renouvelle à Son Excellence le Reis Efendi les assurances de sa haute considération.

(Signé)

FALJ LATOUR MAUBOURG.

Inclosure D in Mr. Adair's No. XI.

*Copy of a Note from the Chargé d'Affaires of France at the Sublime Porte to His Excellency the Reis Efendi, dated January 19th, 1809.*

*The French Chargé d'Affaires to the Reis Efendi.*

LE Soussigné, Auditeur au Conseil d'Etat, Chargé d'Affaires de S. M. l'Empereur des François, Roi d'Italie, et Protecteur de la Confédération du Rhin, près la Porte Ottomane, en répondant à la Note par laquelle S. E. le Reis Efendi lui a fait connoître le rétablissement de la paix entre la Sublime Porte et l'Angleterre a omis de parler d'un objet qui est contenu dans cette Note, parceque cet objet a paru au Soussigné être assez important pour faire le sujet d'une note particulière.

S. E. le Reis Efendi paroît supposer dans la dite Note que la conduite tenue par la Sublime Porte depuis quatre mois à l'égard de l'Angleterre a été concertée entre la Sublime Porte et le Soussigné, et approuvée par lui. D'où il suivroit que le Soussigné a reçu dès long-tems connaissance par la S. P. elle-même de son rapprochement avec l'Angleterre, et y a prêté les mains; supposition qui ferait injure aux sentimens connus du Soussigné, et qui seroit bien opposée à l'attachement qu'il a sans cesse témoigné à la S. P., et au zèle qu'il a montré pour la gloire et la prospérité de l'Empire Ottoman.

Il est nécessaire d'établir ici les faits dans toute leur vérité.

Lorsque les Anglois parurent aux Dardanelles demandant à négocier avec la Sublime Porte, S. E. le Reis

Efendi, Galib Efendi, observa au Soussigné que la situation déplorable dans laquelle se trouvoit l'Empire le mettoit hors d'état de supporter les éclats qu'un refus brusque pourroit occasionner, que la Capitale surtout divisée en plusieurs factions courroit les plus grands dangers à l'apparition d'une flotte ennemie. S. E. le Reis Efendi rappela au Soussigné que lors de l'arrivée de M. Paget, la douceur mise dans les refus avoit épargné à la S. P. les maux qu'Elle craignoit, et que dans cette occasion la Porte avoit su concilier son avantage et la sûreté de sa Capitale avec son attachement au système de la France, et l'exécution des promesses faites à sa Majesté l'Empereur des François.

S. E. le Reis Efendi déclara au Soussigné que la S. P. étoit dans l'intention d'agir cette fois comme la première, et il renouvela la promesse si souvent réitérée que la S. P. ne se détacheroit jamais du système de la France et ne feroit point avant elle la paix avec l'Angleterre.

Le Soussigné prévint dès lors que cette affaire alloit être traitée avec lenteur, et il annonça à la S. P. les dangers auxquels Elle s'exposoit. Il lui déclara que le seul moyen de s'assurer une prospérité solide et durable, étoit de montrer un véritable attachement au système de la France, et une grande fermeté dans l'exécution des promesses faites à l'Empereur. Le Soussigné approuva sans doute le parti que vouloit prendre la S. P. de choisir parmi les différentes manières de refuser et d'éconduire l'agent Anglois, celle qui pourroit le mieux convenir aux intérêts de l'Empire. Le Soussigné étoit trop véritablement (et par devoir et par affection) attaché à la gloire de sa Hautesse pour ne pas en agir ainsi. Mais il re-

présenta, non pas une seule fois, mais toutes les fois qu'il eut l'honneur de conférer avec les Ministres, combien le plan dilatoire qu'ils paroissent vouloir adopter étoit périlleux et opposé à la dignité de la S. P. Le Soussigné fit voir aux Ministres quel inconvénient il y avoit à jeter dans l'esprit de l'Empereur des soupçons sur la fidélité de la S. P. dans un tems où ce prince, lié avec l'Empereur de Russie par une étroite amitié, pouvoit défendre auprès de lui d'une manière efficace les intérêts de l'Empire Ottoman ou bien les abandonner. En un mot le Soussigné montra aux Ministres qu'une conduite franche et ferme pouvoit seule lui convenir, et que tout retardement dans cette affaire lui deviendroit funeste. Le Soussigné atteste ici à l'appui de ces faits les protocoles des conférences qu'il a eues avec les Ministres depuis cette époque, les Notes qu'il a remises à la Porte depuis le même tems, et le témoignage même des Ministres.

Le Soussigné, frappé des dangers dans lesquels la S. P. alloit se précipiter, n'étoit pas même touché des raisons tirées de l'état de trouble et de désordre dans lequel se trouvoit l'Empire. Le Soussigné voyoit bien que cette situation difficile mettoit la Porte dans l'obligation de conserver avec plus de soin que jamais l'appui et la puissante amitié de S. M. l'Empereur des François. Le Soussigné, considérant que la S. P. étoit dans une de ces circonstances délicates qui décident ordinairement, selon le tour qu'elles prennent, de la prospérité ou de la ruine des Empires, et animé par un zèle ardent pour la gloire de sa Hautesse, se permit de parler à la Sublime Porte avec une liberté et une franchise qui ne peuvent se trouver jamais que

dans une amitié véritable. Le Soussigné ne craignit pas de dire que si la Sublime Porte étoit portée par la crainte à retenir les Anglois, cette conduite étoit un acte indigne de foiblesse ; que la foiblesse ne soutenoit point les Empires, mais bien la vigueur et la force, et qu'il étoit sûr qu'un état arrivé au point de manquer de foi à ses amis pour fléchir devant ses ennemis, n'eût jamais pu reprendre ensuite ce degré de gloire et de splendeur qui convient à la grandeur du nom Musulman, et où la France a toujours désiré qu'il s'élevât.

Le Soussigné, qui a été entraîné par son zèle pour le salut de l'Empire jusqu'à des observations aussi hardies et aussi délicates, a donc été bien loin d'approuver aucune espèce de rapprochement entre la Sublime Porte et l'Angleterre.

Durant les derniers mois qui se sont écoulés, le Soussigné, voyant que la Sublime Porte étoit entraînée dans un abyme profond par une fatalité malheureuse, ou plutôt par les intrigues détestables de quelques hommes traîtres à leur Souverain et indignes de vivre, il s'est permis plusieurs fois de parler à L. L. E. E. les Ministres, et de leur dépeindre l'enormité des dangers dans lesquels ils alloient faire tomber leur pays, avec beaucoup de force et d'énergie. Le Soussigné se flatte que les Ministres (et notamment S. E. le Reis Efendi), pour lesquels il est plein de respect et d'attachement, n'auront vu dans les expressions du Soussigné que les effets de son zèle. Ce zèle pour les Musulmans, avec lequel le Soussigné a travaillé de tous ses efforts pour les empêcher de faire la plus grande faute qu'ils puissent commettre, n'est point éteint, quoiqu'il n'ait point eu le succès que le Sous-

signé désiroit. Le Soussigné va s'employer tout entier à prévenir les resultats funestes que doit avoir cette faute commise, de même qu'il l'a employé, avant qu'elle le fût, à faire connoître à la Sublime Porte quels devoient être ces résultats. Le Soussigné fait les vœux les plus sincères pour que S. M. l'Empereur des François, son auguste Souverain, se rappelant dans cette occasion l'ancienne amitié que la France a toujours eue pour l'Empire Ottoman, lui pardonne, en faveur de cette amitié, l'offense grave qu'il vient d'en recevoir, et accepte les excuses de la S. P. Le Soussigné déclare ici qu'il a plaidé de tout son pouvoir auprès de son Souverain la cause de la Sublime Porte, et qu'il a cru dans cette occasion, comme dans toutes les autres, ne devoir employer son Ministère qu'à affoiblir les griefs et à entretenir l'amitié des deux pays.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur, &c.  
(Signé) FALJ LATOUR MAUBOURG.

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No. XII. Four Inclosures. By Captain Stewart.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, March 19th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAD the honour of receiving your despatches Nos. 11 and 12 on the 23d ult.

In anxious expectation of the powers you announce an intention of sending out to me to conclude a treaty of triple alliance between Great Britain, Austria, and the Porte, I now proceed to lay before you what has

already been done towards that object since I had the honour of writing to you last ; by which you will also perceive the nature of the difficulties which retard it for the present.

You will have seen by my letter to Count Stadion inclosed in my No. 11., that I had already endeavoured to lay a foundation for entering into communications with the Court of Vienna on the expediency of forming a defensive alliance, including Sweden, grounded on the mysterious nature of the subsisting relations between Russia and France.

My conferences at the Dardanelles, as my despatches from thence will have informed you, had prepared the Turkish Government for the discussion of such a proposition ; and although, for obvious reasons, I have hitherto deemed it expedient to abstain from bringing the matter forward in any direct shape, every step I have taken since my arrival has been with a view to that object.

The Ottoman ministers, as far as I can judge, are well inclined to this measure in its principle. If, however, they can obtain peace from Russia without it, much will remain to be overcome before they will be induced to accede to a system, the sure consequence of which must be war with France. The peace with Russia is what now occupies them solely, and until that shall be settled on a fair and solid basis, or until all hope of an accommodation shall be at an end, I can have but little expectation of making any material progress towards the establishment of a system which would connect the Porte so closely with Great Britain.

The course therefore which I have taken, and which until the arrival of information from Jassy I find it



most expedient to persevere in, is that of endeavouring to convince this Government, first, that they are guilty of a most fatal error in persuading themselves that Russia will restore the provinces which she occupies; and secondly, that if the Porte should cede them by treaty there will be an end of the Ottoman Empire in Europe.

The expectation of obtaining the restitution of their provinces appears to be founded on the mission of a Russian officer, sent by Prince Prosorowsky in November, with an invitation to negotiate directly, and independently of the mediation of France. Nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the conclusion drawn from this circumstance by the Turks, especially when it is known that at Erfurt Bonaparte abandoned them to their fate.

The purpose of all my representations, which I omit no opportunity of bringing before the Ministers, is to convince them that if they expect the recovery of Moldavia and Walachia, or if they wish to induce Russia to come into any tolerable terms with respect to Servia, they must make the most vigorous demonstrations, and immediately assemble an army on the Danube. I have pointed out to them (although one would scarcely think it necessary), that if they are seriously determined not to cede the territories in question, the war with Russia must begin afresh, and consequently that they will be looking for allies to support it. These allies can only be Great Britain and Austria; but how can they expect assistance from either unless they first put themselves in a situation to profit by it? Could Great Britain trust a fleet in the Black Sea without security for its return?

and what security is there that the Russians will not be in possession of the castles on the Bosphorus, unless a Turkish army be in readiness to prevent their passage over the Danube? With regard to any assistance from Austria, they must consider that it can only be afforded them in the event of Russia attacking that Power in concert with France; and even then that her own territories must be her principal care.

In pressing these considerations, I have most strongly recommended, that if they find themselves unequal to crossing the Danube and acting offensively against Russia in Walachia, they should immediately make an attack on the Crimea.

With regard to the negotiations about to be opened at Jassy, I have had some conferences with Vaahid Efendi, who is the only person I can trust, or even see without ceremony, and who appears to be much consulted by the Government. In one of our earliest interviews, after conversing with him on the probable effect of the English peace upon the negotiations with Russia, and after inquiring what instructions had been given to Galib Efendi (the Ottoman Plenipotentiary) with regard to the light in which he was to represent it, and the use he was to make of it, I proposed to him, in order to strengthen the hands of their negociator, that I should deliver in two notes to the Porte, the first of which should contain general expressions of a wish for peace between the Porte and Russia, and the second a strong exhortation not to permit Russia to establish herself on the Danube.

The use to be made of these notes was, that they should be transmitted to Galib Efendi, to be produced by him at the conferences according as he might find

Russia disposed to give way, or to insist upon the great point of the boundary of the Danube.

In order to make them agree better with the purpose for which they were intended, as well as with a view to the principles on which my future proceedings must be guided, the first of these notes was dated the 28th of January, two days after my arrival here, and the second on the 22d of February, shortly after my receiving from Malta his Majesty's declaration of the 15th of December.

This proposal has been taken into consideration by the Ottoman Government, and on mature deliberation agreed to. I accordingly prepared the two papers inclosed (A, B), which, after having been delivered in to the Sultan, and, as I am informed, much approved by him, were forwarded to Galib Efendi. The substance of these papers will necessarily form the basis of any future proposal which may be made to this Government to become a member of a general alliance.

The measures of which I have here given you an account were communicated fully to the Austrian Minister. From the extreme delicacy of his situation, however, and the necessity there is that Austria should avoid all suspicion of being concerned in encouraging the Turks to resist, the Internuncio can afford me no other aid than that of showing me his instructions. With a view to these circumstances of Austria I took upon myself to address the inclosed letter to Prince Prosorowsky (C), and I sent a duplicate of it to Count Stadion, inclosed in a letter of which I also transmit the copy (D).

Since I received his Majesty's declaration, which of course I consider in the light of an instruction for my conduct, I can no longer hope for any direct success

from overtures of this nature, nor would it be proper without your orders to repeat them. Yet as my letters from Vienna do not speak in absolute despair on the subject of Russia, and as at all events the Austrian Cabinet, by transmitting this overture to Prince Swartzenberg, will have the merit of endeavouring to relieve Russia from her embarrassments, I saw no reason to hesitate in taking a step which might afford a chance, however distant, of being useful, and which I already find has proved highly gratifying to the Porte.

This system of conciliation and menace on my part I find to be perfectly conformable to the views of the Court of Vienna, and consequently that it is the method most calculated to promote the project of an alliance in that quarter. Long before this despatch can reach England you will have received the proposals of Austria and a specification of her views. The general nature of those views \* \* \* \* \*

The impossibility (as I should suppose) of complying with the first and most prominent demand will reduce, probably, the chances of alliance for the present to the simple hope of restoring our diplomatic relations with the Court of Vienna. In \* \* \* letter to me it is expressly stated  
\* \* \* \* \*

But the force of events will leave Austria no choice upon this subject. In the mean time I have written to apprise \* \* \* that I was in daily expectation of receiving both powers and instructions which would enable me to speak distinctly to all the points of his communication.

I did not omit acquainting him that previously to

all other engagements the state of peace between Great Britain and Austria must be restored. When your instructions arrive I shall see whether it be intended by his Majesty's Government that these relations should be restored by a formal treaty ; but in order to save much valuable time, I have apprised Count Stadion of the difference of opinion on this subject, which appears to subsist between his Majesty's Ministers and himself, with regard to the precise relation in which our two countries now stand towards each other. I know that at Vienna it is not admitted that we are at war ; consequently, they would not at first see the necessity of a formal instrument to restore peace. Acting on this persuasion, the Austrian Government might neglect to furnish their Plenipotentiary (supposing one to be sent to treat with me at Constantinople) with the proper powers, and consequently all the time required to obtain them would be lost. This inconvenience will, I trust, now be obviated.

On the whole, I think it will appear that this business of alliance can only be brought about in one of the three following cases : — first, if Russia should directly take part with France against Austria, continuing the war against Turkey ; secondly, if Russia should make peace with Turkey, restoring the provinces, and remaining perfectly neuter in the impending contest ; thirdly, if Russia should return again to her true policy and join us. This last case I look upon to be quite desperate. I confine myself therefore to the two first.

Despatches from Prince Swartzenberg were expected to arrive at Vienna about the end of February. From these it was supposed that Austria would know

what she had to depend upon from the Emperor Alexander. If his determination should be to join France, the hopes of a triple alliance will rest entirely on our being able to prevent the Turkish peace.

If the second case should happen, I think an alliance may also be brought about, but then this case cannot itself be produced except through the operation of fear on the mind of the Emperor Alexander.

Of the probability of either preventing the conclusion of a disadvantageous peace by the Turks, or of persuading them to act with vigour, in order to force Russia into restitution and neutrality, I can form no judgment before the arrival of the report of the first conferences at Jassy. But in any event it appears to me of the utmost importance that I should be enabled to support the language of my second note. Count Stadion's letter to me is decisive with regard to the cession of the provinces. With Russia so close on her eastern frontier Austria can make no effort to the west, and the only method of securing her on that side (if peace be not restored on the terms we wish) will be by carrying on the war in such a manner as to occupy Russia seriously on her own frontiers. It is this consideration which makes me recommend so strenuously an attack on the Crimea.

I have written fully and confidentially to Lord Collingwood upon this point, by Captain Stewart, of the Sea-Horse, who is upon the eve of his departure to join him. In my letter I have reminded his Lordship of our conversation at Cadiz, and of the opinion he then expressed on discussing with me that article of

my instructions which related to an expedition to the Black Sea. I took the liberty of representing to his Lordship that at that period the great change in the affairs of Europe, which is bringing us again into communication with Austria, was not in immediate contemplation; and that consequently the danger he apprehended from a sudden change of system in Turkey, or from the occupation of the forts of the Bosphorus before a British squadron could return from the Black Sea, was no longer to be apprehended, or was not of a nature to counterbalance the immense advantages in the present state of continental affairs of keeping Russia in alarm for her own possessions. I then strongly recommended to his Lordship to consent to the demand of naval co-operation in the Black Sea if the Turks should require it, and if his means would permit it. I have also requested Captain Stewart to inform his Lordship of various matters respecting our situation which I cannot prudently commit to paper. Captain Stewart, who has seen the Castles both of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, is decidedly of opinion to venture a squadron in the Black Sea. I really think the menace of attacking Sebastopolis would materially assist the conclusion of the Russian peace on fair terms, and secure her neutrality; consequently that this great obstacle to the triple alliance on the side of Austria would be done away.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A in Mr. Adair's No. XII.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

Pera, ce 28 Janvier, 1809.

MONSIEUR,

LA paix venant d'être heureusement rétablie entre nos deux Empires, je saisis avec empressement l'occasion de sa signature pour donner à la Sublime Porte Ottomane les premières preuves de cette amitié que la Grande Bretagne n'a cessé de nourrir envers Elle.

La guerre que la Sublime Porte soutient encore contre la Russie n'a aucune relation avec la grande querelle qui se vide entre l'Angleterre et la France ni dans son origine ni dans son but; et S. M. l'Empereur de Russie ayant nommé des Plénipotentiaires pour traiter de la paix avec la Sublime Porte, paroît avoir fourni une preuve de ses dispositions amicales envers Elle.

Le retour de la paix entre ces deux Puissances seroit du meilleur augure pour tous les peuples. Bannio, presque, du monde Chrétien, c'est dans les états Ottomans qu'Elle cherche à se fixer la première, et c'est de là sans doute, que le Souverain Dispensateur de tous les biens a voulu qu'elle s'étende sur le reste de l'univers.

Effectivement il paroît que l'Empereur de Russie, du même moment où, s'affranchissant de la médiation Française, il a nommé des Plénipotentiaires pour traiter directement avec la Porte, a adressé aussi des propositions amicales au Roi, mon maître.

Si les propositions de sa Majesté Impériale ne renferment que le sujet du différend entre l'Angleterre et



la Russie, cette paix sera bientôt faite. La Porte et la Russie s'accorderont de même s'il ne s'agit au congrès de Jassy que du sujet original de leur querelle.

D'après ce principe, en attendant l'ouverture d'un congrès général pour régler les affaires compliquées des autres Puissances actuellement en guerre, il paroît tout simple que la conclusion immédiate de la paix entre la Porte et la Russie seroit un bonheur commun et un objet pour le succès duquel, malgré tant de sujets de division, tout le monde devroit se trouver d'accord.

C'est afin de prêter la main à une œuvre si salutaire que je m'adresse maintenant à V. E. Ses lumières sans doute lui présenteront les moyens de tirer parti de tout ce que le renouvellement des anciennes relations entre l'Angleterre et la Sublime Porte pourroit y offrir d'avantageux. J'aime à croire que l'intervention de l'Angleterre, non pas pour s'immiscer dans vos négociations sans y être appelée, mais par l'intérêt sincère qu'il est toujours permis de témoigner pour le salut et le bonheur d'une Puissance amie, ne seroit point déplacée à cette occasion, car quoique les événemens extraordinaires de nos tems aient mis l'Angleterre et la Russie en état de guerre l'une avec l'autre, rien de ce qui pourroit contribuer au renouvellement de l'amitié entre des peuples faits pour s'estimer à tant de titres, ne peut être indifférent pour aucun des deux.

Pénétré de cette vérité et pleinement muni des sentimens et des vues de ma Cour, j'autorise votre Excellence à communiquer aux Plénipotentiaires Russes que quelque puisse être le fruit de l'ouverture pacifique que l'Empereur de Russie, conjointement avec

la France, vient de faire auprès du Roi mon maître, *la conclusion de la paix entre la Porte et la Russie sera dans tous les tems un obstacle considérable de moins à la paix entre Elle et l'Angleterre*, et présentera même des moyens de l'acheminer que les vrais amis des deux Empires sauront toujours mettre à profit.

Je saisis cette occasion, &c.

(Signé) ROBERT ADAIR.

Inclosure B in Mr. Adair's No. XII.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

LE Soussigné, Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté Britannique, a l'honneur de communiquer à S. E. le Reis Efendi la déclaration du Roi, son maître, au sujet de l'ouverture pacifique que l'Empereur de Russie et le chef du Gouvernement François ont adressée à sa Majesté au mois d'Octobre dernier.

La Sublime Porte y verra avec peine que la Cour de Russie, abandonnant la cause la plus faite pour toucher une âme généreuse, paroît se prêter aux vues du chef François pour la subjugation de l'Espagne.

Tout en gémissant sur un tel malheur pour la justice, la morale, et l'humanité, le Soussigné ne laisse pas de former les mêmes vœux qu'il a déjà énoncés pour qu'une paix honorable et solide puisse se conclure entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie.

Cependant, il ne peut se dispenser de représenter à S. E. le Reis Efendi d'une manière franche et amicale (telle que le renouvellement des anciennes relations entre les deux Empires semble autoriser) combien la conduite de la Russie à cette occasion doit aug-

menter le danger auquel la Sublime Porte s'exposera en permettant à cette Puissance de s'établir sur le Danube, et surtout dans la Servie, soit par une pacification qui lui céderoit les provinces limitrophes de cette fleuve, soit en la laissant plus long-tems dans l'occupation paisible de ces provinces.

Le Soussigné croit aussi devoir observer à la Sublime Porte qu'en opposant une résistance ferme et vigoureuse à toute prétention d'aggrandissement pareil, la Sublime Porte se mettra dans le cas de profiter d'une manière effective des bonnes dispositions du Roi à son égard, et par une sage combinaison de leurs moyens, de porter des coups décisifs à l'ennemi commun des deux Empires.

Le Soussigné saisit cette occasion, &c.

(Signé) ROBERT ADAIR.

Pera, ce 22 Février, 1809.

Inclosure C in Mr. Adair's No. XII.

*Mr. Adair to Prince Prosorowsky.*

Pera, ce  $\left. \begin{smallmatrix} 28 \\ 16 \end{smallmatrix} \right\}$  Janvier, 1809.

MONSIEUR LE FELD MARÉCHAL,

QUOIQUE l'état d'éloignement où se trouvent malheureusement nos deux Cours ne permette aucune correspondance entre les employés respectifs des Souverains nos maîtres, les circonstances tout-à-fait nouvelles où nous nous trouvons par rapport à la guerre qui dure encore entre la Russie et la Porte semblent autoriser la communication que je prends la liberté d'adresser maintenant à votre Excellence.

Il seroit inutile de rappeler à V. E. les causes qui ont amené cette guerre. Elle sait que l'Angleterre y est entrée comme l'alliée de la Russie. L'Angleterre de même ne se seroit jamais prêtée à des négociations séparées avec la Porte (comme il a été prouvé par la conduite de son Plénipotentiaire en l'an 1807) sans la malheureuse séparation d'intérêts que la paix de Tilsit avoit produite entre Elle et la Russie.

La rupture plus fâcheuse encore qui s'ensuivit, rendit cette séparation complète.

L'Angleterre ainsi n'ayant plus rien à démêler avec la Porte, et le Roi mon maître m'ayant muni de pleins pouvoirs à cet effet, j'ai conclu un traité de paix avec Elle le 5 Janvier.

Cependant, M. le Feld Maréchal, je ne puis ni oublier l'origine de cette guerre dans laquelle nous sommes entrés sous les mêmes auspices, ni perdre la douce habitude de regarder la Russie comme essentiellement l'amie de l'Angleterre, au point de négliger une occasion qui m'est si naturellement présentée d'offrir à V. E. non pas l'intervention de ma Cour dans vos négociations avec la Porte (où je suis loin de vouloir m'immiscer sans y être appelé), mais tous les bons offices, tout ce que l'expression des vœux sincères du Roi mon maître pour voir se rétablir, d'une manière solide, la paix entre la Russie et la Porte, pourroient avoir d'efficace auprès de la Cour Ottomane. C'est avec d'autant plus d'empressement, Monsieur, que je vous fais cette offre, que j'ai connoissance d'une démarche pacifique que S. M. Impériale, votre auguste Souverain, vient de faire conjointement avec le chef du gouvernement François auprès du Roi mon maître. Quelque puisse être l'issue de cette ouverture, je ne balancerai pas d'assurer V. E. que la conclusion de

la paix entre la Russie et la Porte sera dans tous les tems un obstacle de moins à la paix entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, et par conséquent à cette paix qui seule peut assurer le vrai repos de l'univers.

Je prie V. E. d'agréer les assurances de la considération très distinguée avec laquelle

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c. &c.

(Signé)

ROBERT ADAIR.

Inclosure D in Mr. Adair's No. XII.

*Mr. Adair to Count Stadion.*

Pera, le 18 Février, 1809.

MONSIEUR LE COMTE,

QUOIQUE les relations diplomatiques aient cessé entre nos deux Cours, la position tout-à-fait nouvelle où se trouvent l'Angleterre et la Russie par rapport à la guerre Turque, et l'intérêt général des états qui avoisinent à la Porte et à la Russie de voir cesser cette guerre semblent justifier la démarche que je viens de hasarder en vous envoyant la lettre ci-incluse, adressée au Feld Maréchal Prince de Proskowsky. Ayant appris ici que S. E. Monsieur le Feld Maréchal n'étoit plus chargé des négociations à Jassy, j'ai pris le parti de vous l'envoyer, M. le Comte, avec prière d'en faire parvenir le sens au Cabinet de St. Petersbourg. Après l'avoir lue, votre Excellence verra les raisons qui paroissent excepter ce cas de la rigueur des règles diplomatiques, et laisser les Cours

d'Angleterre, de Vienne, et de St. Petersburg, libres d'agir selon les principes d'une convenance évidente et réciproque. La paix Turque intéresse la Russie au plus haut point. Elle ne peut vous être indifférente; et quoique je connoisse tout le prix de la diversion que la puissance Ottomane, réunie à la nôtre, peut opérer en notre faveur dans le cas où la guerre continueroit entre nous et la Russie, l'intérêt général d'une paix qui conservera et assurera une existence indépendante à l'Empire Ottoman l'emporte sur toute considération de cette nature.

Avec bien des excuses, Monsieur le Comte, de la liberté que je prends en vous écrivant, je vous prie d'agréer les assurances de la considération très distinguée avec laquelle

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c. &c.

(Signé)

ROBERT ADAIR.

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No. XIII. Two Inclosures.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, March 19. 1809.

[THIS despatch merely inclosed the copy of a declaration on the part of the Porte, dated Feb. 18. 1809, announcing its neutrality in the war between France and England and its intention not to suffer any act of hostility to be committed between these Powers within three miles of its harbours and coast, and the copy of a note from Mr. Adair to the Reis

Efendi dated Feb. 26th, acknowledging the receipt of this declaration, and expressing his satisfaction at seeing the Porte determined to enforce the rights of its sovereignty.]

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No. XIV.\* One Inclosure. By Captain Stewart.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, March 19th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you, that notwithstanding the secret intrigues of the French, assisted by the inclosed note of the chargé d'affaires, the Ottoman Government has granted to me every attention and distinction hitherto enjoyed by his Majesty's ambassadors at this Court.

On the 14th instant in the character of H. M.'s Plenipotentiary I had a public audience of H. I. M. Sultan Mahmoud the Second. This ceremony was attended with the usual formalities practised here on similar occasions; the manner in which I was received by H. I. M. was highly flattering, as it afforded a testimony of his friendship for the King my master, and of the esteem entertained by the Turkish Government for the English nation. In the speech which I delivered according to custom to H. I. M., I confined myself to congratulations upon the re-establishment of peace between the two countries, and to assurances of the never-ceasing regard of England for the welfare of the Ottoman Porte. H. I. M. was

\* This despatch was written by Mr. Stratford Canning. — R. A.

graciously pleased to return an answer with his own mouth, in which he expressed his satisfaction at the return of peace, and his sense of the constant friendship testified by Great Britain towards his empire.

Before I retired from his presence, his Imperial Majesty was pleased to add in a second speech the personal compliment of declaring his acknowledgement of the services which he was pleased to say I had rendered to him.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in Mr. Adair's No. XIV.

*Note presented by the Chargé d'Affaires of France to the Dragoman of the Porte, translated from the Turkish. (No date.)*

LE chargé d'affaires a entendu que l'on a accordé au Ministre d'Angleterre la faveur de se rendre officiellement à la Sublime Porte, et après cela de se présenter au pied du trône de S. M. Impériale.

De pareilles faveurs n'ont été accordées qu'aux Ministres chargés de présenter une lettre de créance, et conformément à l'ancienne coutume de l'Empire Ottoman, il n'est arrivé dans aucun tems, que ceux qui ne sont pas porteurs d'une lettre de créance soient présentés à la Sublime Porte, et surtout admis à la présence de sa Majesté Impériale.

Or le Ministre d'Angleterre n'ayant point de papiers officiels à présenter, une conduite si étrange et un accueil si flatteur provient de la grande estime et considération, et de l'extrême amitié de la Sublime Porte pour les Anglois. En effet, si l'on accueillera



la demande de ce Ministre d'être présenté au trône de sa Hautesse, ce seroit une preuve de l'union et liaison étroites de la Sublime Porte avec l'Angleterre; on prie de demander cette affaire à S. E. le Reis Efendi.

Après qu'on a fait part que l'Empire Ottoman, contre son gré, a été forcé de faire la paix avec l'Angleterre, le chargé d'affaires est peiné et affligé d'entendre à présent des procédés propres à causer des soupçons à la France.

Quoiqu'il en soit, étant nécessaire que la France en soit aussi informée, et qu'après avoir eu connoissance de l'intention et pensée de la Sublime Porte à cet égard, Elle règle sa conduite en conséquence; si le Ministre d'Angleterre aura la permission de se rendre à la Sublime Porte, comme de se présenter au trône Impérial avant l'arrivée de la ratification, cette affaire sera écrite et annoncée à l'Empereur de France de la part du chargé d'affaires, et elle sera expliquée et exposée comme une circonstance sur laquelle on doit mesurer la sincérité et l'amitié de la Sublime Porte envers la France.

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No XV. Two Inclosures. By Captain Stewart.

*Extract.*

Pera, March 25th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAD scarcely finished my last despatch when I was informed of the sudden arrival of a Russian officer with a letter from Prince Proserousky, commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in Moldavia, to the Grand Vizier.

The purport of this letter was to inform the Otto-

man Government that, by the express commands of his Sovereign, written with his own hand, he had to declare the armistice between the two armies at an end, in consequence of the admission of an English Plenipotentiary at Constantinople. He had further to announce the immediate resumption of hostilities, also that no negotiations for peace would be entered upon, unless the English Plenipotentiary were sent away. Forty-eight hours were granted to the Turkish Government to resolve what course it would follow.

The bearer of this demand was soon given to understand that he might take the forty-eight hours to repose himself from the fatigues of his journey, but that he would derive no other benefit from his mission.

In effect the Ottoman Government sent to inform me without delay of this requisition, and to consult with me on the answer to be returned to it. There was not the slightest hesitation as to its rejection; and their consulting with me was rather in testimony of their confidence, than from any doubt with regard to the conduct which became them, or with any view of bargaining for their refusal.

A grand Divan was held accordingly at the Mufti's on the 23rd, where the inclosed answer to the Russian demand (to which I have the honour to add a copy of Prince Prosorowsky's letter) was unanimously agreed to.

On receiving this notification the Russian officer quitted Constantinople to return to the army. Hostilities therefore may be daily expected.

In this situation the Sultan seems to have taken the resolution of calling forth all the resources of his Empire, and of directing them with energy against

the common enemy. Proper measures are taken to assemble their army, and the Sultan allows it to be rumoured that he will put himself at its head.

As Captain Stewart was on the eve of his departure when the Russian officer arrived here, I suggested the propriety of their consulting with him on the naval operations of the ensuing summer, and of combining them with those of Lord Collingwood. I also resumed the question of an attack on the Crimea.

A meeting with the principal Ministers took place, accordingly, yesterday. Here it was resolved upon to attack Sebastopolis, and in short to carry on offensive operations vigorously against Russia in the Black Sea, provided a British naval force would co-operate in them.

• • • • •

I agreed to transmit this requisition to his Majesty's Government, and to recommend most strongly a compliance with it. I have communicated the whole to Lord Collingwood, and have added the same recommendation to his Lordship if the state of his squadron will admit of his detaching that force.

The manly good faith of the Turks would indeed deserve our assisting them in this manner, even if it were not called for by general views of policy, and the very critical situation of Austria. Without the slightest hesitation or reserve, therefore, I humbly presume to press it on the consideration of his Majesty's Government with my most clear opinion in favour of its adoption.

It remains for me now to offer you some observations on this proceeding of the Emperor Alexander. Your information from other sources will enable you to judge how far they may be well founded.

On considering the Emperor's letter, I cannot but think the whole to be the work of France. The peremptory nature of the demand would make it appear to have been dictated under a sudden impression of resentment ; yet the fact not merely of the negociation, but of the actual signature of the English peace, must have been known at St. Petersburg nearly three weeks before the letter was sent off ; for as the officer who was the bearer of it to Prince Prosorowsky was but seven days on his journey from thence, and afterwards but eleven days in bringing its contents to Constantinople, it must have been written about the 2nd instant. Now the peace was known at Jassy on the 31st of January, and the usual course of the post from thence to St. Petersburg is ten days. The probability therefore is that the Emperor Alexander, who knew of the whole progress of the English negociation, troubled himself very little about its success until Caulincourt represented to him—first, that suffering an English Minister to reside at any Court on the Continent until the peace, was contrary to the fundamental principle of his alliance with France ; and secondly, that such residence might encourage the Turks to resist the execution of the plans agreed upon at Erfurt, concerning their territories.

If this speculation be correct, I think an advantage is presented to us which, more perhaps than any other circumstance, may be made use of to produce a misunderstanding between Russia and France. The French Minister neither intends to quit this place, nor expects orders to quit it, notwithstanding my admission to an audience, and notwithstanding the subordinate character in which his country is obliged to appear at the Porte. Here, then, the allies are at variance ; and

at variance on a fundamental point in their agreement which most particularly concerns Russia. The Emperor Alexander, faithful to *his* promise, breaks off *in limine* a negociation from which he had reason to hope an advantageous result, expressly because an English Plenipotentiary is at Constantinople. His ally submits to the affront. He makes no common cause with his confederate. He allows me quietly to go on, fortifying the Turks in their determination not to cede the provinces, and thus doing Russia all the mischief in my power. How can the Emperor Alexander account for this? How, except that Bonaparte is playing a double part with regard to this very question, and that while I confine myself to measures *hostile to Russia*, he sees nothing offensive in my continuing here — nothing at least worth quarrelling about with the Turks.

I submit these reflections to your better judgment. They have been already communicated at Vienna, from whence means will be found of making use of them at St. Petersburg.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A in Mr. Adair's No. XV.

*Copie d'une Note du Prince Prosorowsky à la Sublime Porte, en date de Jassy, le 22 Février, 1809.*

*Prince Prosorowsky to the Porte.*

LE Soussigné, Général Feld Maréchal de S. M. l'Empereur de toutes les Russies et commandant en chef de son armée en Moldavie, Valachie, Bessarabie,

et le long des rives du Niester, a l'honneur d'informer la Sublime Porte Ottomane qu'il vient de recevoir de son auguste souverain une lettre autographe, portant en propres termes que

“ L'observation de l'armistice qui a jusqu'à présent existé avec la Porte Ottomane étoit fondée sur les principes de modération que S. M. I. avoit adoptés dès le commencement, qu'Elle a constamment suivis, et d'après lesquels Elle désiroit de le voir terminé par la paix.”

“ Qu'au milieu de ce rapprochement qui tendoit à ce but salulaire la Porte Ottomane vient de changer de conduite, que tandis qu'Elle se disposoit à traiter de la paix avec S. M. I. Elle a admis auprès d'Elle le Plénipotentiaire Anglois, et renoncé ainsi par le fait aux intentions qu'Elle manifestoit par des paroles.”

“ Que S. M. I. considère cette conduite comme une rupture totale et une cessation de l'armistice.”

“ Qu'en conséquence S. M. I. charge le Soussigné d'expédier immédiatement après la reception de cette lettre un officier à Constantinople, et de déclarer au Ministère Ottoman en son nom et d'après son ordre précis, qu'Elle considère l'admission du Plénipotentiaire Anglois comme une rupture totale de l'armistice.”

“ Que dès lors quand même les Plénipotentiaires Ottomans arriveroient au lieu destiné pour le Congrès, aucune proposition de paix ne sera ni faite ni écoutée, si le Ministre Anglois n'est point éconduit, et l'officier expédié par le Soussigné renvoyé au bout de *deux jours* avec une réponse qui satisfasse parfaitement à cette demande.”

“ Que ce terme de *deux jours* est de toute rigueur, et enfin que si l'officier ne revient dans une espace de tems suffisant pour son retour, ou qu'il revienne sans

une réponse pleinement satisfaisante, le Soussigné a l'ordre de commencer les hostilités."

La Sublime Porte peut juger d'après le contenu de cet ordre quel juste sentiment de surprise et d'émotion a dû éprouver S. M. I. en apprenant la nouvelle inattendue de l'admission du Ministre Britannique. Elle saura sans doute calculer toutes les suites de la détermination que cette nouvelle dicte nécessairement à S. M. I., et le Soussigné espère qu'Elle voudra les prévenir par une réponse prompte, décisive, et entièrement conforme aux désirs de son auguste Souverain.

Il saisit cette occasion, &c. &c.

Inclosure B in Mr. Adair's No. X V.

*Réponse de la Sublime Porte à la Note du Prince Pro-sorowsky, remise à l'Emissaire Russe le 23 Mars, 1809.*

LA Sublime Porte vient de recevoir la lettre que vous lui avez adressée par un officier exprès, portant que si le Plénipotentiaire Britannique arrivé dernièrement à Constantinople n'est point éconduit, les hostilités recommenceront entre la Sublime Porte et la Russie, et exprimant que vous avez reçu un ordre sur cela de la part de S. M. l'Empereur. La teneur et le sens de cette lettre sont parvenus à notre connoissance amicale.

Quand la Russie par un effet des circonstances du tems a commencé les hostilités en occupant les provinces et forteresses Ottomanes sans qu'il eût existé en effet aucun sujet d'inimitié entre Elle et la Sublime

Porte, l'Angleterre ne s'est portée à nous déclarer la guerre, que dans la simple idée d'agir de concert avec la Cour de Russie en ce tems. Mais après la paix de Tilsit, la Cour Britannique se prêtant à ce que la raison suggeroit, et la Sublime Porte penchant toujours du côté de la conciliation et de la justice ; un Plénipotentiaire Anglois arriva en effet au détroit de la Mer Blanche avec l'offre de renouveler l'ancienne amitié entre les deux Cours.

La Sublime Porte considérant alors que la disposition de l'Angleterre à rétablir l'amitié comme ci-dessus, pourroit devenir un moyen préparatoire à la paix générale, et au rétablissement de la tranquillité et repos de tous les peuples ; et une dépêche portée par un officier exprès, ayant paru de la part de V. E. *dans l'interval même où l'on étoit en négociation de paix avec le Plénipotentiaire Britannique* au détroit sus-dit, indiquant que votre commission précédente avoit été renouvelée de la part de S. M. l'Empereur, et proposant la nomination et envoi des Plénipotentiaires Ottomans pour le rétablissement de la paix, ce qui confirmoit les conjectures et les vues de notre gouvernement — la Sublime Porte n'hésita point de nommer S. E. Galib Efendi, Reis Efendi actuel, son premier Plénipotentiaire, et de le faire partir avec d'autres Efendis, personnes également distinguées de ses collègues, pour le lieu destiné.

Outre la persuasion où l'on est que S. M. l'Empereur de Russie (comme sa dignité et sa haute renommée l'exigent) ne sauroit contravenir à ses promesses et conventions, et outre que c'est une chose claire et connue par tout le monde, qu'une reconciliation entre les deux Cours, en envisageant la position desagréable que le destin a fait naître entre



Elles comme non avenue, seroit une mesure salulaire à l'une et à l'autre partie ; *il y a maintenant cinq ou six mois depuis que la négociation fut commencée avec l'Angleterre de la manière ci-dessus* ; il y a quelques mois déjà que la paix même a été conclue, et presque un an depuis que le Plénipotentiaire Britannique a quitté Londres, et jusqu'à ce moment, cependant, on n'a rien entendu du côté de la Cour de Russie sur ce sujet, ni en bien ni en mal ; et comme après les conférences d'Erfurt des ouvertures de paix ont été faites à l'Angleterre par la Russie et la France, l'on ne voit pas comment il peut exister aucun sujet de critique contre la Sublime Porte à l'égard de sa paix avec la première.

Tandis donc que par des Notes qui ont été données à qui il appartenait, tout le monde a eu connoissance sur quel pied et de quelle manière la Sublime Porte avoit fait sa paix avec la Grande Bretagne — c'est à dire que l'arrangement conclu avec Elle ne consistoit que du rétablissement pure et simple de l'ancienne amitié sans un traité d'alliance ; et tandis qu'il étoit de toute possibilité par l'arrivée de L. L. E. E. les Plénipotentiaires Ottomans en ces jours, de leur faire des questions et avoir des réponses s'il le falloit d'eux-mêmes, l'apparition d'une lettre de cette espèce adressée à la Sublime Porte n'a pû que nous causer de la surprise ; ce qui ne doit échapper à la pénétration de V. E. elle-même.

Au surplus la position de la Sublime Porte à l'égard de continuer une guerre maritime avec l'Angleterre n'étant point à comparer avec celle des autres puissances, des provinces et forteresses appartenantes à l'Empire Ottoman de plein droit étant actuellement occupées par vos troupes ; une long interval s'étant

écoulé depuis que la paix avec l'Angleterre a été heureusement et salutairement conclu et arrangée; et étant connu à l'univers entier que la Sublime et puissante Porte Ottomane n'a dans aucun tems reculé de ses engagements, mais qu'Elle est exacte à maintenir ses Traités avec les puissances et nations avec lesquelles Elle est en paix, elle ne conçoit par conséquent aucun sens du parti qu'on lui propose maintenant — celui de se désister de sa dite paix; et comme ces propos mêmes se présentent sous une voile d'ambiguïté et de sens obscure dans votre lettre, la Sublime Porte remet à la prudence et aux lumières de sa digne personne de dissoudre et développer ces points en conférant avec nos Plénipotentiaires sur le lieu même d'une manière conforme aux intérêts des deux Cours, et analogue aux loix de la modération, et de l'équité.

C'est pour cela que la présente dépêche est écrite et vous est envoyée par le retour de l'officier ci-dessus mentionné.

A sa reception (Dieu plaisant) on remet à votre modération et à votre perspicacité de faire ce que la prudence et la sagesse exigent.

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No. XVI.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, March 28th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your despatches to No. 14. inclusive by Mr. Meyer, and of the full powers for concluding peace with

Austria, with which his Majesty has been graciously pleased to honour me.

Permit me to express my grateful thanks to his Majesty for this additional and distinguished mark of his confidence.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XVII. Three Inclosures.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, April 12th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of inclosing you a notification (A) which has been made to me by the Ottoman Government, by which it has prohibited all intercourse with Russia by sea and by land.

This measure is the result of the change of system in the Ottoman councils, produced by the unwarrantable pretensions of the Court of St. Petersburg, and of the conviction with which the Turks are at length impressed of the necessity of vigorous offensive operations.

That the measure will prove in some degree prejudicial to English commerce is certainly not to be denied; but the advantages upon a larger scale which our cause will derive from it are so manifest that I conceive myself fully justified in having advised and enforced it.

If Great Britain possessed the Dardanelles there can be no doubt that she would issue a similar de-

claration ; and after the language and principles adopted of late years by France and the Powers acting under her influence, I confess that it appeared to me of no small importance to mark the renewal of our Continental intercourse by associating to our system a Power so considerable by its means, and so important by its situation, as Turkey.

The direct mischief which it will produce to the enemy is considerable, and must be severely felt. The remainder of the foreign commerce of Russia must be totally extinguished. Her exports from Odessa and the Crimea exceed greatly her imports ; and of her imports the two most considerable articles are sulphur and oil, of both of which it will distress her extremely to be deprived.

The article of export most useful to the Turks and to ourselves is corn ; but with the least degree of industry, which their own necessities will teach them, they may obtain enough of this necessary article from Syria, Egypt, and various other parts of their extensive dominions.

Indeed, nothing can speak more strongly in favour of this measure than the information received from Odessa, where orders had arrived from St. Petersburg to keep the trade open for neutral flags, notwithstanding any rupture of the armistice.

The French Minister, in his remonstrances to the Porte against it, has departed a little from his usual style of menace and invective ; but he asserts it to be a direct breach of treaty, and insists on its revocation in favour of the French flag. I have the honour of inclosing you two notes (B, C) which he has presented on the occasion. They have produced no effect.

I have met with no support, nor did I expect it in

this business, from the Internuncio. But I have taken care to explain to him my share in the measure, so as to obviate any misunderstanding which might affect our future communications. Indeed, he is fully convinced of its necessity, and that there can be no such effectual diversion for Austria as that of giving the most serious aspect possible to the war between Russia and the Porte.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A in Mr. Adair's No. XVII.

*Notification from the Porte to Mr. Adair.*

THE Court of Russia having heretofore, in a manner contrary to existing Treaties, seized an opportunity of marching upon the Ottoman territories by surprise, and of invading in a like manner the forts and provinces of this Empire, at a time when the Sublime Porte had suffered no omission or infringement whatever to occur in the observance of the stipulations and engagements contracted in her favour, the war became consequently inevitable; and the respective armies were on the point of coming to action, when Russia, showing a disposition towards adopting an equitable and pacific conduct, demanded an armistice, on the ground of restoring the provinces and fortresses which were arbitrarily occupied by her, and of settling the affair of the peace within a short period.

The Sublime Porte, being desirous to adhere, on the other hand, to her uniform and favourite system of avoiding the effusion of blood, and ever willing to pursue her maxim of contributing to the attainment of such a salutary end as the general ease and security

of mankind, an armistice was accordingly concluded and agreed upon between the two parties.

At the time of the breaking out of the war with Russia as above, in order to put an effectual stop to the navigation to and from the Russian ports in the Black Sea, and to cut off every intercourse and relation between that country and the Ottoman states, a resolution was taken to shut up the passage of that Sea; and this circumstance was notified and stated to the Ministers of foreign Courts at amity with us, by official notes which were delivered to them at the time.

This measure therefore continued in force till the time when a suspension of hostilities had been agreed upon. But, considering that an armistice is a time of conciliation and peace, licence was given to the merchantmen belonging to Powers in amity with this empire to navigate in the above Sea, according to the rights and privileges which had been granted them in time past respecting that navigation.

In the present instance, however, Russia, following again a mode of conduct inconsistent with the rules and maxims which belong to independent Governments, has not only announced that her troops are going to recommence hostilities, but they have actually marched and attacked the Ottoman territory anew; although (thanks be to the Almighty) they have again gone back in consequence of a defeat they have met with on the side of Islabozy and Guirgiova.

In this situation it becomes highly necessary to prevent all merchant ships from going and coming to and from Russia to the Ottoman States, and to cut off every communication and intercourse with that country both by sea and by land, by shutting up the

above channel ; — at the same time that this measure is to have a provisional operation, and to last only till such time as no inconvenience may appear to accrue from granting such permission hereafter, when all ships belonging to friendly Powers will again be allowed to navigate that Sea, and to carry on their trade as in former times.

Orders being sent therefore to the officers of the Imperial navy, and the commander at the above straits, to use every attention and care to the same being kept shut, and that this measure may also be made known on the part of our friends the foreign Ministers to those to whom it may appertain, this present official note has been drawn up, and is sent to our esteemed friend his Excellency the Plenipotentiary of Great Britain.

25 Safer, 1224, i. e.  
10 April, 1809.

Inclosure B in Mr. Adair's No. XVII. French Note.

*Copy of a Note from the Chargé d'Affaires of France to the Reis Efendi, dated Constantinople, April 9th, 1809.*

Votre Excellence a dit aujourd'hui à M. Franchini, Dragoman de l'Ambassade de France, que la guerre étant au moment de se rallumer entre l'Empire Ottoman et la Russie, la Sublime Porte songeoit à fermer le Bosphore et à en interdire le passage aux batimens de commerce.

Dans cette circonstance, et tandis qu'un objet de cette importance n'est point encore décidé et s'agite dans les conseils du Ministère, je crois devoir rappeler

à V. E. que le point principal du dernier Traité fait à Paris entre la France et la Turquie établit d'une manière formelle et irrévocable la libre navigation des bâtimens de commerce François de la Mer Blanche dans la Mer Noire; que dans ce Traité la Sublime Porte ne s'est réservée pour aucun cas la faculté d'interdire ou même de suspendre momentanément cette navigation; de sorte que la Sublime Porte en l'interrompant porteroit atteinte au Traité qui fait la base de l'amitié des deux Empires.

J'abandonne ces observations à la prudence des Ministres; j'ai cru devoir les faire, afin d'éviter, s'il se peut, des évènements funestes.

J'ajouterai à ceci une autre observation. Je sais que des vaisseaux qui communiquent entre deux pays en guerre l'un contre l'autre doivent s'abstenir de porter de l'un à l'autre certains objets connus sous le nom de *contrebande de guerre*. C'est pourquoi ayant appris que des capitaines François partant de Constantinople pour Odessa avoient pris à bord une certaine quantité de souffre, qui est au nombre de ces objets, je les ai contraints de le débarquer et de le laisser à Constantinople. Jamais aucune infraction aux Traités et aux usages établis par le droit des gens ne pourra être reprochée à la France.

J'ai l'honneur de renouveler, &c. &c.

(Signé) FAIJ LATOUR MAUBOURG.

Inclosure C in Mr. Adair's No. XVII. French Note.

*Copy of a Note from the Chargé d'Affaires of France to the Reis Efendi. (No date.)*

LE Soussigné, Auditeur au Conseil d'Etat, Chargé d'Affaires de S. M. l'Empereur des François, Roi.



d'Italie, Protecteur de la Confédération du Rhin, près la Sublime Porte, a reçu la Note du 10 Avril, que la Sublime Porte lui a adressée pour le prévenir qu'Elle avoit jugé à-propos d'interdire aux batimens de commerce l'entrée et la navigation de la Mer Noire.

Le Soussigné, en lisant les articles du Traité conclu à Paris entre la France et la Sublime Porte signé le 6<sup>m</sup>e Messidor l'an 10 (24 Safer-al-hair), et dont la copie est ci-jointe, trouve dans l'article 2. de ce Traité que la Sublime Porte consent à ce que les vaisseaux de commerce François jouissent à l'avenir et *sans aucune contestation* du droit d'entrer et de naviguer librement dans la Mer Noire. Le Soussigné remarque que dans le reste du Traité la Sublime Porte ne s'est réservée *dans aucun cas* la faculté d'oter aux navires François ou même de suspendre à leur égard cette navigation.

Le Soussigné voit en conséquence dans la clôture de la Mer Noire un acte qui détruit ce Traité.

Le Soussigné pense qu'une erreur ou un mal-entendu aura donné lieu à l'envoi de la Note que la Sublime Porte lui a remise et à laquelle il répond ; car s'il n'en étoit pas ainsi, et si la Sublime Porte avoit réellement l'intention de fermer la Mer Noire, il en résulteroit qu'Elle veut ancantir le Traité qui l'unit à la France, chose que le Soussigné ne peut admettre. Le Soussigné croit que la Sublime Porte n'est point dans le dessein de se priver volontairement de l'amitié de la France ; et quand cela seroit, ce qu'à Dieu ne plaise, ne conviendrait-il pas mieux à la franchise de la Sublime Porte de déclarer nettement qu'Elle veut rompre avec la France que d'amener cette rupture par mille voies détournées.

L'Empereur des François est un grand et puissant monarque. Il n'a jusqu'ici donné à la Sublime

Porte que des marques d'attachement et d'amitié. Le Soussigné supplie la Sublime Porte, et cela pour la gloire de l'Empire Ottoman, de prendre ce dernier point en grande considération.

Le Soussigné supplie la Sublime Porte aussi de considérer que l'Empereur des François ne souffrira point qu'il soit enlevé à ses sujets un droit qui leur est assuré par les Traités.

Le Soussigné prie également la Sublime Porte de vouloir bien lui donner par écrit à l'égard de cette Note de plus amples explications.

Le Soussigné a l'honneur de renouveler à son Excellence le Reis Efendi les assurances de sa haute considération.

(Signé) FAL LATOUR MAUBOURG.

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No. XVIII.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, April 18th, 1809.

SIR,

THE menaces of Russia have at length roused the spirit of this nation, and the greatest activity prevails in all its military departments. Troops are marching in considerable numbers towards the Danube, and the fleet is equipping with the utmost diligence.

The Russians commenced hostilities on the 5th instant. It is not known whether they waited the return of the officer despatched by Prince Proskourousky, and who left Constantinople only on the 24th of March.

The official accounts received here state the enemy

to have been defeated in an attempt to surprise Guirgiová with the loss of 2,000 killed and prisoners ; and subsequent advices mention another advantage gained by the Ottoman forces near Silistria.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XIX.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, April 18th, 1809.

SIR,

SINCE the rejection of the Emperor of Russia's demand, of which I had the honour of sending you an account in my No. 15., and the consequent renewal of the war on the Danube, I have received various and most urgent applications from the Ottoman Government for pecuniary assistance from his Majesty.

In our conferences at the Dardanelles, I had succeeded in convincing the Ottoman Plenipotentiary that it would be fruitless to apply to his Majesty for subsidies. I could not make him understand, however, the nature of the difficulties which rendered the proposal for a loan nearly as objectionable.

To this point accordingly my attention has again been called ; and I have received such representations both of the spirit with which the Government is animated, and of the necessities under which it labours, as to induce me, with great deference, to submit to his Majesty's Ministers the question whether there be any practicable method by which Great Britain could sustain this spirit and relieve these necessities.

In addition to the state of disorder to which years, it may be said centuries, of maladministration have reduced their finances, the loss which the Government has recently sustained by the insurrection in which the Grand Vizier Mustapha lost his life, is most severe. What is worse, it falls on that department where the utmost energy must be displayed if this Empire is to be saved. Almost all the tents belonging to the army, all the baggage, and an immense quantity of stores, provisions, and magazines, were destroyed in the late fires at Constantinople.

These financial difficulties impede the progress of every effort which the Ottoman Government is disposed to make, and which the people are uncommonly eager to second, to carry the war into the enemy's country. The enthusiasm by which the whole mass of the population of this Empire is animated, is stated to me to exceed any thing known in the memory of modern times. On the other hand, the pecuniary distress is at least equal in proportion.

The Ottoman Government does not apply to me on this occasion in the tone which has too frequently been adopted by other States, by declaring that unless Great Britain shall assist them, they shall be reduced to make cessions of territory, and other sacrifices, to obtain peace; they assure me that they mean to carry on the war to extremity whether we assist them or not; but they also point out to me the impossibility of carrying it on upon the only scale that can either insure them ultimate success, or enable them to render it an effectual diversion for Austria, unless some method can be devised for remedying the evil of which they feel so strongly the pressure at the present moment.

In the different conversations which I have had on this subject with the Plenipotentiary Vaahid Efendi (and I have had many, but have not hitherto deemed it necessary to trouble you with the details of them) it has been my constant endeavour to impress upon the Government the necessity of calling out their own resources, which are immense, and of establishing rigorous reforms in the collection of their revenue. I have found to all appearance a serious disposition to adopt these measures; but it has also been justly observed to me, that their wants are immediate, and that the reforms in question are not only distant in their operation, but, until the ferment occasioned by the Nizam-Dgedid shall be thoroughly appeased, not wholly safe to institute on an extended plan.

The method to which they seem chiefly to adhere is that of a loan from Great Britain; and with a view of effecting one, the Porte invited me not long since to a conference with Vaahid Efendi.

In the conference which I had with him accordingly, I assured this Minister of every disposition on the part of his Majesty to assist in relieving the necessities of the Ottoman Government; and for this purpose I stated myself to be ready to consult with him day after day, and to assist in framing any plan which should clear the question from the numerous difficulties with which it was encumbered. A loan from the merchants of England I convinced him was out of the question; a loan from the Government I thought equally so, but I would not refuse to transmit any proposal for one which might be accompanied with a specification of sufficient security for the payment of the interest, and the gradual extinction of the capital.

The particulars of their proposal, and of the security they offer, will be the subject of a future despatch. Vaahid Efendi was not prepared with any details, but he stated generally that it was intended to propose that the Mufti, the Ulemas, and the whole body of their law should join in an act pledging the revenues appropriated to the maintenance of their religion, for the repayment of the sum borrowed.

In consenting to transmit any plan of which this security is to be the basis, you will easily perceive that I have been actuated solely by a desire to prove to the Turks my readiness to enter into the state of their necessities. Such is the composition of the Turkish character that a refusal to listen to their proposals, however chimerical, would have been construed by them into an indifference to their situation, which I am far indeed from feeling.

This conference, which had been so earnestly solicited by the Ottoman Government, appeared to me to afford a favourable opportunity for submitting to its attention a measure of a different nature, and one through which a foundation might be laid, not only for relieving them from their present embarrassments, but for augmenting their natural resources, and procuring for his Majesty's service a permanent supply of several valuable articles of consumption.

It is well known that the different dominions of this vast empire produce oak timber in abundance, likewise copper and hemp. This latter article is not so valuable as the Russian hemp; but in case of necessity may become a very serviceable commodity. The copper used in the Turkish navy is of the finest kind; and, as I learn, would be obtained cheaper than that used in his Majesty's dockyards. I need not

expatiate on the importance of securing a constant supply of corn in the present, or indeed in any future prospect of our affairs in Spain, Italy, or the Mediterranean.

Instead of coming to Great Britain for a loan, therefore, I stated that these resources pointed out a much shorter and simpler method of supplying their wants ; and I offered to submit to his Majesty's Government the outlines of a convention by which Great Britain might engage to advance a certain sum to the Porte, bearing interest, and consent to receive in payment, at stated periods, ship timber, copper, hemp, and corn to an equal amount.

The utility of this measure to both countries will, I think, appear evident. To Great Britain, by insuring a supply of the most valuable articles of constant consumption ; to Turkey, by showing them the extent of their own resources, and by teaching them habits of industry to call them forth.

Vaahid Efendi received the communication of this offer with much apparent satisfaction. It is to be laid before the Divan ; and by the time at which I shall have another opportunity of writing to you I expect to receive an answer to it, together with the plan for the projected loan.

Not to lose time, I am now making proper inquiries with regard to the amount of timber, corn, hemp, and copper which the Porte can actually dispose of. I have also written to Sir Alexander Ball, communicating fully to his Excellency the nature of my proposal ; and as the wants of the Porte are most pressing, I have sent to inquire of him how far he is actually authorised to become a purchaser for his Majesty's service of any quantity of the above articles suf-

ficiently large to be made an object of arrangement between the two Governments.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XX. Three Inclosures.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, April 23d, 1809.

SIR,

APPLICATION having been made to me by the commanders of several vessels belonging to the Republic of the Seven Islands to take them under his Majesty's protection on their renouncing that of France, after due inquiry into the circumstances of their respective cases, and upon consultation with Mr. Dendrino, late Chancellor of the Septinsular republic, I acceded to their request under certain conditions, of which I have the honour to inclose you a copy (A).

The article by which these vessels engage to proceed from hence to Malta, in the first instance, appeared to me necessary in order to guard against any fraudulent attempt to cover enemy's property under a pretence of abjuring French usurpation. At Malta their papers and the crews of the vessels will undergo a rigid examination, and his Excellency Sir Alexander Ball, in whose vigilance and accuracy it is needless for me to express the fullest confidence, will be enabled to give such further directions respecting the disposal of them as to his judgment may seem necessary.

These articles having been signed by the captains of five ships now lying in the harbour of Constan-



tinople, I ordered the inclosed proclamation (B) to be made public. The Septinsular flag was then hoisted on board the ships, and the colours of France were hauled down.

The violence of the French Charge d'Affaires on this occasion has passed all bounds, and he has proceeded to acts which have been productive of the most serious discussions with the Porte.

Ever since the cession of the fortresses of Corfu by Russia France has openly claimed the sovereignty of the Islands, and has asserted her claim by acts which, although never distinctly recognised by the Porte, have not been formally resisted. I had occasion very shortly after my arrival here to protest against this usurpation, and I gave fair notice to the Porte that I should exert the right of protecting the subjects of the Septinsular Republic in all such cases as appeared to me to require it.

Immediately on the appearance of the proclamation above recited, Mr. Dendrino was arrested in the street by order of the French Chargé d'Affaires, and conducted prisoner to his house.

Of this outrage I sent immediate notice to the Porte, and demanded redress. Satisfaction was promised me without hesitation; and a note was instantly despatched to Mr. Latour de Maubourg by the Reis Efendi, requiring him to deliver up his prisoner. Mr. de Maubourg refused, declaring him to be a French subject.

On receiving intelligence of this refusal, I thought it expedient to present without delay the note of which the enclosed is a copy (C); and I went myself to the Reis Efendi to enforce the representations contained in it.

When I arrived at the Porte I found the Divan assembled, and that a determination had been taken to send the Dragoman of the Porte to Mr. de Maubourg (a step never taken but on very extraordinary occasions) with the following message : —

“ That it appearing to the Porte that the English Minister claimed the individual in question as being under the English protection, and that the French Minister claimed him as being under that of France; it appearing also that the territory of the Porte had been violated by the forcible seizure of his person, the Porte demanded, in the first instance, that the man should be delivered into its custody, in order to his being interrogated by the Caimacan to which nation he belonged.”

In obedience to these orders the chief Dragoman went immediately to Mr. de Maubourg, who again refused to deliver up the man. The Dragoman then remonstrated with him on the consequences of involving the two countries in war, which would infallibly be the case if he persisted. Mr. de Maubourg still adhered to his refusal, unless the Porte would undertake that the man should not exercise his functions of Chancellor of the Seven Islands, and unless the ships which had hoisted the Septinsular flag should be ordered to strike their colours.

The Dragoman refused to enter into any question concerning the Seven Islands, or to hear of any conditions for the delivering up of Mr. Dendrino. Mr. de Maubourg then required a written note from the Reis Efendi to justify him towards his own government in complying with the demand of the Porte. The Dragoman retired, and the same evening returned with a note from the Reis Efendi; but Mr. de Maubourg

still refused to deliver up his prisoner. Each party threatened the other to proceed to extremities.

Thus stands the question at this moment. Tomorrow the Grand Vizier is expected at Constantinople, and the matter will, I conclude, be referred to his decision.

So long as I see this Government resolved to maintain the rights of my sovereign as well as its own dignity, I shall abstain from all interference with the course it is pursuing. This course by no means precludes me from insisting on a distinct personal satisfaction to myself. Of this right I shall avail myself according to circumstances; but it is needless to embarrass the Porte with a question upon it before its time.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A in Mr. Adair's No. XX.

This paper contained the conditions to which the Septinsular Captains subscribed. These were,

1. To proceed from hence to Malta under convoy of a British ship of war.
2. On their arrival at Malta to put themselves under the direction of Sir A. Ball.

Inclosure B in Mr. Adair's No. XX.

[Public declaration by which Mr. Adair granted the English protection to the Septinsular flag, and to all individuals belonging to the Seven Islands, who should present themselves before their chancellor, Mr. Dendrino.]

Inclosure C in Mr. Adair's No. XX.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

THE undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Plenipotentiary, had the honour of representing yesterday to the Sublime Porte the atrocious violation of the rights of his sovereign committed by the Chargé d'Affaires of France, in the seizure and imprisonment of Mr. Dendrino, a person under the special protection of the King of Great Britain.

Such an act the Sublime Porte will readily believe cannot pass unnoticed by the undersigned.

But before the undersigned has recourse to those measures which the nature of the proceeding both indicates and demands, he is anxious to address himself to the Sublime Porte with that frankness which is due to the friendly relations so recently established between the two empires, and with that temper which is requisite for the preservation of the important interests involved in this proceeding.

The undersigned, therefore, has to observe to the Sublime Porte that independently of the right of personal security which he claims and demands for all persons under the protection of the King his master, and which has been so atrociously violated in the present instance, this act of the French Chargé d'Affaires is a direct insult to the sovereignty of the Porte itself.

The establishment of the Republic of the Seven Islands was formally recognised by the Sublime Porte by the Treaty of Peace in 1802. An embassy from that Republic was received at Constantinople, and admitted to exercise the functions attached by

the law of nations to all representatives of Independent States. Mr. Dendrino was attached to that embassy, and acted for it in the character of its chancellor.

No Treaty subsequent to the Treaty of Peace above recited has been made among the Powers interested in the fate of this Republic which can annul or in any degree weaken the rights possessed by Mr. Dendrino, whether as an authorised public agent of an Independent State, or whether as an individual under his Majesty's protection.

Mr. Dendrino has never acknowledged himself a subject of the French Government. He has never accepted the protection of France.

It is, therefore, to the Sublime Porte in the first instance, to its justice, to its friendship, to the sense of its own offended dignity, that the undersigned looks with confidence for the instant liberation of Mr. Dendrino, and for reparation for the insult thus wantonly and without provocation offered to the King his master by his arrest.

The undersigned abstains from any further observation for the present, and requests his Excellency to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

Pera, April 20th, 1809.

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Separate. No. 1.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, April 23d, 1809.

SIR,

THE circumstance which to all appearance has induced the captains of the Septinsular vessels in this

port to apply for British protection has been the measure adopted by this Government of shutting the Bosphorus. I have granted that protection under the conditions mentioned in my despatch of this day's date, with a view of stimulating the Septinsulars in other parts to make some effort to get possession of Cephalonia and the other Islands contiguous to Corfu; also of Cerigo, which is now a rendezvous for French privateers, who are becoming extremely troublesome in these seas. If this can be effected, and Corfu well blockaded, the French may very probably be expelled from thence during the summer.

On the importance of these Islands in the renewed state of our connections with this Empire, and with a view to the part which it may take in re-establishing our connections with the rest of Europe, it would be useless for me to dwell.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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Separate. No. 2. One Inclosure.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, April 23d, 1809.

SIR,

THE circumstance to which I have alluded in my despatch of this day's date as having given me occasion to protest against the asserted claim of France to the sovereignty of the Seven Islands, is as follows:—

I had engaged one Castriot, a native of Corfu, to print occasionally such proclamations and other public documents as might appear to me useful, with a view of counteracting the impressions produced by the

bulletins and other misrepresentations of the French. The utility of establishing a press, especially if the discussions between Austria and France should terminate in war, is a point on which I should think there could be no question.

This Castriot was under the protection of France; but he declared himself desirous of renouncing it if he could obtain that of England.

Had he been a native of any country which his Majesty by the Peace of Amiens had recognised to be within the limits of France, although I should not have given up the right of protecting him, I should probably have hesitated with regard to the propriety of exercising it just now. But as he was the native of a Republic whose independence had been recognised by all the parties to the Treaty of Amiens, and as no subsequent Treaty had been entered into by his Majesty which could in any degree alter the relations then established between his Majesty and that Republic, I thought myself bound in honour to promise the British protection to Castriot. This produced a representation from the French minister to the Porte, and a threat, and even an attempt to arrest the man under pretence of his being a French subject. The Porte wishing to avoid entering into the French claim of sovereignty, applied to me to find a middle course. I replied by the note of which the inclosed is a copy.

Since that period Castriot has not been molested, but I have been given to understand that it is only in consideration of his being in my service.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in Separate No. 2. of April 23d.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

Le Soussigné, Plénipotentiaire de sa Majesté Britannique, a reçu une communication de S. E. le Reis Efendi par la voie de M. Bibieca, premier Dragoman de la Sublime Porte, au sujet du nommé Jacob Castro, qui est au service du Soussigné.

On prétend que ce Jacob Castro étant natif de Corfou, le Soussigné n'a pas le droit de lui accorder la protection Britannique.

Le Soussigné insiste sur son droit absolu d'accorder la protection de son Souverain aux individus de toute nation quelconque (hors les sujets de la Sublime Porte) qui en seroient dignes, et qui la réclameraient de lui.

Les circonstances qui ont amené l'établissement de la République des Sept Isles, et la reconnaissance de son indépendance à la paix d'Amiens, sont connues de toute l'Europe : le Soussigné par conséquent insiste non seulement sur son droit, mais il se fait un devoir spécial de protéger les sujets de cette République.

L'occupation casuelle de Corfou par une garnison Française ne change en rien la nature de cette question. Il n'existe aucun Traité entre sa Majesté et aucune Puissance depuis la signature du Traité d'Amiens qui change les relations subsistantes entre sa Majesté et la République des Sept Isles.

Avec autant de raison la France s'arrogeroit-Elle la reconnaissance de sa prétendue souveraineté sur l'Espagne, sur la Sicile, sur l'Italie, et sur le royaume



de Naples, que de celle sur Corfou, où ses troupes ne sont entrées qu'à la suite d'un accord avec l'Empereur de Russie, dont la discussion ne serait pas ici à sa place.

Mais en même tems que le Soussigné réclame en toute sa plénitude, et insiste sur son droit de protection, (à l'exception seule de ce qui pourrait regarder les sujets de la Sublime Porte,) et qu'il annonce sa détermination invariable de l'accorder à tous ceux qui la lui demanderont, et qui ne s'en seroient pas rendus indignes, et particulièrement à tous ceux qui sont restés fidèles à leurs sermens, et à leurs Souverains légitimes, le Soussigné n'empêchera personne de chercher la protection de telle puissance qu'elle jugera le plus en état de la lui accorder. Le Soussigné ne réclame autre chose sinon la jouissance de ses droits, qu'il est résolu de défendre jusqu'à la dernière extrémité.

Le Soussigné désire vivement d'éviter à la Sublime Porte tout sujet de désagrément, mais la question dont il s'agit est d'une nature infiniment trop importante pour permettre qu'il reste le moindre doute sur les principes qui le dirigent. Il se trouve par conséquent dans la nécessité, en réponse à la communication amicale de S. E. le Reis Effendi, de le prévenir qu'il ne retirera pas sa promesse faite au nommé Jacob Castro, dont cet individu sera toujours le maître de profiter quand bon lui semblera.

Le Soussigné prie, &c. &c.

Pera, le 15. Mars, 1809.

No. XXI.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, April 26th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the new Grand Vizier, Jusuf Pacha, arrived at the Porte on the 23d instant, and took possession of the Government on the 24th.

On sending Mr. Pisani with the usual congratulations to his Highness, I had it intimated to him that the settlement of the affair of Mr. Dendrino's arrest must precede all other business in which I could take part.

As some days may yet elapse before it is terminated, I do not think proper to detain any longer the vessel which is waiting at the Dardanelles for my dispatches.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XXII. One Inclosure.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, May 8th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAD the honour of receiving your despatches, Nos. 1 and 2, on the 7th instant.

In my dispatch, No. 20, I gave you an account of the arrest of Mr. Dendrino by order of the Chargé d'Affaires of France.

I have now the honour of informing you, that in consequence of this daring outrage, the Porte has adopted the resolution of breaking off all communication with the French Mission until Mr. Dendrino shall be set at liberty.

The notification of this resolution was made to me yesterday morning in form by the Porte through its dragoman, who was sent to me for that special purpose.

I forward to you a copy of this communication in the words in which it was delivered, and likewise of my answer to it.

This measure of the Porte was adopted after a conference with me, which I had demanded, in order to bring the business to a point. Fourteen days had elapsed, during which the French had been employing every artifice and intimidation to induce the Ministers, and especially the new Grand Vizier, to acquiesce in the act of violence they had committed. These efforts, I had reason to perceive, were not without their effect, and to say the truth, in the distracted state of the affairs of this Government, and under the strong impressions of alarm which the name of France still inspires, I began to fear that they would be successful. It became necessary for me, therefore, to use very decisive language, and even to make the Porte sensible that the ratifications of the treaty of peace were not yet exchanged.

The demand to suspend the functions of the French Minister came from me, and after a long discussion was complied with in the manner I have related to you.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in Mr. Adair's No. XXII.

*Speech of the Dragoman of the Porte to Mr. Adair.*

JE viens au nom de la Sublime Porte pour demander l'état de la santé de votre Excellence, et pour vous donner une preuve agréable de l'intérêt que la Sublime Porte a pris dans l'insulte commis par le Chargé d'affaires de France dans l'arrestation et emprisonnement du Sieur Dendrino.

Votre Excellence est informée en même tems de la résolution de la Sublime Porte de couper toute communication avec la *mission Française* jusqu'à ce que M. Dendrino soit mis en liberté.

*Mr. Adair's Answer.*

Je suis très sensible, Monsieur, à l'attention de la Sublime Porte en m'envoyant son dragoman pour me faire part de la juste indignation dont elle est pénétrée à l'occasion de l'arrestation de Monsieur Dendrino.

Cet outrage inoui fait dans la capitale de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans, à une personne sous la protection Britannique, est un attentat égal contre les droits du Roi, mon maître, et contre la souveraineté de la Sublime Porte.

Aussi je ne puis qu'applaudir à la résolution qu'a prise la Sublime Porte de rompre en premier lieu toute communication avec la mission Française, et je la remercie de cette marque de ses égards pour le Roi mon maître.

No. XXIII. Two Inclosures.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, May 28. 1809 .

SIR,

WHEN I had last the honour of writing to you, I had not seen the enclosed note from the French Minister to the Porte relative to Dendrino's arrest. Its contents are of considerable interest, and help me to explain some of the difficulties which I have recently met with in the prosecution of this business.

Instigated very probably by the suggestions contained in this note, the Turkish Ministers have taken up the question on principles which by no means accord with my views in bringing it forward. They have advanced a claim of paramount sovereignty over the Seven Islands, by virtue of which they deny my right of protecting their inhabitants, and of establishing a chancery for the concerns of the Septinsular republic. This claim was first talked of on my repeating an application for firmans for the sailing of the five vessels which had hoisted the republican flag. It was then given me to understand that although, for reasons of convenience, the Ottoman Government had been silent in regard to the pretensions of France, they had never renounced their own. I was also informed that, as the same motives which had induced the Turkish Ministers to avoid discussing this question with France still subsisted, they could not sanction any act of mine within their territories which tended to the formal re-establishment of a state of things on the lawfulness of which they had resolved not to pronounce.

Not choosing to involve myself in an adverse discussion with the Porte on this occasion, nor to take any step before Dendrino's release, the effect of which might be to unite the Turkish and the French Governments against me, I consented that the ships in question, the captains of which had agreed with me to proceed in the first instance to Malta, there to surrender themselves to the disposal of Sir Alexander Ball, should be described as English ; but the Republican flag having been hoisted under my sanction, I absolutely refused to permit its being hauled down.

Accordingly, after many difficulties and delays, the five ships sailed with their colours flying on the 14th inst. But having carried this point, I judged it most prudent to abstain for the present from hoisting the flags on board other Septinsular vessels now in the harbour. Enough had been gained for the principle ; and I was too much interested in keeping the Turks steady to the point at issue with the French Minister, and in rendering the rupture with him complete, to disoblige them by a repetition of acts which I found had already produced some degree of soreness in respect to myself.

With this view, I had recourse to a measure which has subjected this Minister to a fresh mortification, and which his own hastiness has converted into an abdication of his public character.

In spite of the notification of the suspension of his functions, he had continued to send his dragomans to the Porte, and to assert publicly that the harmony between himself and the Ottoman Government continued uninterrupted. His chief dragoman had even the audacity to force his way into the Grand Vizier's presence. His Highness it is true received him very

ill ; but the effect produced upon the public by this intrusion, for which the dragoman does not appear to have been punished, was a belief that all differences were amicably adjusted, and that the Porte was amusing me with empty professions. That this was far from the fact I had many satisfactory proofs. The French Minister had applied for a passport for General Gardanne, said to be on his return from Persia to France. He had twice attempted to present official notes. He had sent his secretary to the Porte to demand admission to the Reis Efendi. Every thing was refused him ; notwithstanding which, as it appeared to me that this extraordinary proceeding of his chief dragoman called for some notice on my part, immediately after the sailing of the Septinsular ships I gave in the enclosed note.

The Porte took twelve days to consider what step to take upon it, when, in consequence of a peremptory summons from me, they yesterday ordered the guard of honour to be withdrawn from the palace of France.

This act of the Porte (in itself nothing, as the guard had been continued beyond the usual time allowed upon the arrival of foreign Ministers) appears to have singularly affected the Chargé d'affaires of France. He has thought it necessary to shut the doors of his palace, and to declare to the chief merchants of his nation that he considered his functions at an end. I do not observe, however, that he is taking any steps to quit Constantinople. In all probability he will wait to see what passes in Germany, which will also materially determine the conduct of this Government towards him.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A. in No. XXIII. French Note.

*Copie d'une Note de M. Latour Maubourg, Chargé d'affaires de France, à la Porte Ottomane, en date du 1 Mai, 1809.*

LE Soussigné, &c. désirant qu'il n'y existe aucun mal-entendu sur les objets qui ont été traités dans la conférence d'hier entre S. A. le Grand Vizier et lui, a le dessein d'exprimer de nouveau ses sentimens par écrit.

Le Soussigné a établi le droit qu'il avoit de saisir et de garder le nommé Dendrino. Cet objet étant prouvé dans plusieurs notes, le Soussigné n'y reviendra plus. La Sublime Porte n'ayant point répondu à ces notes, elle a sans doute reconnu que les raisonnemens qui y sont soutenus sont sans réplique.

Toutes fois S. A. le Grand Vizier a demandé au Soussigné de relâcher le nommé Dendrino. Connoissant par les instances du Grand Vizier que S. A. attachoit un grand prix à cette condescendance, oubliant tous les procédés outrageans qui ont été prodigués à son égard dans cette affaire, le Soussigné étoit tout prêt d'accéder aux volontés de S. A. Mais comme le devoir du Soussigné s'opposoit expressément à ce qu'il consentît aux demandes du Grand Vizier, il désiroit qu'on lui promît pour prix du sacrifice qu'il feroit, des assurances propres à le faire approuver par son Souverain. Le Soussigné demandoit en conséquence que les griefs sérieux qu'il a contre la Porte fussent applanis, qu'on promît d'empêcher l'établissement d'une prétendue Chancellerie des Sept-Isles, qu'on remît aux cinq batimens Fran-



çois le pavillon François qu'on leur a enlevé dans le port de Constantinople, que la Sublime Porte reconnût le Chargé d'affaires de la Cour d'Espagne. Non seulement on n'a voulu donner aucune assurance au Soussigné sur ces objets, mais on a refusé d'en parler. Si le Soussigné avoit été satisfait sur ces trois points, il auroit eu pour S. A. le Grand Vizier la condescendance qu'on recherchoit, parcequ'elle auroit assuré la bonne harmonie. Mais cette condescendance n'ayant pas le but désirable, elle ne seroit plus condescendance, elle seroit foiblesse.

Le Soussigné avoit eu un autre moyen de satisfaire S. A. le Grand Vizier. Le Soussigné ne peut laisser sortir un François de ses mains pour le remettre en d'autres mains, mais il pouvoit inviter tous les sujets de S. M. à quitter l'Empire Ottoman ; si la Sublime Porte avoit consenti à cette mesure le sujet de la contestation tomboit de lui-même. Mais la Sublime Porte n'y a pas voulu consentir, et le Soussigné a reconnu avec plaisir dans cette occasion les dispositions amicales de S. A. le Grand Vizier. Dans l'impossibilité d'accommoder cette affaire le Soussigné a eu la douleur bien grande de ne pouvoir condescendre au désir de S. A., et lui donner une preuve de sa haute vénération pour sa personne. Le Soussigné désirant vivement que sa conduite ne paroisse pas dirigée par le dessein d'élever des débats entre la Sublime Porte et la France, déclare, ainsi qu'il l'a fait il y a 15 jours dans une note officielle, qu'il a ordre de son Souverain de vivre en paix et en amitié avec la Sublime Porte.

Le Soussigné seroit fort chagrin s'il devenoit lui-même par ses procédés une occasion de discussion entre les deux Empires. Pour éviter ce malheur, il propose à la Sublime Porte d'écrire à S. E. Muhibb

Efendi, afin de reconnoître par le canal de cet ambassadeur si le Soussigné est approuvé ou blâmé par sa Cour. Dans 50 jours la Porte peut avoir des éclaircissemens sur cet objet, qui est fort important, surtout dans ce moment, où une nouvelle guerre commencée contre le gré de la France va se terminer, avec l'aide de Dieu, comme les précédentes, à la gloire du nom François.

Il y a des hommes intéressés à brouiller la Porte avec la France; et pour cacher leurs coupables desseins, ils les rejettent sur le Soussigné. Mais ce n'est pas le Soussigné qui a engagé la Porte à ne pas reconnoître le Chargé d'affaires du Roi d'Espagne. Ce n'est pas le Soussigné qui a concouru à l'établissement d'une Chancellerie des Sept-Isles, source de la discussion actuelle. Ceux qui ont fait ces choses sont des hommes traitres à l'état et indigne du nom Musulman.

Le Soussigné prie la Sublime Porte de considérer que la France n'a jamais voulu la guerre, qu'elle ne la veut point, et qu'elle est toute prête à aider la Porte et à l'appuyer aussitôt que la Porte le désirera et fera ce qui sera nécessaire pour cela.

Le Soussigné saisit, &c.

(Signé) FAIJ LATOUR MAUBOURG.

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Inclosure B. No. XXIII.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

AFTER the conference which took place on the 4th instant between the undersigned, H. E. the Reis

Efendi, and his colleagues, respecting the arrest of Mr. Dendrino by the French Chargé d'Affaires,—after the resolution taken by the Sublime Porte, at the end of that conference, to break off all communication with the French mission until Mr. Dendrino should be released,—and after the subsequent solemn and official notification of that resolution made to the undersigned by the Porte through its Dragoman, the undersigned fully expected that he should be relieved from the necessity of addressing to the Sublime Porte any further representations on that subject.

The undersigned, however, is well informed, that on the 8th instant, the principal Dragoman of the French Embassy was admitted to his Highness the Grand Vizier; and that, instead of being ordered instantly to quit his presence, he remained with him a considerable time in close and private conference.

The undersigned would readily flatter himself that accident had given rise to this circumstance, which otherwise he would have a right to represent as a direct breach of engagement on the part of the Sublime Porte: but how can he attribute it merely to accident, when it is notorious to the whole capital that the Chargé d'Affaires of France has officially notified to all persons under his jurisdiction, that the relations between the Sublime Porte and the French Embassy still remain on the usual footing of intimacy and cordiality?

A minister in the station of the Chargé d'Affaires of France would not have officially announced this fact without believing himself authorised so to do.

The undersigned can impute no blame to that minister for an error into which he may have been led, not only by the admission of his Dragoman to the

presence of his Highness the Grand Vizier, but by the fact, still more notorious, of his continuing to receive from the Sublime Porte those distinctions which are granted to the ministers of foreign states only during the first months of their residence at the Imperial capital.

Such a circumstance would in itself be too trifling to merit the notice of the undersigned, were it not of a nature strongly to confirm the official statement of the Chargé d'Affaires relative to the uninterrupted harmony and good-understanding alleged still to subsist between himself and the Ottoman Government.

The undersigned has further to represent what follows:—

The object of the Sublime Porte, in breaking off all communication with the French mission, was not only to express its indignation for the insult offered to the undersigned, but likewise to obtain Mr. Dendrino's release. This object has not been effected; notwithstanding which the Dragomans of the French mission continue under various pretexts their daily attendance at the Sublime Porte, and thus give countenance to the reports, universally disseminated, that the Porte has abandoned its resolution of procuring Mr. Dendrino's liberation, and that it submits with patience to the violation of its territory.

The undersigned deeply regrets the continuance of a state of things which cannot but interrupt the harmony so recently re-established between Great Britain and the Sublime Porte. In the present situation of affairs, this interruption constitutes of itself a powerful diversion in favour of the common enemy. This diversion is caused by France, and by France alone;

the undersigned having in no instance, since his arrival in the Ottoman dominions, invaded the rights of France ; while on the other hand a most daring outrage has been committed by the Chargé d'Affaires of that nation against the rights of the King his master.

The undersigned is far from presuming to point out to the Sublime Porte the course which it would be for its dignity to follow, in order to enforce its own resolutions ; but he cannot refrain from observing that unless the French minister shall himself receive from the Sublime Porte a distinct communication in writing, declaratory of its determination to break off all intercourse with the French mission until Mr. Dendrino's release, and unless a similar notification be addressed to the ministers of friendly powers resident at the Ottoman Court, no step which the Sublime Porte may have it in its contemplation to take to procure satisfaction for the undersigned can prove efficacious.

The undersigned requests, &c. &c.

Pera, May 14. 1809.

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No. XXIV. Four Inclosures.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, June 3. 1809.

SIR,

THE unsettled situation of affairs in this country has induced me hitherto to defer sending you any account of the composition of the Ottoman administration, and consequently of what may be expected from it in the present crisis. I seize a moment of apparent harmony among the several orders, to transmit to

you some particulars on this subject, which, if not so ample as I could wish, contain what I can depend upon as accurate.

The difficulty of persuading the Janissaries to accept Jusuf Pacha for Grand Vizier, delayed his arrival at Constantinople until the end of April. During this long period from the death of Mustapha, the Ottoman Empire may be said to be without a government. The heads of the different departments confined themselves to the details of their several charges. No man would undertake the responsibility of a general measure. The obvious consequences ensued. Public business, in all its essential parts, was at a stand. Councils, indeed, were continually held, but without leading to any result. Nothing was done to get an army,—nothing to gain the confidence of the Janissaries,—nothing, at least, either sufficiently decisive or sufficiently honest to be successful. The obstinate refusal of that body to receive any Grand Vizier without some security for his being disposed in their favour, and the difficulty of finding such security where confidence had ceased to exist, produced a long series of jealousies and discontents, with which, until within these few days, the capital has been incessantly distracted.

The disorders in the provinces continued with as little intermission. Government, indeed, appeared every where to be fallen into such a state of relaxation, as to have lost the means of acting right, even when it was supported by the public sentiment. Nothing can so truly characterise both the nature and the source of these disorders as what has passed at the frontiers upon the renewal of hostilities with Russia. I have already had the honour of informing you to

what degree the spirit of the people was roused by the insolent demand made at the end of March by that power. Some degree of vigour seemed also to have been inspired into the ministry on that occasion. Great activity prevailed in all the war departments. The fleet was ordered to be fitted out; and in fact ten sail of the line have been equipped with uncommon expedition. Troops and provisions were ordered to the fortresses; and numbers of men were seen to pass the Bosphorus, day after day, taking their route for the frontiers. Unhappily, when they reached the Danube, instead of being embodied into an army to oppose the enemy, finding no leader to command them, they enlisted under one or the other of two ferocious chiefs, who, in the very sight of the Russian tents, were desolating their country with civil war. There is an Ayan of Schiumla, and a chief named Pehlivan Aga, under whose banners all the new comers engaged, and who have already had many desperate encounters, to the unspeakable injury of the public cause.

These multiplying dangers of the state, however, facilitated the negotiations for the reception of Jusuf Pacha. He arrived accordingly on the 23rd of April, and was received by the Janissaries with every appearance of cordiality.

Immediately on his installation, the Hatti-scheriff, which I have here the honour of enclosing, was made public. The principles and views contained in this instrument announce, as we must suppose, the system on which his government is to be carried on. According to all I am able to learn respecting the personal dispositions of the Sultan, there can be no doubt of his intending to act in strict conformity with his professions; but however his subjects may feel disposed

to rely on his individual rectitude, there is nothing in the composition of his Divan which can afford much hope of those energetic measures which are imperiously called for by the public necessities.

In effect, with the exception of the Reis Efendi Ghalib, whose return to his office is doubtful, and of Chelebi Efendi, who is entirely in the French interest, the council consists of men who are not likely to deprive chance of the merit of saving their country. The very first act of the new Vizier's administration had nearly lost him the public confidence for ever. Soon after his arrival, a grand Divan was assembled, the object of which was to conciliate the Janissaries, in order to induce them to march to the Danube. With this intent, it was publicly announced as having been resolved, at that divan, that the Grand Vizier should march at their head. At the time of making this notification, equivalent in its nature to a promise, there was not the most distant intention of sending the Vizier from the capital. The Janissaries were indignant at the deceit. A suspicion that some attempt was meditated against their order, and was to be put in execution during their absence from Constantinople, was the fruit of this ill-advised duplicity. Murmurs and angry remonstrances, and even some acts of violence, succeeded. The alarm became general; and there was even a moment when the worst extremities were to be apprehended.

These troubles are now appeased by the resolution finally taken, that the Grand Viziers shall march. On receiving the enclosed Hatti-scheriff (A) (written, as it is said, by the Sultan himself), his standard was erected in form. On this occasion, the solemnity of which, even in the present humbled state of the Ottoman



power, retains its full hold on the public opinion, all animosities appear at once to have subsided. Enthusiasm took its turn. The Janissaries by a special deputation declared their entire satisfaction, and their readiness to fall in with all the Sultan's views. Conditions are annexed to their compliance, but they are such as demonstrate the high state of the public spirit. They demand to be led at once to the enemy. They demand that no peace shall be listened to without the restitution of the provinces; and, above all, that they shall be amused with no more armistices. On these considerations they will march with the Vizier instantly to the Danube, and they pledge themselves to submit to the severest discipline, and even to consent to the abolition of their order, if any outrage be committed, or any civil troubles be renewed, in their camp. In short, there is nothing which has not been promised on both sides.

Such at the moment I write, is the situation of affairs between the grand Vizier and the Janissaries. He is yet too new in his office, and too much favoured by the Sultan, to fear any intrigues either in the Seraglio or in other quarters.

Of anything so loose and indeterminate as the foreign politics of the Porte I should in vain endeavour to speak with precision. The Turks, as you know, never were very desirous of Christian alliances. The common danger connected them with Great Britain and Russia in 1798; but after France had by her artifices dissolved that union and brought on the war of 1806, the Porte was thrown back upon her old system, and became, by our being obliged to take part in that war, more than ever dissociated from the community of Europe. Austria, indeed, was too

nearly interested in the fate of Turkey not to cultivate her friendship with the most anxious care ; but such was the situation even of Austria, that she was compelled to restrict herself to the common good offices of a friendly power, without venturing to look forward to any nearer connection.

I was not surprised therefore to find that Austria did not enjoy at this Court the consideration due to so near and so faithful a neighbour. But in the distance which Turkey observed towards her, there was at least as much fear as indifference. General Sebastiani had left such impressions of terror on the minds of the Turks, such a belief that Bonaparte's power was irresistible, that in the midst of the distresses of the war with Russia, and after a full discovery of the designs of France both at Tilsit and at Erfurt, they did not dare to address an overture to Austria, or even to ask an explanation of her intentions in the event of any attempt to execute the project of partition.

The absolute nullity of all the other continental Powers renders their relations with this empire of little account. Thus, at the time of signing the peace with Great Britain, the Turks stood alone, unregarded, and devoted to immediate ruin. That event again connected them with the common destinies ; but, unfortunately, they cannot yet be made to see that to avail themselves of this last chance, they must act like Austria, and venture upon war against a Power which for the third time they have detected in contriving their destruction.

For the present, therefore, the whole system of their foreign policy appears to be limited to the renewal of their relations with Great Britain. Their

behaviour consequently under these relations will be the test of the principles of the Grand Vizier's foreign administration.

On this subject there is much to be said. Before the Vizier arrived, the Turkish Government, in spite of the distractions of their internal state, the incessant menaces of the French Minister, and at length the actual renewal of hostilities by Russia, made and maintained the peace with Great Britain. These were acts which bore at least the appearance of decision ; and for these acts, although in the main they were most consonant with their interests, I am bound to praise both their firmness and their good faith.

But when I began to take steps directly affecting the interests of France, and the stability of the French mission at Constantinople, I found a material change in the conduct of the Ministers. Partiality towards France is by no means the motive of this conduct ; it is the terror of her power, and the objection, very just if well applied, to increasing the number of the public enemies in the present enfeebled and distracted state of the empire. Still, after making all due allowance for these impressions, I cannot feel wholly pleased with the support they have given me in the affair of Dendrino. They promised me complete and immediate satisfaction. They promised me the liberation of the man. The satisfaction however which I have already obtained, such as it is, has been very gradual ; and as to Dendrino's liberation, I now see no prospect of it except by forcing the gates of the French palace, a measure which the minister of a ~~power~~ power in this country can under no circumstances commend. During the first fortnight

I was given to understand that in an affair of this nature, in which a compliance with my demand might occasion a rupture with France, no one of the Ministers would take upon himself the responsibility of acting, but that when the Grand Vizier arrived I should carry every point I wished. I found no such effect from his presence. On the contrary, his whole object seemed to be to temporise, to please both parties, and, indeed, to persuade me that the point in dispute was not worth my persisting in. It was not until ten days after his arrival, and even then not until after a most stormy discussion with the Ministers, that I could obtain a promise from them of suspending official communications with the French mission. It was full three weeks afterwards, during which I was complaining incessantly that this promise was not kept, and goading them with remonstrances and demands, before his guard of honour was discontinued. It was with the utmost difficulty that the firmans for the sailing of the five Septinsular ships were granted to me, although I had consented to their being described as English. I mention these matters to show with what extreme reluctance this Government consented to take any steps, however due to his Majesty's dignity, which seemed liable to a hostile construction on the part of France. The assurances given me on my arrival that the French party in the Divan was extinguished by the peace with England, were far from correct. It exists ; and although not in sufficient credit to enable the French Minister to govern through it, I cannot disguise from myself the power he still possesses to thwart me in the great objects I am labouring to carry.

There is however another and a very material point,

on which, all things considered, I have, as far as I have gone, great reason to be satisfied. In order to discharge what appeared to me an important part of my duty towards his Majesty's allies, I took an opportunity of endeavouring to re-establish their official relations with the Porte, which had been suspended during the prevalence of the French influence. The Swedish Minister had been informed that his appearance at the Porte might be discontinued. The envoy of his Sicilian Majesty had received a formal notification in writing that his functions had ceased. The situation in which I found the Spanish legation at my arrival, called also for my particular attention. That whole legation had quitted Constantinople, leaving a Dragoon in the character of *Chargé d'Affaires* of the usurper Joseph. Under these circumstances it became necessary to re-establish, if possible, the two first, and to prevent the recognition, or if already recognised to annihilate the character, of the third.

With regard to the Swedish Minister the obstacle to his resumption of his diplomatic relations was soon removed. Intending to employ his good offices in the affair of Dendrino, I had demanded a conference for him in form; and the day for it was already fixed, when the arrival of the news of the Revolution at Stockholm induced him, with my full consent, to decline attending it. Let me take this opportunity of bearing testimony to M. de Palin's unshaken loyalty and attachment to the person of his sovereign.

The case of the Sicilian envoy was more difficult. The notice of the cessation of his functions is so perfectly according to all the forms of diplomatic usage, that it will be impossible to re-establish him without fresh credentials. These have not yet been sent. He has simply been instructed to profit by my arrival to

put himself again in relation with the Porte. For the present, therefore, I do not see how I can assist him.

With regard to Spain, I had very early been assured by the Porte that they never had acknowledged the person left by the Marquis d'Almenara in the diplomatic character of Chargé d'Affaires for the usurper Joseph. But an opportunity having presented itself during the month of April, to make an advance in behalf of the lawful sovereign of Spain, in the hope that some accredited person might be sent out by the Supreme Junta, I presented the inclosed note (C) to the Reis Efendi. The contents will inform you as well of the occasion as of the use I endeavoured to make of it.

Before I could receive an answer to the desire I expressed in this note, the affair of Dendrino occurred, which, as it was in itself sufficient to try the strength of the English and the French missions, induced me to suspend the prosecution of all other points.

In this interval came the declaration of Austria, and the news of her first successes. Finding that these events assisted me but little in the main business, I thought it best to profit by the actual interruption, while it lasted, of the intercourse between the Porte and France, to press once more the business of Spain, and to obtain permission for Don Rodrigo to present the letters entrusted to his care.

The inclosed second note (D) therefore, was delivered in; and I have the satisfaction of informing you that Don Rodrigo had yesterday an audience of the Reis Efendi, at which he presented in form the letter of the Supreme Junta to the Grand Vizier.

From the statement which I have here the honour of submitting to your consideration, added to the

doubtful aspect of the war between Austria and France, you will perceive that, at this moment, the prospect of engaging the Porte, either in a general alliance, or in any measure of common concert, is not materially advanced.

Events alone can bring matters to this point. These, in the renewed war with Russia, have hitherto been highly favourable to Turkey. Three times the Russians have been decidedly beaten on the Danube. These defeats, indeed, have been sustained in attempting to carry fortresses by assault, but they have nevertheless been complete in themselves, and attended with a very serious diminution of the Russian armies. Our intelligence from Bucarest, from Jassy, and from Odessa, concurs in estimating their loss as little short of 20,000 men. The Turks have also obtained several advantages over the Servians.

I should have more satisfaction in communicating this intelligence, if I could be quite sure that the promise made to the Janissaries would be kept, and that the pecuniary distresses of this government would not drive them into some sort of peace, than which, if it be separate from Austria, nothing can be more destructive to the common cause.

What is passing in Austria must also materially influence the decision of these great questions. The points connected with this part of the subject are too many and too various for present speculation; neither have I any facts to guide me, except the official accounts of the military operations of Austria up to the 22nd of April.

But the most material of all things will be the arrival of the ratifications of the peace. Without

these, I must fairly say, that I expect to carry no more great points against France; and if before their arrival, Bonaparte should penetrate to Vienna, I will not answer for the effect which may be produced upon the dispositions of men who compose such a Government as I have above described : reason, undoubtedly, ought to determine them, in proportion to the successes of France, and the approximation of danger to their frontiers, to cling still closer to that general cause, in the success of which they can alone hope for safety, and to the only sovereign in Europe from whom they can have no fear of a separate peace; but all I can promise is to place that reason before their eyes on every occasion, and in the strongest light that I am able,

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure, A in No. XXIV. Translation.

*Hatti-scheriff to the Grand Vizier.*

Vous qui êtes mon premier Ministre, aussi magnifique que la lune dans son plein, profond dans vos pensées, mon Vizier doué d'une lumineuse intelligence, El Hady Jusuf Zija Pacha !

Après vous avoir honoré et fait grace de mon souverain et heureux salut, qu'il soit notoire à votre perspicacité que les fondemens et les soutiens de la Sublime Puissance Ottomane étant inséparables des Commandemens du Livre de Dieu (Couran), du chemin des Vrais croyans et de la nation fidèle, et de la loi du divin Prophète sur lequel soit le salut de paix; mes augustes ancêtres que Dieu ait dans sa miséricorde, se sont



fuit un boulevard inexpugnable de tous les préceptes de la loi Mahometane auxquels ils ont prêté une entière soumission et déférence ; en faisant tout ce qui est juste, et s'abstenant de toute action illicite, en donnant tous leurs soins et attention à la volonté du Très-Haut, en n'outrepassant pas les limites de la législation et des canons qu'ils ont opéré en conformité à la sainte Loi, ils ont institué et formé les milices de mes Sept Odjaks suivant l'ordre et la règle pour les faire combattre valeureusement dans le besoin contre les ennemis de la Foi. De la même manière que mes augustes ancêtres se sont soumis et ont obéi à la sainte Loi, de même les Janissaires de mon Empire, les Dgebedgis, les Tobtchis, les Arabadgis, les Sipahis, les Silihdars, et autres, en se soumettant et obéissant à leurs souverains, aux Visirs, aux Seraskers, aux Miri-Mirans, et aux officiers, ont tiré avec valeur le sabre contre l'ennemi de la Foi, étendu les limites de l'état, et obtenu les plus heureux succès dans les guerres et les combats : ce dont les livres et histoires rendent un témoignage manifeste.

Depuis un certain tems quelques personnes perverses glissées dans mon Gouvernement, ont par des vues personnelles dérogé aux anciennes constitutions de mon Empire, changé la loi et les canons, et uniquement pour satisfaire à leurs passions se sont livrés à certaines sortes d'affaires odieuses et coupables, ont embarrassé et troublé les habitans de mon Empire ; et comme les oppressions et torts qu'éprouvoient les serviteurs de Dieu étoient sans mesure, que les Rayas se trouvoient dispersés et éperdus, et que même l'état en étoit ébranlé, il est évident que les ennemis de la Foi trouvèrent l'occasion favorable pour attaquer de divers côtés les provinces de l'Empire Ottoman.

Quoique la plupart de ceux qui ont été la cause de ces désordres et maux pour la Sublime Porte, aient subi le châtement mérité de leurs œuvres, et éprouvé le mal comme ils l'ont fait, cependant la semence de la malignité qu'ils ont repandues parmi les Vrais-croyans, nuisant et causant de la mésintelligence jusqu' à ce jour, c'est un état de choses bien surprenant et étrange de voir, qu'un individu ne se fie plus à l'autre, et qu'on ne prête pas l'oreille aux mémoires remplis de plaintes qui viennent des extrémités des domaines Ottomans ! Ceux qui ont jetté une semblable corruption parmi les Vrais-croyans et ont déjà trouvé leur malheur, et ceux qui encore existant, osent se conduire contre les canons de l'Empire, que la malediction de Dieu, celle des anges et de toutes les nations soit sur eux !

En conséquence de ce préambule voici quelle est ma volonté Impériale. La situation de ma Sublime Porte n'est point cachée, elle est connue à tout le monde. L'applanissement d'une affaire si difficile ne peut être opéré que par le Ministère d'un Visir religieux, sage, éclairé, et prudent. Vous êtes parmi les Visirs celui qui est doué d'intelligence, d'habileté et capacité dans les affaires, et en même tems d'un âge avancé et dans son déclin. Dans l'attente de vos services pour la religion et pour l'état, je vous ai élu et nommé mon Vicaire absolu, et Suprême Visir avec une autorité illimitée ; et je viens d'envoyer à votre personne très fidèle par le canal de mon Bach-Ichohadar (premier valet de chambre) un cheval dont la marche est aussi légère que le Zéphir. Je veux donc voir ce que vous ferez. Votre conduite passée prouve une parfaite connoissance de tout ce qui a rapport aux affaires de mon Empire. D'abord vous soutien-

dreZ fortement la Sainte Loi; en second lieu vous ferez cesser la mésintelligence qui règne parmi le peuple; vous travaillerez à la tranquillité de mes Odjaks; vous recommanderez d'après l'ancienne coutume chaque affaire à des personnes dont elle est du ressort; vous réglerez ces affaires en assemblant et consultant les Ulêmas, les Grands, et les anciens de l'Odjak selon le besoin; en un mot toutes vos pensées et vos soins seront dirigés à la conservation de la Religion, et de mon Empire. Je ne veux point des procédés contraires à la loi, et opposés aux anciens canons. Il n'est nécessaire que l'on observe les commandemens du Seigneur Très-Haut, que l'on s'abstienne de toute œuvre illicite, et que l'on soit soumis et obéissant à la Divine Loi. S'il faut obéir aux ordres suprêmes, vous vous conduirez conformément à mes présentes prescriptions souveraines, vous les recommanderez fortement aux autres, et vous punirez ceux qui y contreviendront. Repousser l'ennemi de la Foi, est un des premiers devoirs qu'impose la Sainte Loi. Que le Tout-puissant rende prospérés dans ce monde et dans l'autre ceux qui se conformeront à mes souverains ordres; mais qu'avec son nom vengeur, il anéantisse ceux qui agiront d'une manière contraire. Dieu vous accorde un parfait succès et bonheur dans toutes vos affaires.

Le 15 Rebiub Evel, 1224.

(Le 29 Avril, 1809.)

Inclosure C in No. XXIV.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

THE undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's Plenipotentiary at the Ottoman Court, had the honour of communicating to the Sublime Porte the substance of the correspondence which lately took place between the King, his master, and the Governments of Russia and France relative to negotiations for peace.

Since that period a treaty of alliance has been entered into between his Majesty and his most Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII., king of Spain and the Indies.

The undersigned has now the honour of informing H. E. the Reis Efendi that together with the despatches containing the above important communication from his Court, letters from the Government of Spain acting in the name of his Majesty, Ferdinand VII., have been transmitted to him. These letters are addressed to M. Joseph de Enderiz, formerly secretary to the Spanish legation at Constantinople.

By virtue of the close and cordial union now subsisting between Great Britain and Spain, the undersigned, in the absence of M. Joseph de Enderiz and of all the members of the Spanish legation, has not hesitated to open the packet and to entrust the letters contained in it, one of which is addressed to his Highness the Grand Vizier, to the care of Don Rodrigo, a faithful subject of his most Catholic Majesty, and already known to H. E. the Reis Efendi by his having filled, with distinguished ability, the office of chargé d'affaires of his most Catholic Majesty at the Ottoman Court.

In taking this step, the undersigned has acted in strict conformity with the intentions of the Spanish Government, who have addressed themselves in the first instance to the King, his master, in order to obtain, through the good offices of his Majesty, that the letters above mentioned should be communicated to the Sublime Porte with that certainty and fidelity which their importance requires.

The undersigned has therefore to request that H. E. the Reis Efendi will name an early day at which Don Rodrigo may present himself in person to H. E., and impart to H. E. the divers urgent and weighty matters which form the subject of these letters.

The undersigned requests, &c.

Pera, April 17th, 1809.

Inclosure D in No. XXIV.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

THE undersigned, &c. has the honour of recalling to the recollection of H. E. the Reis Efendi that on the 17th of April he informed H. E. by a written note —

1st. That the King, his master, had concluded a treaty of alliance with his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII., king of Spain.

2dly. That a letter addressed to his Highness the Grand Vizier by the Government of Spain, acting in the name of Ferdinand VII., had been transmitted to the undersigned in order to its being delivered to H. M. in the manner most suitable to the circumstances.

3dly. That the undersigned, in the absence of all

the members of the Spanish legation, had judged it most expedient to entrust this letter, together with various other authentic documents, to the care of Don Joseph Rodrigo, formerly his most Catholic Majesty's Chargé d'affaires at the Ottoman Court.

This course appeared most advisable to the undersigned, as he judged it of the greatest importance that the Ottoman Government should have before its eyes as early as possible a clear and true exposition of the events which had passed in Spain, a country on every account so interesting to the world, and whose friendship, by the situation of its ports and its sea-coast, might be so peculiarly useful to the Sublime Porte.

The undersigned therefore requested that H. E. the Reis Efendi would name a day at which Don Rodrigo could have the honour of presenting the letter and documents above mentioned.

His Highness the Grand Vizier, being on the eve of his departure for the army (to whose efforts may God grant victory and glory!), the undersigned feels himself under the indispensable necessity of renewing on the present occasion the request contained in his note of the 17th of April.

The undersigned, &c.

Pera, May 31st, 1809.

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No. XXV.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, June 6th, 1809.

SIR,

ON the 4th instant despatches were brought me by a Spanish officer, who arrived at the Dardanelles on

the 29th of May in a Spanish frigate, having on board Don John Havat, a person charged with a diplomatic mission from the Supreme Junta to the Ottoman Porte.

The character and the mission of Don John Havat were stated to me in a letter from H. E. Sir Alexander Ball, and I received, at the same time, a letter from this gentleman himself, claiming my good offices with the Ottoman Government to procure a firman for the passage of the frigate to Constantinople.

Although thoroughly aware of the inutility of such an application, I directed Mr. Pisani to make it, but I could obtain nothing further than permission for Don John Havat, and his suite, to come up to Constantinople, and a firman to the Pacha of the Dardanelles to facilitate his journey, and to observe towards him "all honours and distinctions."

By my preceding despatch you will see what had already been done to prepare the way for the reception of a Minister from Spain; but I am afraid that the war in Germany is not sufficiently prosperous to Austria to authorise a hope of the immediate recognition of his public character by this Government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XXVI.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, June 21st, 1809.

SIR,

On the 14th instant, accounts of the entry of the French into Vienna were received here without any

advices which could enable the Austrian Internuncio to diminish the effect of this disaster on the minds of the Turkish Government.

On the 17th despatches arrived from Buda, representing the general state of affairs up to the 16th of May in a much more favourable light than we could hope for.

At the same time the Internuncio received information that some Bosniak chiefs, instigated by the French in Dalmatia, had made an irruption into Croatia, where they were committing great ravages, and whither it had become necessary, in order to oppose them, to detach a considerable body of Austrians intended for the attack of Dalmatia.

The next evening (June 18th), a set of ruffians wearing the French cockade, after insulting in the streets the Spanish Plenipotentiary (of whose mission and arrival I gave you an account in my last number) attacked the palace of the Internuncio, and gave occasion to a most disgraceful scene of violence and tumult.

The Reis Efendi, Ghalib (whose name I have often had occasion to mention), being returned for a few days to Constantinople, I had fixed to see him on the 20th. I had much to say to him on many subjects, and these fresh occurrences gave me a fair opportunity of pressing the Government to explain itself upon its intended conduct towards France.

After enumerating, therefore, the various matters of complaint I had to state against the French since my residence here, and remarking to him the friendly part I had acted towards the Turkish Government, I told Ghalib Efendi it was impossible things could go on in this manner any longer. That on signing the



peace I had been willing to suppose it *possible* that at this extremity of the world an English and a French minister might live without disturbing each other. In this I had been deceived; and the intolerable conduct of the people under French protection, instigated by their chiefs, had now brought matters to a point at which I felt myself compelled to call upon the Ottoman government to make its choice between the two missions.

Before coming to this extremity, however, it was fit that the Ottoman ministers should explain distinctly what they conceived to be the nature of the peace just concluded. Was it a peace merely restoring the commercial relations between the two Empires, or was it a peace embracing political objects, and leading to engagements of reciprocal safety and union? If the first, so let it be; but then I must desire them to talk to me no more of succours, or other matters appertaining to a contract of a higher sort. If the second, I claimed the benefit of the relations which were understood by it, both in favour of his Majesty and of his allies. Now nothing could be plainer than that this irruption of the Bosniaks, if unexplained and unpunished, had put the Turks in a state of actual war with Austria. Who had done this? The French. On the French, therefore, the chief punishment ought to fall. I begged him also to remark another material circumstance in the information received by the Internuncio. A large sum of money for the payment of the French troops in Dalmatia had actually been borrowed in the capital of Bosnia. Now whatever might be his Majesty's dispositions in favour of Turkey, whatever instructions I might receive in conformity to the secret Articles of our Treaty, how,

I asked him, could I continue acting the part of an Ally towards the Porte, while her subjects were attacking Austria in Croatia, furnishing the enemies of Austria with money in Bosnia, and while the Government allowed the Austrian minister's palace at Constantinople to be insulted? I told the Reis Efendi most distinctly, therefore, that when the ratifications arrived, my conduct would be entirely regulated by the principles which had urged me to make the above representation; so much so, that even if the squadron for which they were so anxious were then at anchor at the Dardanelles, I could not recommend to the officer commanding it to co-operate in any expedition which might be in contemplation, while there remained so much serious matter to be cleared up between the Ottoman Government and myself.

I then told Ghalib Efendi that there was but one effectual remedy for these disorders, namely, the dismissal of the French minister from Constantinople.

This dismissal I endeavoured to convince him, was equally called for by the situation of Turkey itself. Without enumerating the various causes of suspicion which France had given to the Porte both by her engagements with Russia at the peace of Tilsitt and by her subsequent conduct, I confined myself to the last act, which in itself was a declaration of war, namely, the proposal to Austria to become an accomplice in the intended partition of the Turkish territories.

I put all these points in the strongest light I was able, and particularly the affair of Bosnia.

Ghalib Efendi understood me at a word. He objected, however, that the Government was not prepared for a war with France; that their law forbade

their declaring war, except under a positive aggression from an enemy ; that Governments were to act for the interest of their subjects, and that under the present circumstances it was not for the interest of Turkey to declare war. He requested me to enter into their situation, and not to press them to come to a rupture with France.

I answered, that the rupture was already declared by the proposals of France to Austria: that certainly every Government was to act as it thought best for the interest of its subjects; that if the Turkish Government thought it most for its interest to wait until Bonaparte was ready with 100,000 men to attack the Empire from Dalmatia, and Russia was ready with another 100,000 to cross the Danube, I had nothing to reply, but that in that case I must claim the benefit of the same principle to observe to him, that England would not easily be made to see how it could be for her interest to be spending her money and risking her fleets for a nation so conducting itself.

Much more was said on this and many other topics. In conclusion, and after mutual exhortations to frankness, Ghalib Efendi gave me very plainly to understand, that the motions of the Porte with respect to France would be regulated by the arrival of the ratifications and the degree of benefit which, on exchanging them, the Porte would find she was to derive from the peace.

Since this conversation, a guard of honour has been granted to the Spanish Plenipotentiary, and orders have been sent to the Pacha of Bosnia to repress the disorders on the Austrian frontiers. The Internuncio

has also been assured that the French Consul resident at the Pacha's Court has been dismissed.

Matters in other respects remain nearly the same as when I had the honour of writing to you last, except that the Servians have extended themselves across Bosnia, and effected a junction with the Montenegrians. This, for the present, cuts off our communication with Hungary.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XXVII. By the Messenger Kaya.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, July 6th, 1809.

SIR,

I RECEIVED yesterday by the messenger Basilico your despatches Nos. 3, 4, 5, and 6.

He delivered to me at the same time his Majesty's ratification of the Treaty of Peace concluded with Turkey on the 5th of January; and likewise my credentials as H. M.'s Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Porte.

I beg leave to express my humble and dutiful thanks to H. M. for this high honour and most distinguished mark of H. M.'s approbation of my conduct.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XXVIII. By the Messenger Kaye.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, July 6th. 1809.

SIR,

It is with great concern that I perceive from your despatch No. 3. that my having drawn up the Treaty with Turkey in the French language, and my having transmitted French copies with the Turkish originals, has been the cause of an embarrassment to his Majesty's Government in respect to the mode of presenting it for his Majesty's ratification.

The circumstances under which the negotiation was carried on, and the distance from the capital at which our conferences were held, were the causes of my consenting to use the French language in reducing the Articles to writing. No other language could have been used for the discussions, the Dragoman of the Turkish Plenipotentiary being absolutely ignorant of English; and with regard to the signatures, he positively refused advising his principal to execute an instrument for the contents of which he could not himself be responsible.

The impressions of terror under which men of this class perform even the most ordinary functions of their office are such as to render it impossible for any exertions of human persuasion to overcome a scruple or a doubt when once it has taken possession of their imagination. So far was it carried by this Dragoman (who is a Greek), in the present instance, that when, upon a revisal of the Articles with a view to grammatical and other errors of composition, I suggested

some obvious corrections, I found no less resistance than if I had proposed a change in the sense of the Articles themselves. He was but little acquainted even with French, and between his ignorance, his fears, and his suspicions, I could not obtain the alteration of a word, sometimes not even the transposition of a word, after the Article itself, to the substance of which I was obliged chiefly to attend, during discussions not always the most temperate, had once been admitted.

Even if the negotiation had been carried on at Constantinople, I should have found no Dragoman employed by the Porte sufficiently master of the English language to render himself responsible for affixing the signature of the Turkish Plenipotentiary to an instrument of so much importance.

With regard to my having transmitted a copy instead of an original instrument, I confess it was an error for which I have to throw myself entirely upon the indulgence of his Majesty's Government. The error, however, is confined to this mission. Two original instruments were, in fact, signed between the Turkish Plenipotentiary and myself. One of these instruments I thought it necessary to keep, in order to be prepared against emergencies and accidents to which the mission was liable every day in the unsettled state of the Turkish affairs. I now perceive that it would have been better to have retained the Turkish original, and to have sent home the one in French. I determined on the other course, conceiving that the authentic instrument on which I was to act had better be in my possession in the language which I understood.

In this error I was strengthened by the consider-

ation that his Majesty does not affix his royal signature to the same instrument which contains the names of the Plenipotentiaries, but that a treaty, when ratified, is copied into a separate book, and becomes an entirely new instrument. The treaty in its final state, therefore, being itself a copy from what is signed by the Plenipotentiaries, it appeared to me, I confess, not very material whether it were taken from the original instrument, or from a copy made from the original by myself.

I take the liberty of submitting to you these observations by way of accounting for, but by no means defending, my mistake.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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Separate. By the Messenger Kaye. One Inclosure.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, July 6th, 1809.

SIR,

ALTHOUGH it has not been in my power to obtain the recognition of Don John Havat as Plenipotentiary from his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand the Seventh, I have the satisfaction of acquainting you, that in consequence of the enclosed note, which I presented immediately after the conversation with Ghalib Efendi mentioned in my despatch No. 26., the Porte has sent a written and peremptory order to Mr. Duval to abstain from all acts tending to create a belief that the Porte had recognised him in the capacity of Chargé d'Affaires from the usurper Joseph ; and particularly

to take down the arms of Spain from the front of his residence. The Porte has again notified to Duval, although for the first time in writing, that it neither did nor would recognise him in that or in any other public character.

The official communication of this fact was made to me yesterday. It would have pleased me more if it had been made by a written note, but the Turks considered this to be too vigorous a proceeding.

I have the honour to be, &c.

*Inclosure in Separate of July 6.*

*Mr. A. to the Reis Efendi.*

THE undersigned, &c., by an official note presented to his Excellency the Reis Efendi on the 17th of April, had the honour of informing the Sublime Porte that the King, his master, had concluded a Treaty of Alliance with his Catholic Majesty Ferdinand the Seventh, King of Spain and the Indics.

Since that period it has come to the knowledge of the undersigned that a person of the name of Duval, a Dragoman attached to the Spanish Legation, has assumed the title and character of Chargé d'Affaires to Joseph Bonaparte, who calls himself King of Spain.

The said Duval occupies the palace belonging to the King of Spain, and although not formally recognised by the Sublime Porte, assumes the state of a Chargé d'Affaires, grants passports, signs protections, performs unmolested all the functions, and enjoys all the privileges attached to members of the diplomatic body.



The undersigned is under the necessity of protesting, in the name of the King his master, the ally of his Catholic Majesty, against these flagrant abuses. He relies with confidence on the immediate interference of the Sublime Porte to put a stop to proceedings injurious to the dignity of his Sovereign, contrary to the laws of neutrality, and which, while they continue, cannot but interrupt the harmony so recently and so solemnly re-established between Great Britain and the Sublime Porte.

The undersigned requests H. E. the Reis Efendi to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

Pera, July 1st, 1809.

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No. XXX. Two Inclosures. By Mr. Baker.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, July 13th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you, that Mr. Dendrino was, on the 4th instant, released from his confinement in the French Palace, and delivered into the custody of an officer of the Porte.

The circumstances under which this release has taken place are such as to afford me a great degree of dissatisfaction.

In my despatch No. 20., in which I had first the honour of mentioning this affair, I stated that the course which the Porte had engaged itself to me to pursue was that Dendrino should, in the first instance, be brought before the Grand Vizir; that he should be

asked to what nation he belonged ; and that according to his answer he should be delivered either to me or to the French Minister.

On my observing at the time that this person was a native of Corfu, it was distinctly told me that the place of his birth would make no difference, and that the meaning of the question as to his country was, by what Power he was protected.

A material part of the agreement was, that the Porte should enter into no conditions whatever with the French Minister for his release.

From this period I never ceased urging the Porte to a fulfilment of its promises.

On the return of Ghalib Efendi to the Porte, and his resumption of the office of Reis Efendi, the whole proceedings in this affair were stated to him, and all the promises of satisfaction were renewed to me in the most solemn manner.

It was with much surprise, therefore, that I learned that Dendrino had been released on two express conditions: one that he should not be delivered up to me, and the other that no Chancery for the Republic of the Seven Islands should be established at Pera.

As I had never demanded from the Porte the formal recognition *de novo* of the Sept-insular Republic, the last of these conditions is nugatory so far as it may affect any general proceedings which may be in view for its re-establishment. But the first stipulation could not be passed over in silence. I sent Mr. Pisani to the Porte, therefore, with a very strong message, claiming the performance of the promises so often repeated to me, and the immediate delivery up of Dendrino's person as a British protected subject.

While this business was in the course of negotiation

at the Porte, a Proclamation published by order of the French Chargé d'Affaires was brought to me, by which the Republic of the Seven Islands and its Chancery was declared to be abolished and annulled. You will observe by the wording of the paper that it is also meant to be insinuated that the Porte had authorised, and was a party to the above Proclamation.

This notification, and the circumstances attending it, appeared to me so serious, that I determined on sending Mr. Stratford Canning to the Porte, to enquire how far the Proclamation had in fact been sanctioned by the Ottoman Government; and if it had not been sanctioned, to insist on the most solemn and public disavowal of it. I instructed him to declare that nothing would satisfy me short of the Porte sending its Dragoman to my house to disavow in its name the contents of the paper, and likewise all knowledge of, or participation in, its publication.

Mr. C. found some difficulty in executing his commission; but with spirit and perseverance he succeeded in obtaining a promise to the above effect.

I enclose an account of the proceeding which took place in consequence (A), and which was immediately communicated in the form of a circular to our Consuls and all persons concerned.

The business, however, did not end here. The Porte, as you will perceive, pursuing that double policy for which it is so notorious, in order to make friends with the French Minister, consented that Dendrino should not be delivered up to me; while, in order to avoid the difficulty consequent upon a refusal to deliver up an English protected subject, it has brought forward the claim of a paramount sovereignty over the Islands; in

consequence of which Dendrino is declared to be under its own special protection.

I have long been aware of this intended claim; but after the repeated and solemn promises of the Porte, I could little expect the assertion of it on the present occasion. Nothing, indeed, can be more grossly inconsistent than the conduct of the Ottoman Ministers. By the declaration of the Chief Dragoman in his visit to me of the 7th of May, my right to a satisfaction was distinctly and unequivocally admitted. The sole basis on which that right was or could be rested was the seizure and imprisonment, within the territories of the Porte, of an English subject by the French Chargé d'Affaires; yet now that he is liberated from the French prison, the Government refuses to deliver him to me on the plea of his being a subject of the Porte. It is difficult to assemble more contradictions in a single proceeding.

The embarrassment in which I was liable to be involved, by contesting just now this pretension of sovereignty with the Porte, added to other considerations, determined me to suspend the controversy for the present, which I did by the enclosed note (B).

The mere re-establishment of a Sept-insular Chancery at Constantinople, independent of any embassy from the islands, and before a foot of territory belonging to them is in our possession, would be perfectly useless as a means of furthering the re-establishment of the Republic itself. I have thought it better, therefore, to leave this question under the above protest, under which I shall always be at liberty to resume it when more favoured by events.

I am induced to take this course by having now ascertained, beyond a doubt, that the Porte is deter-

mined on no consideration to precipitate a rupture with France. On my side I have no means of pressing the point further, except by suspending the exchange of the ratifications; a measure full of hazard in the present temper of the Turks, and in the very critical situation of the Austrian Monarchy. Had Lord Collingwood given me any encouragement to expect a British squadron, to co-operate against Russia in the Black Sea, I could have adopted a stronger tone, and have even procured (possibly) the dismissal of the French Minister. But his Lordship informs me that he has no ships, and by his letter I perceive that I have not convinced him of the propriety of employing a British force on that service.

On the other hand, the rapid advance of the French armies, the little effect which seems to have been produced by the Archduke Charles's victory at Aspern, the occupation of Styria, Carinthia, and so many neighbouring provinces by the enemy, and the belief of their being far advanced even in Hungary, by alarming the Porte on the side of Servia, enables the French faction in the Divan again to raise its head; and to resume a considerable share of its influence over the councils of this feeble and distracted Government.

I can have no doubt that these causes have produced the recent deference shown to France in the affair of Dendrino, and, consequently, that it would not be prudent to risk our newly-established credit by pressing any further a question, which, from the first, was unpleasant to the Turkish Government. For the present, therefore, my chief objects will be to secure the exchange of the ratifications, to keep the Turks in good humour, notwithstanding the non-

arrival of British succours, and above all, to prevent their listening to new overtures of peace from Russia.

I have the honour, to be &c.

Inclosure A. in No. XXX.

Qualmente fù Giovedì passato, affissa alle Porte della Cancelleria Francese, la Carta che segue: —

*“ Avis.*

“ On fait savoir qu’il a été réglé et convenu avec qui de droit, et de la manière et dans les formes les plus authentiques, que la soi-disante République des Sept-Isles, que l’on avait établie, a été détruite et annulée; et de plus que dorénavant et à l’avenir aucune Chancellerie de la soi-disante République des Sept-Isles pourra être établie en quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce puisse être.”

Quest’ oggi il Dragomanno della Porta, con espresso commando della Sublime Porta, venne al Palazzo Britannico, e fece a Sua Eccellenza l’Ambasciatore, la dichiarazione che segue: —

“ La Sublime Porte m’a chargé de déclarer à Votre Excellence que l’avis affiché à la porte de la Chancellerie Française jeudi passé, que je tiens ici à la main, est faux, et a été fait sans le consentement ou la connoissance de la Porte; *et qu’elle ne reconnoit point que la République des Sept-Isles ait été détruite et annulée.*”

Palazzo Britannico, al di 9 Luglio, 1809.

Inclosure B. in No. XXX.

*Mr. A. to the Reis Efendi.*

THE undersigned, &c., has received, with the deepest concern, the declaration communicated to him by H. E. the Reis Efendi, that Mr. Dendrino, the Chancellor of the Republic of the Seven Islands, so long and so unjustly detained in prison by the Chargé d'Affaires of France, and whose liberation had been so repeatedly promised to the undersigned, without any conditions whatsoever, is now considered by the Ottoman Government as a subject of the Sublime Porte.

The independence of the Republic of the Seven Islands was formerly recognised by the treaty of Amiens. The Sublime Porte was a party to that treaty. His Majesty the King of Great Britain is one of the protectors and guarantees of the Republic so recognised by that treaty. No subsequent treaty has been entered into between his Majesty and the Sublime Porte to alter the nature of the relations then established between his Majesty and the Seven Islands.

On the 19th of April, Mr. Dendrino demanded and received from the undersigned the protection of H. M. the King of Great Britain. This protection he has never renounced.

The undersigned therefore calls on the Sublime Porte to declare by what authority it claims the right of considering Mr. Dendrino as its subject, and by what authority he is denied his liberty?

In default of a satisfactory answer to this demand, the undersigned, in the name of the King his master,

denies the sovereignty thus attempted to be asserted and exercised by the Sublime Porte. He protests against, and declares unlawful, all acts done by the Sublime Porte, in support of such assumed sovereignty, and more particularly the detention of the person of the said Dendrino, as being directly contrary to the Treaty of Peace signed with the Ottoman Government on the 5th of January, and particularly prejudicial to the friendship then happily re-established between the two empires.

The undersigned requests H. E. the Reis Efendi to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

Pera, July 12th, 1809.

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No. XXXI. Two Inclosures. By Mr. Baker.

*To the Right Honourable G. Canning.*

Pera, July 18th, 1809.

SIR,

MR. JAMES MORIER arrived here yesterday in his way to England, charged with despatches from Sir Harford Jones to his Majesty's Government. He is also the bearer of a Treaty of Peace signed between Sir H. Jones and the Persian Plenipotentiaries on the 12th of March.

Not having it in my power to procure for Mr. Morier an immediate conveyance to England, I lose no time in forwarding to you a copy of the Treaty (A), together with an abstract from such of the despatches as Sir Harford left under a flying seal for my perusal (B).



Sir H. Jones having testified great anxiety to know my opinion on the subject of his transactions at Tæhran, I have not hesitated to assure him that I considered the peace which he has just signed with the King of Persia, by the diversion which it appears already to have operated in favour of Austria, to be a measure highly beneficial to the common cause of Europe.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure B in No. XXXI.

*Abstracts of Despatches from Sir H. Jones to His Majesty's Government, dated from Tæhran, 1809.*

IN a despatch of the 16th March to H. M. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Harford Jones encloses the copy of a letter from him to the Governor-General of India, dated 18th February, informing H. E. that General Gardanne and suite had quitted Tæhran on the 13th instant, one day previous to the arrival of H. M. mission; and in another despatch, of the same date, Sir H. Jones encloses a preliminary treaty of defensive alliance, signed on the 12th instant, between himself and the Persian plenipotentiaries.

Under the 16th March, he informs H. M. Minister for the Affairs of India that the terms

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These terms Sir H. Jones mentions to have been rejected until the 30th March, when the Persian plenipotentiaries agreed that they should be acted upon until the pleasure of H. M. Government should be known, and that consequently the conclusion of

the definitive treaty should remain suspended until he received such communication.

On the 21st April, in a despatch to H. M. Minister for the Affairs of India, Sir H. Jones encloses the copy of a letter from himself to the Governor-General of India, dated 13th April, in which he states that the Persian ministry, having made strong requisitions for an advance of subsidy, and the French, so long as he deferred granting their request, succeeding so well to impress them with the idea "*que les Anglais jouent la Cour de Perse,*" that he had found it absolutely necessary to consent to an advance of six months' subsidy.

Under the 2d May, to the same minister, Sir H. Jones encloses the copy of a letter to himself from the Governor-General, dated 30th January, in which, under a conviction that Sir H. Jones could never succeed in the object of his mission, H. E. intimates to him his positive instructions to quit the court and territory of Persia, in whatever predicament his letter might find him; that in the event of his not complying without reference or delay with the instructions conveyed in that letter, by closing his mission and retiring from Persia, it had been determined, and measures had been taken accordingly, to disavow his public character in that country, subsequent to the receipt of H. E. letter of the 31st October, 1808, and to apprise the Persian court that Sir H. Jones's powers had expired, and that no engagements he might contract would have any validity or effect. H. E. had also directed all Sir H. Jones's future bills to be refused in India, and those which might have been already paid drawn subsequent to the receipt of H. E. letter of 31st October to be charged to Sir H. Jones's personal debt.

In answer to this letter, Sir H. Jones informs the Governor-General, under the 24th April, that he had lost no time in communicating to the Persian ministry the orders he had received, instantly to suspend his functions of British minister, and to leave Persia; that he had delivered them an official note, stating that he had suspended his functions accordingly, accompanied by such extracts of H. E. letter as seemed most likely to effect his dismissal.

Sir H. Jones then informs H. M. Minister for the Affairs of India, that although the first idea that occurred to the Persian ministry was to detain the French Chargé d'Affaires then at Tæhran, and to recal General Gardanne, yet the King of Persia, in an interview which took place soon after, informed Sir H. Jones that he had determined not to accept the declaration he had made of the resignation of his public character, that he should be treated with increased attention and respect, that H. M. would immediately send a person to the court of London, in quality of his Chargé d'Affaires, that he would faithfully perform his part of the preliminary treaty, and that he would immediately dismiss the French Chargé d'Affaires.

That on the 28th following, Meerza Abdul Hassan, a man of family, was appointed Persian Vakeel, *i. e.* Chargé d'Affaires, at the Court of London, and that on the 29th the French Chargé d'Affaires left Tæhran.

In adverting again to the subsidy he had judged it expedient to propose, Sir H. Jones observes, it was only to express the most respectful and most conscientious conviction that its execution would be attended with great present and incalculable future advantages to the East India Company. Experience daily con-

vinced him, that, once executed, there was scarcely an object Great Britain could wish in Persia but what would be easily attained.

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No. XXXII. By Mr. Baker.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, July 24th, 1809.

SIR,

THE Grand Vizir is at length on his march to the Danube. He has about 35,000 Janissaries under his command, and by the time he reaches the Danube it is supposed that his army will amount to not less than 140,000 men.

Some days previous to his departure I had a full conversation with Ghalib Efendi, who accompanies the Vizir, leaving Vaahid Efendi (the plenipotentiary who signed the peace with me) in the situation of Reis Efendi for the time being.

This interview was sought by Ghalib himself. I soon found that his object in proposing it was no other than, by evincing an apparent anxiety on topics of a general interest, accompanied with protestations of attachment towards Great Britain, to appease the discontent I had manifested at the conduct of himself and his colleagues in the affair of Dendrino.

Far from declining to enter upon those general topics, I was glad to prove to this minister, with whom I had had no opportunity of conversing confidentially since his arrival, the benefit which the Porte might derive from the friendship of His Ma-

jesty, if, by a nearer conformity of his views with those of His Majesty's Government, and particularly by a change of system towards France, she would endeavour to deserve it.

Not to distract his attention, however, by too much generality in the objects which I proposed bringing under his consideration, I confined myself to one simple point, namely, that of cautioning the Ottoman government to beware of a peace with Russia. As by good fortune no dragoman but M. Pisani was present at this conversation, I could speak much more clearly than it would have been prudent to do in the presence of any of the dragomans employed by the Porte, who are Greeks, many of them devoted, and all friendly to Russia.

Before stating to you the nature of the arguments which I endeavoured to bring to bear on this point, I think it necessary to remark, that not only the general aspect of affairs, but some doubtful symptoms have of late awakened in me a considerable degree of anxiety, and even suspicion, with regard to the real intentions of the Porte. That Bonaparte should recommend to the Emperor Alexander to make peace with Turkey on any terms, in order to leave his ally at liberty to bring his whole force to act against Austria, is in the true spirit of his politics. On the other hand, he knows too well how fully his hostile projects have been developed to the Turks to make it probable that he would alarm their suspicions by proposing a second time his mediation. The course he would naturally follow under these circumstances would be that of recommending to the Emperor Alexander either to make peace at once by a temporary restoration of the provinces, or simply to withdraw his troops, to trust

to Turkish indolence for not carrying the war beyond the Dneister, to establish in this manner a peace *de facto*, and to leave the rest to the course of events upon the destruction of the Austrian power. If he could prevail on the Emperor Alexander to adopt, and to act upon, these views, I doubt whether the Turks have sufficient foresight to avoid the snare, and still more, whether they would reject an offer of peace accompanied with the actual evacuation of Walachia and Moldavia.

That the enemy has been endeavouring to prepare the way for some arrangement, or at least for fresh negotiations, which might prevent for this year the Turkish army from acting, I have undoubted information. Not long ago the French Chargé d'Affaires addressed a letter to Husrew Pacha, one of the leading chiefs on the Danube, who by his post has frequent opportunities of communicating with the Russian armies, the object of which was to open a direct correspondence with him on the means of restoring peace. Husrew Pacha sent the letter to the Porte, by whose order it was communicated to me. I have also seen a letter from Prince Prosorowsky to Baron Hubsch, the Chargé d'Affaires for Denmark, by which ample proof is afforded that this agent, a devoted tool of the French, has been engaged in similar attempts. When to these circumstances I add the personal wishes and interest of Ghalib Efendi, whose situation and even whose life may answer for any bad success of the Ottoman arms, the views of Prince Morousy, his confidential dragoman and adviser, the difficulty of carrying on this war owing to its immense expense, to the poverty of the treasury, and to the still unsettled condition of the government, you will not

be surprised at my apprehensions that the Turks, preferring present ease to future security, may listen to a proposal such as I have alluded to, backed by the promises, the threats, and perhaps the money of France.

To prevent this peace in the relative situations of Austria and Russia had always appeared to me of the greatest possible importance; but my means of preventing it had hitherto been no other than argument and representation in concert with the Internuncio. If, indeed, the public service had rendered it possible to send a British squadron to the Dardanelles, I should have found little difficulty in binding Turkey, as the price of its co-operation, to an agreement to make no truce with Russia while she continued to threaten the Austrian frontier. The final settlement of a peace between these Powers I may still possess some means of retarding. There are too many personal interests connected with the restoration of the *Barats* for Russia readily to renounce a privilege productive of so many profitable abuses; and as by the capitulations I shall have a right to claim the same privileges which may be granted to any other nation, the *Porte* is already aware that if it should yield this point to Russia I shall insist on the same concession for Great Britain, and consequently that either our capitulations must be violated, or the whole projected system of internal reforms in the administration of the Turkish commerce and revenues must be abandoned. But although this instrument, which I should not fail to use in a case of emergency, might be strong enough to retard the conclusion of a treaty, I fear it would not be of sufficient efficacy to prevent an armistice, which, by leaving Russia free to co-operate

with France, would effectually counteract the only object of my present anxiety and exertions.

These considerations had determined me to try once more, when the ratifications should arrive, whether it would be possible to impress the Turkish Government with the expediency, for its own sake, of entering into some defensive engagement to which Austria might become a party. Austria, it is true, from the uncertainty which still appears to prevail at that court with regard to the ultimate views of Russia, is not ready to sign such an engagement at this moment; but I consider that if I could prevail on the Turks to propose it to Austria, particularly in the form suggested by your despatch, time, which at this moment is of the highest value, would be gained, and during the interval all agreement with Russia would be suspended. I did not, consequently, neglect so favourable a moment as that of a conference of Ghalib Efendi's own seeking to point out all the advantages of such a measure by arguments derived from the present fears of this Government as well as from its hopes of future security.

I represented to him that the comparative tranquillity which the Turks had enjoyed of late years was owing to their having wisely deviated from those maxims of their ancestors which formerly kept them aloof from the rest of Europe, and rendered them indifferent spectators of the issue of wars among Christian states for the balance of power. They had found that those maxims, since the system and the species of wars caused by the French Revolution, were no longer safely to be persevered in, and that, notwithstanding the total difference of manners and religion, even their own government was of necessity associated



with those of Christendom in the common object of self-preservation. The conviction of this truth had produced the treaty of triple alliance in the year 1799, a connection preceded by a series of important services on the part of Great Britain, and leading to a peace which provided for and maintained the integrity of the Ottoman empire. If it be now alleged that Russia, by the inconstancy of her politics, had proved herself an unfit member of any confederacy which should have the security of Turkey for its object, it was also to be recollected that the Turks had been the first to renounce the triple alliance; that they had refused to renew it upon its expiration, and had put themselves totally under the guidance of France, the true author of all their present embarrassment and danger. With the largest admission of the wrongs done them by Russia, therefore, the wisdom of the system itself could not be disputed; and the only question now to be considered was, whether, as a substitute for Russia, some other Power might not be found, equally the neighbour of Turkey, equally interested against the accomplishment of the French scheme of universal dominion, and still more interested, perhaps, in the preservation of the absolute and permanent integrity of the Ottoman territories. Such a Power was Austria. The friendship and alliance of Austria, therefore, cemented by that of Great Britain, and grounded upon engagements which, in process of time, might be extended to every other leading Power that could preserve its independence, became an object of the most serious importance to the Porte, and one which not only I felt it my duty to recommend as the minister of a friendly state, but which I had the autho-

rity of my government to propose to their immediate consideration.

Having laid down these preliminary principles, and discussed and enforced them as well as it was possible to do through the very unsatisfactory channel of interpretation, I proceeded to point out the nature of the connection which I recommended. In pursuance of your instructions, I stated that the most obvious and the most simple method of uniting the three parties would be, that Austria should accede to the treaty of the Dardanelles. In answer to the objection that the stipulations of that treaty contained no common object in the execution of which Austria could join, I referred to the Secret Article, No. 4., which stipulates that in the event of a peace between Great Britain and Russia his Majesty will endeavour to procure a peace for the Porte, grounded upon the preservation of the integrity of the Ottoman territories; and I stated that Austria might on these grounds be invited to accede to our treaty.

I supported this proposal by expatiating on the obvious advantages which would arise to Turkey from the acceptance of it by Austria. Turkey, if she was in truth determined to have back her provinces, with security for the future enjoyment of them, would engage herself on her side to nothing beyond a resolution already taken. The simple restitution of those provinces afforded no such security. It was not in the character of the Russian cabinet gratuitously to renounce any favourite object of its ambition. If, therefore, that Power were now suddenly to adopt the language of moderation, and propose a peace grounded on the restitution of conquests so dear to her, could Turkey flatter herself that she would renounce them

for ever? For what could be the motive to determine Russia to such a sacrifice, except that, being joined in an unprincipled confederacy with France to rob Austria of her dominions, she found it convenient to relieve herself for the moment from the pressure of one of the *four other wars* with Persia, England, Sweden, and Austria, in which her confederate had involved her?

I here put to Ghalib Efendi the possible event of a change in the councils of Russia, and a return on her part to a just sense of her own interests as connected with those of Great Britain and Austria. There was nothing impossible in such a change on the part of Russia, neither would there be any thing in it inconsistent with her persevering in her present plans against Turkey, unless previously diverted from them by some such engagement as that under discussion. If a moment so favourable, therefore, as the present for binding Austria to such an engagement were suffered to pass by, to what Power in Europe could Turkey address herself to prevent the final incorporation of the provinces in question with the Russian empire? Austria would be too much benefited by the alliance of Russia to resist her in so favourite a point. Great Britain, deriving equal benefit from the accession of such an ally against France, could not be expected to go beyond the letter of her present engagements for the sake of a Power that still discovered so much tenderness towards her inveterate enemy. In this situation the Porte, to regain her provinces, would be reduced to the friendship of France — in other words, to the friendship of that very Power which had involved her in all her present difficulties, under a promise of assisting her to retake the Crimea,

and which had prevented her getting back these very provinces when the Emperor of Russia offered to restore them.

I did not fail in this place to call the attention of Ghalib Efendi to the proposal made by France to Austria, by way of settling all differences, to join in the profligate system of partition disclosed at Erfurt.

Little as I am disposed to indulge the hope that any representations, whether of good or of evil in prospect, can produce the smallest effect on the Turkish councils, if Ghalib Efendi is to be believed, what passed between us at this interview may not be absolutely fruitless. He owned himself fully sensible of the danger to Turkey, which I had pointed out from a too hasty peace with Russia. He gave me, likewise, the strongest assurances that the Porte, and he himself particularly, would keep steadily in view the caution I had that day given them, and that, so far as his own advice and influence might prevail, no peace should be concluded with Russia the effect of which might enable her to afford assistance to France against Austria in the present war. I tried to prevail on him to promise me the communication of any overtures towards peace which might be addressed to the Vizir; but his answer was evasive, grounded upon his intended absence at the camp, and referring me to the government at home. He appeared to me, however, so truly impressed with a sense of the danger of listening even to the most favourable terms, that, although not relieved from my fears, I think there is little ground for immediate alarm, unless some great calamity should befall the Ottoman arms. Even then we may trust to Russia for not

accompanying her success with proposals too tempting from their moderation.

I will add, not as a satisfactory circumstance attending this interview, but merely as a proof of my neglecting no occasion to open the eyes of this government to the certain ruin that awaits it by trusting to the professions of France, that Ghalib Efendi assured me again and again that all the Ottoman ministers were fully aware of the same dangers, and convinced that they arose from the same sources, that I had pointed out. He admitted in its fullest extent my statement contained in an abridged enumeration, of the bad faith of France towards every power not of its own immediate creation. He seemed indeed to have learned the same facts, and to be aware of the same policy on the part of the ruler of France, on which I had grounded my representations, and especially of the probability of his not again proposing his mediation, but rather of his advising Russia simply to withdraw her troops with a view of operating a peace *de facto*. Still, however, he repeated, as on every former occasion, that the Porte had enough to do with one war, and could not think of undertaking a second. I must not conceal from you that the co-operation of Great Britain by a squadron in the Black Sea was again and again pressed upon me by Ghalib Efendi; and indeed that he accompanied his arguments by some insinuation that Great Britain was temporising with Russia. This charge I answered by explaining to him the system we were pursuing in Persia, and the diversion already effected in that quarter; and likewise by stating it as my firm belief that at the hour we were then conversing

some decisive measures against Russia were in the course of execution in the Baltic.

At the close of this conversation Ghalib Efendi added of his own accord that he was fully aware that I could not be pleased with the turn which affairs had of late been taking in the Ottoman councils; but that I was mistaken in supposing this to be the effect of any partiality towards France. He assured me that it was solely owing to the very uncertain situation of Austria, and the dread every post of hearing that Bonaparte was upon their frontiers. No arguments that I could think of were omitted to convince him how fatal might be the effect of determinations taken upon such false views of their safety; but all I could say on this head was fruitless. Where I appeared most to prevail was in my exhortations against peace or truce with Russia. He did certainly seem sensible of the little safety to be expected from either, and reiterated his assurances that nothing of the sort was in contemplation. For this, however, I trust much more to the spirit of the Janissaries than I am disposed to do to the promise of any member of the Turkish government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No XXXIII. By Mr. Baker.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, July 28th,

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that yesterday I had an audience of the Caimacan, at which I pre-

sented to his Highness the letter from his Majesty to the Grand Vizir, and likewise exchanged with him the ratifications of the treaty of peace concluded with Turkey on the 5th of January.

Mr. Baker, my private secretary, will have the honour of delivering to you the treaty, together with the translations of the Turkish preamble and conclusion annexed to it.

In obedience to your instructions I have declined exchanging the ratifications of the Secret Article.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XXXV. By Mr. Baker.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, August 2nd, 1809.

SIR,

I HAD yesterday the honour of an audience of the Sultan, at which I presented to him my credentials as Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from his Majesty.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XXXVI. By Mr. Baker.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, August 5th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of enclosing a despatch addressed to you from Sir Harford Jones, and likewise another

from Bussora, addressed to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors of the East India Company.

The Persian plenipotentiary arrived yesterday at Scutari on his way to England. I will endeavour to forward him on his voyage under convoy of the next ship of war which may arrive at the Dardanelles.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XXXVII. By Mr. James Morier.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, August 22nd, 1809.

SIR,

HAVING heard of the arrival of his Majesty's ship Success at Smyrna, I have written this day to Captain Ascough, requesting him to receive the Persian envoy on board, and to give him a passage either to England or to Malta.

The public character of this envoy is simply that of Vakeel, although he is himself a person of high rank, and of a very distinguished family.

Mr. James Morier, who accompanies him, will give you the most ample details of all that is transacting in Persia. I shall confine myself, therefore, to the steps which I have taken at Constantinople, in order to render our new connection with that country beneficial to the common cause in Europe.

I perceive that the King of Persia is extremely desirous of establishing a close intimacy, and even alliance, with the Ottoman Porte. Sir Harford Jones appears also to be of opinion that the concurrence of



the Porte in these views, and particularly that the establishment of embassies reciprocally between the two Powers, would be the means of strengthening the peace he has recently concluded.

The objections to the establishment of such a connection as the King of Persia seems to have in view, strike me to be of two sorts: first, the degree to which it might counteract the general plans of the Presidency of Bengal with regard to its connection with the neighbouring Powers, by strengthening Persia too much; secondly, the doubtful prospect of affairs in Turkey itself, for whose conduct, when France shall arrive upon her frontiers, I cannot answer.

On the other hand, the importance of binding Turkey to some engagement against a separate peace with Russia appeared to me so great, and from the misfortunes of Austria had become so pressing, that I could not reject the principle of endeavouring to form some sort of concert between Turkey and Persia.

After much consideration, the simplest and the safest mode of effecting such concert appeared to me to be that of a convention between the two Powers, limited to the defence and security of their respective frontiers against Russia, with a stipulation not to lay down their arms but by common consent.

This measure, therefore, I proposed some days ago to the Reis Efendi in a conference, with the details of which it is unnecessary to trouble you. The proposal was declined, although with the strongest professions of friendship towards Persia, and the acknowledgment that we were all engaged in a common cause.

At the same time, however, I received a promise from the Reis Efendi, conveyed in terms so formal

and so binding, that, were it possible to trust to any professions of the Turkish Government, I should consider the purpose for which this conference was chiefly held, to be fully answered. After repeated assurances that nothing was in agitation between Turkey and Russia tending towards peace, he engaged to communicate to me all advances towards negotiation, and likewise to consult with me on the acceptance or rejection of any specific proposal which might be made on either side.

I must add, however, that this conference took place previously to the arrival of the despatches announcing the armistice between the Austrian and French armies.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XXXVIII. One Inclosure.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, August 28th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of forwarding a letter to your address, together with its translation, from his Excellency Vaahid Efendi, who officiates at the Porte as Reis Efendi during the absence of Ghalib.

A Tartar belonging to the Grand Vizier arrived yesterday from the Persian camp before Teflis, with letters addressed to his Highness directly from the Shah himself. Yussuf Pacha, the Grand Vizier, has always favoured the plan of uniting the two Powers by closer ties than subsist at present, or than indeed

ever have subsisted between them ; and I learn that it is now the intention of this Government to entertain the question, brought forward not many days ago, respecting the establishment of embassies between the Ottoman and Persian Courts.

This Tartar brings intelligence that the Persian army has completely invested Teflis. There is every reason to expect, either that the place will fall into their hands, or that the siege of so important a city will oblige the Emperor Alexander to increase his forces in Georgia, in order to attempt every thing for its relief.

The despatches also state, that the Russian general had again proposed peace, but that the King of Persia had firmly refused it.

This information has caused a considerable degree of satisfaction at Constantinople, which, however, is somewhat diminished by intelligence received from the Grand Vizier's camp at Shiumla, stating that a Russian army of 30,000 men had crossed the Danube at a place called Isaczi, near Ismaclof. The Grand Vizier had detached two corps of 20,000 men each to oppose them, and was himself marching to give them battle.

The Grand Vizier complains greatly of the want of money, and overtures have again been made to me upon the subject ; but my answers are strictly in conformity with my instructions.

The Envoy from the King of Persia to his Majesty will leave Scutari to-morrow for Smyrna. During his stay here I have shown him every attention due to his person and to the importance of his mission. The Ottoman Government has also behaved towards him with great and proper consideration ; but it is

my duty to inform you that Vaahid Efendi has tried every artifice in his power, first, to obtain from him a communication of the treaty with England ; and secondly, to dissuade him from prosecuting his voyage.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XXXVIII.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, Sept. 10th, 1809.

SIR,

SINCE I had the honour of writing to you on the 28th ult., advices have been received that the Grand Vizier has crossed the Danube, and thrown himself in the rear of the Russians, who still remain, to the number of 30,000, at Matchin. On the other hand, it is very generally believed that a Turkish flotilla, sent some weeks ago to the mouths of the Danube for no apparent purpose, has been destroyed.

From Buda no advices have been received since the despatches announcing the armistice, dated July 28th. As those letters neither contained the Articles, nor any sort of intimation of the conditions on which it was concluded, both the Internuncio and myself are to this hour unable to give any satisfactory explanation to the Turkish Government of an event on which they conceive the safety of the Ottoman Empire essentially to depend. The absence of Count Stadion from Buda has been extremely detrimental to my correspondence with Mr. Bathurst, as well as with individuals from whom I was in the habit of receiving information much more full and exact than that

usually transmitted to the Internuncio in his official despatches. I am obliged, therefore, to supply my ignorance of the facts with the too probable conjecture that the Emperor of Austria, notwithstanding his disapprobation of the terms of that fatal convention, has been forced to listen to propositions of peace; that he has submitted these propositions to Russia; and that having placed himself in the hands of the Emperor Alexander, he can no longer refuse to sign such conditions as shall appear reasonable to that monarch.

Reports without number, and from all quarters,—reports accredited even by the French Mission, have reached us, that a great degree of coolness has lately manifested itself in the conduct of Russia towards France. I am not unprepared to take advantage of so desirable an event; in the mean time I cannot flatter myself with the hope, that this supposed coolness can have any other foundation than that of some casual rencontre in Galicia, between the Russian troops sent to take possession of the Austrian provinces, and some chiefs of the Polish insurrection, who would naturally plead their alliance with France, in justification of rebellion against their own sovereign. It is true that, in the beginning of the campaign, Bonaparte expressed great satisfaction at the tardiness of the march of the Russian troops. It may also be true that, he has manifested some design, or thrown out some threat, of restoring the Kingdom of Poland in the person of his brother: but I cannot bring myself to believe that he would choose the present moment for seriously attempting the execution of this design, or that he would bring it forward with any other view than to sell the renunciation of it to the

Emperor Alexander at a high price, and thus to draw that Sovereign still deeper into his snares.

I mention this speculation, because, in default of all official intelligence, I am obliged to assume it as my rule of action in my communications with the Turkish Ministers. So great are their apprehensions of an union between Austria and Russia, and so disposed have I found them, in such an event, to throw themselves into the arms of France, but I think it absolutely necessary to discredit, by all possible means, the belief of any serious misunderstanding between the Emperor Alexander and Bonaparte.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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Separate.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, Sept. 12th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of enclosing you the copies of two letters I have this instant received from Sir Harford Jones, dated 2d August.

It has not been in my power to get a translation of the Persian papers in time to send them by this opportunity, but the substance of them I understand to be a proposition of peace from Russia, on the basis of making the Arras the boundary of the two empires; in which case, Russia shall assist Persia to indemnify herself upon Turkey for the loss of Georgia, by taking possession of Bagdad, Bussora, Erzerroom, and other contiguous territories.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Separate.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, Sept. 18th, 1807).

SIR,

I BEG leave to call your attention to the situation of the English Palace at Constantinople. Almost immediately after my arrival, I had occasion to describe to you the ruinous condition to which it had been suffered to fall by the neglect of Baron Hubach.

On the 27th of February, 1807, some Turks having a suspicion that a quantity of arms and gunpowder were concealed in the cellars, an order was obtained to search the palace, and from that time, on various occasions, it has been entered by other persons. This gave rise to a system of continued petty pilfering, by which, property to a considerable amount has gradually disappeared, and many valuable articles have been suffered to perish, with a view, apparently, of covering the robbery of the rest. Independently of M. Hubach's negligence in this respect, he totally omitted to give those orders which he knew very well to be necessary for the preservation of the building itself. The consequence has been, that the rains, which, during a certain period, are very violent in this country, and to which it had been exposed during two successive winters, have totally destroyed the roof,—have essentially injured some of the main timbers,—and have irreparably damaged the greater part of the furniture, particularly that destined for the state rooms.

I have been repeatedly, and almost incessantly, viewing this scene of destruction, during the summer.

utterly unable to resolve what course to take respecting the edifice itself. The first estimate of the expense necessary to restore it to its former state, so largely exceeded every sum of which I could venture to sanction the disbursement, that I renounced at once all idea of proceeding upon it. On the other hand, it was absolutely necessary that some measures should be taken to stop the progress of the evil, which, if it had continued one winter more, must, according to the report of all persons employed to survey the building, have utterly completed its destruction.

A second estimate was accordingly made under my directions, limited in its view to the restoration of the roof, and the putting some of the rooms in a habitable state. This estimate will bring down the expense to about 20,000 piastres.

Various reasons induced me to put off the commencement of the work, even upon this reduced scale, until the last moment; but, as three months of favourable weather were requisite to finish the roof, I could not delay it beyond the end of August.

It has accordingly been begun, under the superintendence of M. Chabert, to whose indefatigable attention I am indebted, not only for the advance of the work itself, but for the most rigid economy in the expenditure.

It would be idle in me to give hopes, that even when what I have now undertaken is completed, no further expense will be required. The ornamental parts and the paintings, which are all destroyed by the rains, are yet to be provided for. The stables are not begun, nor do I think it right to begin building them in the present precarious aspect of affairs at the Porte. The garden too, in its present state, is one continued heap



of rubbish, and from the Jowness of the wall by which it is surrounded, is exposed to perpetual intrusion, besides having become the receptacle of every thing offensive. I am afraid under these circumstances that a considerable additional expense must still be incurred, in order to render it a fit residence for his Majesty's Ambassador.

I take the liberty of requesting your further directions on this subject, intending, on my part, to proceed no further until I am honoured with them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XL. By Basilico.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, Sept. 24th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that I received your despatches Nos. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, and one marked "separate," together with the presents destined by his Majesty for the principal members of the Ottoman Government, by the messenger Ruffe.

I beg leave to express my most humble thanks to his Majesty for his gracious compliance with my request for leave to return to England. His Majesty having accompanied that permission with the option to make use of it or not, according to circumstances, I have thought it my duty, in the present unsettled state of affairs among the surrounding Powers, to suspend my departure from Constantinople until the designs of the enemy respecting this Empire shall be more fully developed.

I did not fail to communicate to the Ottoman Government the strength and destination of the powerful armament which sailed from the British ports on the 29th of July. The communication was received by the Porte with the highest marks of satisfaction; but it is my duty to inform you, that when I gave the Reis Efendi to understand that by the destruction of the naval force of the enemy in the Scheldt such reinforcements would probably be sent out to our squadrons on distant stations as might prove beneficial to the Porte, I was again most earnestly entreated to press upon his Majesty's Government the importance of sending a squadron to Constantinople in order to its co-operating with the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea.

The period of such co-operation is certainly over for the present season, but it might be resumed with success and advantage towards the end of February next, should the present political circumstances of Europe undergo in the mean time no material change.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XLI. By Basilico.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, Sept. 24th, 1809.

SIR,

ON receiving the presents intended by his Majesty for the different members of the Turkish Government, as specified in the enclosure which accompanied your despatch, I delivered them to the Reis Efendi, by

whom they were conveyed to the Grand Vizier, and the other officers for whom they were designed.

After minute enquiries, I learned that it would be quite unusual to leave out the Reis Efendi and the Kiaya Bey in the distribution of presents, on the signature of a treaty of peace. I was also informed that the Caimakan, who officiates as Grand Vizier at the Porte while that officer is at the camp, would expect a similar attention, and that, indeed, he could not well be omitted without the risk of offending his dignity.

By the help of a slight deviation from the mode of distribution pointed out in your despatch, for which I humbly ask forgiveness of his Majesty, and by engaging Mr. Wilkinson to take back the dagger ornamented with diamonds which was entrusted to me at the time of my departure from England, I have been enabled to satisfy these additional claims without augmenting the expense already incurred by Government on account of presents.

There having been but one plenipotentiary engaged in negotiating or signing the Treaty, one of the boxes, marked No. 3, could easily be spared for the Reis Efendi.

The dragoman employed in the conferences being a person very inferior both in rank and expectations to the dragoman of the Porte, and he having also received from me a valuable watch at the time of signing the Treaty, I ventured to assign one of the boxes, marked No. 4, to the Kiaya Bey. For the dragoman attached to the Plenipotentiary I purchased of Mr. Wilkinson a handsome box of the value of 5200 piastres.

I also purchased for the Caimacan a gold watch and ornaments for 5600 piastres.

There remained after this Prince Demetrius Morousy, the principal dragoman of the Porte, who attends the Grand Vizier in the camp, and who was not entitled to the box No. 4, that being the due of the officiating dragoman at Constantinople. As Prince Morousy is a very powerful man, and one with whom it is highly expedient to be on good terms; and as a considerable balance in favour of Government would be obtained by the return of the dagger to Messrs. Rundell and Bridge, I judged that a present to him of a ring of the value of 4000 piastres might be spared on this occasion, and be of real service to our interests.

The dagger is taken back by Mr. Wilkinson at the price paid for it by Government. He estimates its value at 36,000 piastres. This will not only defray the expense of the three additional presents above-mentioned, but more than cover the difference between the price of the dagger destined by his Majesty for the Sultan and that which I was under the necessity of providing for his Highness, according to the account I had the honour to transmit to you in my dispatch No. 34.

I will add, that this dagger could not at any time have answered the purpose for which it was put into my hands. It is not valuable enough for the Sultan, not splendid enough for the Grand Vizier (owing to the faulty disposition of the diamonds), and too considerable a present for an inferior subject.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XLII.

*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, Sept. 24th, 1809.

SIR,

I LAID before the Turkish Government a translation in Turkish of the falsification of his Majesty's Speech by the French Government. It was received with every mark of contempt for the authors of so impudent an imposture. It will after this be long, I trust, before the French Mission will obtain any belief to its most accredited publications. I have caused the document to be reprinted at the English press, and shall send it to Persia and to all places with which we have any correspondence.

I have the honour to be, &amp;c.

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No. XLIII.*To the Right Hon. George Canning.*

Pera, Sept. 24th, 1809.

SIR,

I DID not fail to notify to the dragomans attached to the British Embassy the proposed augmentation of their salaries, of which the particulars are contained in your despatch No. 13, and I have the honour of transmitting to you in their name the enclosed paper, expressive of their most respectful thanks to his Majesty for this mark of his royal bounty.

I informed them at the same ti

arrears

of their former salaries were to be paid to them up to the day of the signature of the Treaty with the Porte, and that the new arrangement was to commence from that day.

It is not merely in compliance with their earnest entreaties, but in discharge of what I really think a duty, considering the difficulties to which they were exposed and the distresses which they encountered during the late rupture, that I have consented to transmit to his Majesty's Government their humble petition, that the arrears of their salaries during the suspension of our relations with Turkey, may be computed according to the rule of the new arrangement.

Into the correctness of the representations which have frequently been made to me by Mr. Pisani of the circumstances attending the new plan, from its origin until its final settlement, I am not competent to enter; but from what I have been able to learn of the rapid and continual increase in the prices of all the necessaries of life at Pera during the war, added to the loss of some advantages which the dragomans had been used to derive from their situation before the source of them was stopped by the Treaty of Peace, I can bear ample testimony to the fact of their distress. Indeed, on my arrival here in the month of January, I found myself under the absolute necessity (as I had the honour of informing you in my private letter of the 19th of February,) of applying an immediate remedy to it by the advance to them of a sum of 11,000 piastres, in order to keep the establishment together.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XLIV.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, Sept. 24th, 1809.

SIR,

NOT having received from the Reis Efendi any answer to my proposal for a convention respecting the naval stores, and many events having occurred since I made it to induce me to think it was not likely to be agreed to, I did not deem it expedient to draw up any written articles upon the subject for the consideration of the Ottoman Government. For the same reason, I forbore troubling you with the detail of any plans which might eventually come to nothing; but the Porte having within these few days renewed an application to me for pecuniary assistance, I took that occasion to revive the business, and I have now the satisfaction of informing you, that proper persons are employed to ascertain, first, what quantity of oak timber and hemp is actually ready for delivery; and, secondly, what part of the Ottoman coasts it would be best to fix upon for the supply and shipping of timber, in the event of our coming to a permanent agreement. Whenever a report in any thing of a regular shape shall be made to me of the result of these inquiries, I will not fail transmitting for your consideration the draft of a convention adapted to the circumstances, and grounded upon the principle stated in my former despatch. In the mean time, with the assistance of Mr. Mair, I shall omit no opportunity which may offer for making a present purchase.

I shall in a few days be able to send a sample of hemp to Mr. Frazer at Malta.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Separate.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, Sept. 25th, 1809.

SIR,

ON receiving your separate despatch respecting the antiquities collected by Lord Elgin in the Levant, I did not fail to renew the application which I had already made privately to the Ottoman Government for permission to embark them at Athens. The preliminary steps towards their embarkation not having been taken under the sanction of a firman, I have met with much difficulty in forwarding his Lordship's wishes, and even now it is very doubtful whether the object would be effected so certainly through a firman as through a private application to the Vaivode of Athens. Measures to this effect are now taking by his Lordship's agents in this country, assisted by all the support which I can give them in concert privately with the Reis Efendi.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XI.V. By Basilico.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, Sept. 27th, 1809.

SIR,

IMMEDIATELY after the arrival of a French courier at the beginning of last week, the Chargé d'Affaires of France demanded a conference of the Porte, which,



after various attempts on the part of the ministers to discover the object of it, was granted for yesterday.

I am this moment informed that its principal object was to discover how far the Porte was inclined to adhere to its present system. This was distantly touched upon without mentioning England by name.

An important revelation however was made by the French minister, namely, that it was the intention of Bonaparte to make some material changes in the state of Poland. He accompanied this communication with the remarkable question, — whether the Turks would not like the French for their neighbours better than the Russians?

We have long heard reports that an understanding had begun to show itself between Austria and Russia on the affairs of Poland, and that Bonaparte had discovered views tending to re-establish that kingdom in the person of one of his brothers. One word from Buda would enable me to explain to the Turkish ministers as well as to his Majesty's Government the meaning of this question; but nothing has reached us from thence of a later date than the 28th of July.

In addition to the above communication from the French minister, he stated to the Porte that he had received a letter from the Russian Field Marshal, (Prince Gallitzin, as I suppose,) authorising him to ask the Ottoman Government if it was willing to resume the negotiations tending to re-establish a congress at Jassy? The answer was, that no congress had been established at Jassy, and that no notice could be taken of such a letter. I suspect, however, that the letter has been delivered in as an official piece.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XLVI.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, October 10th, 1809.

SIR,

Soon after I had the honour of writing to you last, an important change took place among the ministers of the Porte. Vaahid Efendi, the plenipotentiary who negotiated the English peace, was suddenly displaced and ordered into exile. I am informed that he would have lost his life but for the timely interposition of Mr. Pisani, who represented with success the doubts which such an act of severity might cast on the dispositions of Turkey towards England.

This change again throws me back in all my measures, and particularly in those which I have been pursuing relative to the convention for oak timber.

The new representative of the Reis Efendi has every thing to learn, and such is the terror inspired by some recent executions, that, to save themselves from acting wrong, the ministers appear to have taken the resolution not to act at all. The Ramazan completes the suspension of every material business.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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Separate.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, October 10th, 1809.

SIR,

AMONG the inclosures in Sir Harford Jones's despatches to the East India Company, which I forward

to you this day, there is the copy of a letter addressed to him by me in answer to the communication he made me of the successful termination of his negotiations at the Court of Persia.

At the close of that letter there is an expression which I feel it my duty to explain, in order that I may not be thought to have improperly or unbecomingly made use of his Majesty's name.

The circumstance is briefly as follows: — Sir Harford Jones represented to me, that, although he had been so far successful as to conclude a treaty of peace with the King of Persia, it would still require great efforts to keep the Persian court steady to the principles of that treaty until the arrival of the ratifications; that there were even doubts whether the treaty would be ratified; that these doubts would form a fruitful ground for French and Russian intrigues during the interval, and that, under these circumstances, it would afford him the most essential assistance if I would express some opinion in favour of the peace, and likewise my belief, if I entertained it, that it would be approved and ratified in England. Sir Harford Jones, with this view, proposed to me to write myself to the King of Persia, and in my letter to convey to his Persian Majesty this direct assurance. I wished to consider the subject a little before adopting precisely the course recommended by Sir Harford Jones; but in the mean time, and to give him what assistance I could, I wrote him the ostensible letter which forms the subject of the present explanation.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. XLIX. One Inclosure.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, Nov. 6th, 1809.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour of informing you that the affair of Dendrino's arrest is at length finally settled, and, considering the present circumstances of the Porte, in a manner more satisfactory than I could have expected.

On receiving information from Captain Leake that the enemy had been driven from Zante and Cephalonia by his Majesty's arms, and that the Sept-insular Government had been re-established in those islands, I felt myself called upon to renew the discussion of this subject of Dendrino, and again to demand his liberation on the grounds stated by me in the protest I delivered in to the Porte on the 12th of July, inclosed to you in my No. 30.

For this purpose I presented three notes to the Porte: one to demand his liberation in pursuance of the promise originally made to me by the Caimacan; a second to demand his liberation as a person bearing the British patent of protection; the third to demand categorically of the Porte whether it recognised, or not, the Sept-insular Republic. I inclose you this last, having reason to think that it materially influenced the decision of the question.

I instructed M. Pisani on delivering it to make the following declaration in my name:—

“That the islands of Zante and Cephalonia having surrendered to his Majesty's arms without the assist-

ance of any other of the Powers interested in the independence of the Sept-insular Republic, his Majesty had a right to proceed to the settlement of the government of those islands without consulting any foreign state. That if the Porte still recognised the Republic, her ancient claims would be attended to;—if not, not.”

I was not long in perceiving the embarrassment into which the Turkish ministers were thrown by this note and the accompanying message. Many overtures were made, and various schemes for a compromise suggested, to none of which I would listen. I even refused for a long time to attend a conference; but this was at last required of me in a manner so formal and solemn, accompanied with such apparent anxiety to adjust the business to my satisfaction, that I was obliged to consent.

The result of this conference, which took place last night, and of which it will be enough to say, that it exactly resembled all the others I have had the misfortune of describing to you, was, that the Turkish ministers gave way. Dendrino is now to be released in the exact form and manner which it was originally proposed to follow, and which from first to last I have rigorously insisted upon, that is to say, that he is to be called before the Caimakan, by whom he is to be interrogated in the presence of the English and French dragomans, to which nation he belongs; and upon his answer, he is to be delivered up either to me or to the French minister.

This mode is, for many reasons, the most eligible that can be adopted. First, it is the completion, as nearly as possible, of the original promise; and, as

condly, it decides the question of protections against the pretensions of France ; as well those pretensions which she sets up to the sovereignty over all countries occupied by her arms, as those which of late years she has advanced to the exclusive right of protecting her natural-born subjects.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in No. XLIX.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

THE undersigned, his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Sublime Porte, has already had the honour of notifying to his Excellency the Reis Efendi the deliverance of Zante and Cephalaunia from the occupation of France by the British arms, and the re-establishment of the Republican Government in those islands under the protection of his Majesty.

The Ottoman Porte having, by several public treaties with Great Britain and other powers, expressly recognised the independence of the Ionian Republic, but having in various instances of late, and particularly by its conduct towards the Sept-insular agents at Constantinople, refused to the said Republic the rights and privileges inseparable from a state of independence, the undersigned feels himself under the necessity, for the regulation of his own conduct, of demanding categorically of the Sublime Porte an explanation of its sentiments, and a direct answer to the question, " Does the Porte *now* acknowledge, or does it not, the Republic of the Seven Islands ?"

The undersigned requests a written official answer to this note, in order that he may transmit it without delay to his Government.

The undersigned seizes this occasion of assuring his Excellency the Reis Efendi of his distinguished consideration.

Pera, October 30th, 1809.

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No. L. One Inclosure.

*Mr. Adair to the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, Nov. 6th, 1809.

SIR,

INCLOSED I have the honour of transmitting to you an authentic copy of a decree published by the French Government at Corfu, against M. Giovanni Dendrino, by virtue of which his property is confiscated, and he himself is declared an exile from his country for ever.

The case under these circumstances appearing to be fairly a case for reprisals, I hope that you will not disapprove my having written to Lord Collingwood and Sir John Stuart most earnestly to recommend that all French property whatever, found on any of the Ionian islands, be rendered responsible to an equal amount for such of M. Dendrino's property as may be sold under the above decree.

As the Commanders in Chief in the Mediterranean may not think themselves authorised to proceed to such an extremity without further orders, and may therefore address themselves to his Majesty's Government for instructions, allow me humbly, but most earnestly, to represent to you, that some signal act of

reparation is due to this unfortunate gentleman ; and that in the way of example, whether to encourage our friends or to deter our enemies, nothing can be so effectual as reprisals on the present occasion.

The number of Corfiots at Pera, Smyrna, and in the other Scales, who might be induced to join us against the French, is very considerable ; but the decree against Dendrino keeps them in subjection. Reprisals, in his case, would be the surest means of bringing them forward. They would have but little fear of confiscation when they saw that all French property in the other islands, private as well as public, was set apart as a fund to indemnify them against such monstrous injustice.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. LI.

*Mr. Adair to the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, Nov. 12th, 1809.

SIR,

AT the desire of the Turkish Government, I have the honour of enclosing you two official Reports from the Grand Vizir of his successes against the Russian force which had passed the Danube and established itself at Babadag. I am afraid it will be found that the Russian troops stated to have been beaten at Silistria consist only of a detachment from the camp at Babadag.

Jealousies and misunderstandings among the Turkish leaders have caused the long inactivity of the Grand Vizir, and, it may be said, the failure of this



campaign. The important fortress of Ismaël is supposed to have fallen into the hands of the Russians through famine.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. LII. 52

*Mr. Adair to the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, Nov. 14th, 1809.

SIR,

INTELLIGENCE of the signature of peace between Austria and France has just reached me from Mr. Bathurst.

Having thought it my duty to communicate to the Ottoman Government, on all occasions, such information as reached me respecting the hostile views of Bonaparte against Turkey, of which they are themselves fully aware, it will be needless for me to dwell on the effect produced here by this disastrous event.

In the first moments of their consternation it seemed to me expedient to renew all the professions which I had ever made to them of the steady and unalterable friendship of Great Britain so long as they kept within the limits of a real neutrality; but I thought it equally necessary to warn them against a too precipitate compliance with those conditions which France was preparing to exact as the price of her precarious lenity.

The chief points which I assumed as likely to form the basis of the French conditions were — 1. The dismissal of the English embassy; 2. The recognition

of Joseph Bonaparte ; 3. The furnishing Corfu with provisions.

On the first of these points I declared that Turkey was not a power with which England could consent to remain on a footing even of mitigated hostility, if she broke off the official communications between the two countries.

On the second, I said that, independent of the direct part in the war which the Turkish Government would be taking by the recognition of Joseph Bonaparte, such an affront to his Majesty, who was in actual alliance with Ferdinand VII., could not be submitted to by Great Britain.

On the third, I mentioned that the furnishing Corfu with provisions, while the island was under blockade, would also be a total departure from the laws of neutrality. I added such arguments as naturally suggested themselves, from the use to be made by France of the military position of Corfu, now that she had so openly discovered her designs on Turkey, by insisting on the boundary of the Save in her treaty with Austria.

Nothing can be stronger than the Reis Efendi's assurances that the Turkish Government will not listen to any of the above demands, should they be made by France. But you know too well the nature of such assurances to take them for more than their value.

In two days their steadiness will be brought to some proof. Dendrino, according to their most solemn promise, given at the end of a conference with the five efficient members of the Turkish administration, is then to be given up to me. The accounts of the

peace arrived subsequent to this engagement. I confess I do not expect it to be fulfilled.

I regret that the time fixed for the sailing of the *Confounder* from Smyrna will not admit of my delaying my despatches beyond this day.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. LIII. Two Inclosures. By the Messenger Ruffe.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, Nov. 29th, 1809.

SIR,

AT the conclusion of my last despatch, I intimated an opinion that the promise which the Porte had made to me to liberate Mr. Dendrino in the mode pointed out in my No. 49. would not be performed.

My apprehensions were well founded. On the 15th inst. the dragoman of the Porte came to me on the part of the Ministers to propose a new arrangement, differing from that which had been agreed upon in the most essential point.

The chief feature in this new arrangement was that the Porte should take Dendrino under its own protection, and that I should withdraw from him the protection of Great Britain.

This proposal was alleged to be grounded on the embarrassment into which the Porte had been thrown since the conference with me of the 5th of November, by a renewed demand on the part of the French *Chargé d'Affaires*, (by the express orders, as he de-

clared, of Bonaparte,) that Dendrino should again be delivered up to him as a subject of France.

My only answer to this proposal was a peremptory demand that the agreement entered into with me on the 5th should be immediately and unconditionally fulfilled.

In reply, the dragoman affirmed that no engagement of any kind whatsoever existed between the Porte and myself upon the subject.

After this, there could be no further doubt of the intentions of the Ottoman Ministers. The repeated proofs, therefore, which I had experienced of their duplicity, and the conviction, that, were I to submit to any fresh instance of it, the French mission would obtain an ascendancy which must expose the British embassy to insults and mortifications without end, determined me to bring the question at once to an issue, and this in such a manner as should convince the Turkish Government that the peace we had granted to their solicitations would depend for its duration upon the good faith with which they maintained its principles.

On receiving, therefore, from the dragoman of the Porte a positive refusal on the part of his Government to liberate Mr. Dendrino in the form and manner agreed upon, I commissioned him to declare, that if on that day sevensnight Dendrino were not set at liberty, I should send for my passports, and quit the Residence without taking leave.

This message produced a fresh altercation between the Turkish Ministers and myself, which at one time assumed a character of anger, and even of hostility, that threatened the most serious consequences.

The history of this whole transaction, as explained

in my different despatches, (from which, however, I have excluded a variety of the minuter particulars, with a view of not encumbering your attention,) will, I am persuaded, acquit me in your judgment of either unnecessarily committing his Majesty's dignity, or of rashly hazarding the continuance of our friendly relations with the Porte.

If indeed it be right to consider only the situation of the Porte, and the difficulty she is under of making head even against Russia, if it be right that a British ambassador should submit to any thing for the sake of being suffered to remain here — and that but in a secondary character, taking his chance for better times — I confess that in this whole business of Dendrino, both in the points which regard his person, and on those which involve the general question of the right of protection, I have acted on an erroneous view of the public interest. But if it be true, on the other hand, that there is a point at which our tenderness towards the Porte, even under all her embarrassments, ought to stop, if it be true, also, that the abandonment of the principles I have been contending for, so far from securing my situation, or enabling me to resist further encroachments, would produce an effect directly contrary, and increase in every way the difficulty of keeping my ground, then I trust that my long perseverance in this struggle, and the means to which I have had recourse to finish it, will find their justification in the opinion of his Majesty's Government.

The degree to which a power like Turkey, calling itself friendly, and with whose great enemy we are actually at war, may be permitted to carry its deference to France, the friend and ally of that enemy, when such deference includes a direct breach of en-

gagement with a British ambassador, is by no means a light consideration in the posture which the Austrian peace has given to the public affairs. Of the efforts preparing both on the part of France and Russia to obtain the dismissal of the British embassy from Constantinople, there can be no doubt. I had received, it is true, the strongest assurances from this Government that no such propositions would ever be listened to; but I must acknowledge, that assurances from Turkish Ministers, with whatever solemnities accompanied, if not sanctioned by written documents, have no influence whatsoever on my belief. Some evidence of the dispositions of the Divan — some fact that might teach me what to trust to in a moment which it is not difficult to anticipate — it seemed to me, all things considered, of the first consequence, under the present circumstances, to possess.

In this view the termination of the discussions concerning Dendrino has been attended with all the success I could desire; and when I shall have stated the manner in which I now suffer this question to rest, you will be able to form a tolerably just opinion as to what points can be gained, and what points cannot be gained, by the respective influence of Great Britain and France on the Ottoman councils.

After the dragoman of the Porte had related to the Ministers the little success of the mission with which he had been charged, various councils were held, and I was not long in perceiving, and indeed in ascertaining beyond a doubt, that the literal performance of the engagement of the 5th of November would never take place. I also was correctly informed that, if driven to extremities, the Ministers would risk a rupture with England rather than expose the Empire

to instant invasion, which they were assured by the French Minister would be the infallible consequence of delivering Dendrino into my possession. I learned that their intention was not to accept my demand for passports as a declaration of war, but to appeal to his Majesty against my conduct, enumerating, in a letter to be addressed directly to his Majesty, all that the Turkish Government had done for my satisfaction; to accompany this by an invitation to me to remain at Constantinople until his Majesty's pleasure could be known; and, on my refusal, to deliver up Dendrino to the French.

Before executing this determination, however, the Ottoman Ministers had recourse to the mediation of the Internuncio. They stated to him in the strongest terms their desire to do every thing for my satisfaction; but added, that the objections to putting Dendrino into my hands were insurmountable. They engaged that if I would consent to let them terminate this difference in their own manner, his person should be secured against the French, his liberty should be restored to him, and he should receive a handsome compensation for his past sufferings. All this they promised to accompany by any act of personal attention towards myself that I should think satisfactory to my own honour, and calculated to give a fresh proof of the value they set on the friendship of Great Britain.

In addressing themselves to the Internuncio, the Ministers afforded me, no doubt, a great facility for bringing this business to an honourable adjustment. I accepted, therefore, without hesitation, the same friendly intervention. After going through the subject with this Minister, he agreed thoroughly with me,

that I could listen to no conditions respecting Dendrino so long as he remained a British protected subject; but he asked whether, if Dendrino should of his own accord first put himself under the protection of the Porte, I would be satisfied with the conditions he was authorised to propose.

I answered, that if Dendrino's calling for the protection of the Porte, as a stranger whose life and safety were exposed to the continual persecution of his enemies, *should be really an act of his own*, there would be an end of the question respecting his person; but I begged to assure the Internuncio, as I had assured Dendrino himself the day before, through Mr. Meyer, that nothing on earth would induce me either to withdraw the protection I had granted him, or allow any undue influence to be used in order to induce him to resign it.

With regard to the conditions, I remarked that in neither case would I be concerned in discussing or arranging them. It would be for Dendrino to judge whether those now offered were sufficiently advantageous, or resting on grounds sufficiently secure, to induce him to exchange one protection for the other; but that I would fairly give him my opinion, that he would not be safe against the French, unless the Porte should agree to put into my hands a written engagement, declaring him at perfect liberty, taking him under its own special protection, and rendering itself responsible for his safety, and for his pursuing his lawful occupations free from all molestation whatsoever. Such an engagement, provided it abstained from all assumption of sovereignty over Dendrino as a native of Corfu — provided it were addressed to me from the Porte without any previous concert or com-



munication with the French Minister, I would accept and keep in deposit *as a security, so far as it went, for the personal safety of Dendrino, emanating from the Porte in her quality of local sovereign*; and I would receive it as a proof of the friendly dispositions of the Ottoman Government towards Great Britain. I then commissioned the Internuncio to say, that if Dendrino, freely and upon due deliberation, should think this arrangement preferable to remaining in his then state of confinement, and if the Porte would transmit me a note to the effect above mentioned, in clear and unambiguous words, I would desist from my demand of passports. *I desired him, however, distinctly to add, that any arrangement that could be made short of the one originally agreed upon, would not be considered by me as satisfactory; and I also enjoined him to declare that it was my firm intention, in my answer to the projected note of the Porte, again to assert and to claim, in its fullest extent, the right of protecting all persons, of what country or description soever, except Ottoman subjects.*

The Internuncio stated all this with precision to the Reis Efendi; and after a discussion, in which every sort of difficulty appears to have been started, in the evening of the same day which I had fixed for the demand of my passports he brought me the solemn promise of the Porte, that an engagement to the effect above mentioned, and which he himself had reduced to writing at the conference, should be put into my hands, as a security for the liberty and personal safety of Dendrino.

The declaration, which together with my answer I have here the honour to enclose, was sent me accordingly on the 25th inst.; and Mr. Dendrino, having

readily accepted the protection of the Porte, *under a promise from me that he should return to that of Great Britain whenever he might choose to claim it*, I consider the affair as terminated for the present.

I have only to add, that the Ministers of the Porte have expressed great obligations to me for having relieved them from the state of embarrassment into which they were thrown by the opposite claims of the British and French embassies: and it will be seen, I trust, by his Majesty's Government, that although from the distressed and really difficult situation of the Porte, I have not been able to carry the point in contest exactly in the manner I had wished and been led to expect, the French have entirely failed in establishing the claim they had set up, and of which the written engagement of the Porte is a direct and unequivocal disavowal.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A in No. LIII.

*Translation of an Official Note from the Sublime Porte to H. E. the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty.*

IN view to put an end to the discussion and altercation which have taken place between the Sublime Porte and the English and French missions respecting the person of Giovanni Dendrino, a native of Corfu, the Sublime Porte, *as the supreme authority of the country*, and ever preferring the tranquillity of all persons, being besides the friend of both the said Powers, in order to preserve the dignity of both parties free from inconvenience, has taken Dendrino

under her special protection, with his children and family.

He shall be perfectly free in his acts and avocations, conformable to law and rule. In consequence of which, this present note, expressive that the Sublime Porte will not suffer him to be molested or meddled with on the part of any one, has been drawn up, and transmitted to the most respected English Ambassador, our friend.

17th Scievvat, 1224 (25th Nov. 1809).

Inclosure B in No. LIII.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

Le Soussigné Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de la Majesté Britannique près la Sublime Porte, a reçu la Note qui lui a été adressée au nom de la Sublime Porte au sujet de Giovanni Dendrinò, natif de Corfou.

Le Soussigné se prêtera avec la plus vive satisfaction à tout moyen honorable de terminer une discussion qui n'a que trop duré entre deux Puissances que les circonstances actuelles de l'Europe invitent plus que jamais à se réunir contre leurs ennemis communs.

En conséquence le Soussigné remercie la Sublime Porte d'avoir, par un acte de son autorité souveraine, pris le Sieur Dendrinò sous sa protection immédiate et spéciale, et de lui avoir garanti la pleine et libre jouissance de ses droits légitimes contre tout attentât de la part de qui que ce soit.

Le Soussigné accepte cet acte avec d'autant plus de satisfaction qu'il n'y voit rien qui porte atteinte ni

aux principes qu'il a énoncés dans ses notes officielles du 15 Mars, du 20 et 29 Avril, du 12 Juillet, et du 24 et 30 Octobre, comme formant les bases fondamentales de la sureté des sujets de sa Majesté dans les territoires Ottomans, *ni au droit qu'il a réclaté, et qu'il réclame encore, d'accorder la protection Britannique à qui bon lui semblera hors les sujets de la Sublime Porte.*

Le Soussigné prie son Excellence le Reis Efendi d'agréer l'assurance de sa considération très distinguée.

Pera, ce 26 Novembre, 1809.

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Separate. By Ditto.

*To the Right Honourable George Canning.*

Pera, December 5th, 1809.

SIR,

As I am not sure that Mr. Bathurst could prolong his residence at Bude sufficiently to obtain an account of three separate and secret articles in the treaty between Austria and France, I send them to you as they have been communicated to me, by a person in whose accuracy I have great confidence.

\* \* \* \* \*

Bonaparte has declared that the Tyrol shall not return under the dominion of the House of Bavaria. He also declared on several occasions to the Austrian Plenipotentiary that he had not the most distant intention of re-establishing Poland as a kingdom. His minister at this place told the Porte the direct reverse.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. I. By the Messenger Relffe.

*To Earl Bathurst, H. M. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.*

Pera, December 24th, 1809.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatches Nos. 1 and 2, by the messenger Robinson.

The letters of protection granted by me to the Ionian Captains were nothing more than the common patents granted to Franks who place themselves under the jurisdiction of the different foreign ministers at the Porte. They are given to protect the persons holding them against the vexations of the officers of the Turkish Government. They extend only to residence on shore or in port, and convey no licence to trade.

The passports which I granted to enable them to proceed to Malta were drawn up in terms corresponding to the condition on which I consented to receive them under the British protection, and which, on a reference to my No. XX., and to its inclosure A, your Lordship will find to be, that they should proceed with their several vessels straight to Malta, under convoy of one of his Majesty's ships of war, and that on their arrival there they should surrender themselves to his Excellency Sir Alexander Ball, to be disposed of as he might think proper.

The passport also was simply a recommendation to captains and commanders of his Majesty's ships *under the peculiar circumstances of the case* to protect these vessels on their way to Malta.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Separate. Two Inclosures.

*To ditto.*

Pera, December 24th, 1809.

MY LORD,

By the desire of Sir Harford Jones, I have the honour of enclosing to your Lordship the copy of his letter to me, of the 25th of October, relative to his intention of making a further advance of subsidy to the King of Persia, and expressing a wish, if I approved the measure, that I would support it by such arguments as might occur to me in communicating it to his Majesty's Government. As I cannot, after the fullest consideration, state my sentiments in favour of such an advance more strongly to your Lordship than I have already expressed them to Sir Harford himself, I copy and transmit to your Lordship the exact words of my letter to him on that occasion. I will only take the liberty of adding, what my recent acquaintance with Asiatic politics has made me invariably remark, that if we mean to have any transactions with Mahomedan States, we must content ourselves with very slender security for the performance of their engagements. In the present state of the politics of Europe, and with a view to the security of India, I may be allowed I hope to express an opinion, that we must cultivate both Turkey and Persia at the risk of being deceived by both, and that we must gain these Powers at almost any price short of our honour, and of that consideration which arises from a sense that we can neither be deceived nor offended with impunity.

I have the honour to be, &c.

No. II. Six Inclosures.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, December 26th, 1809.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of forwarding to your Lordship some despatches which I have received from Sir Harford Jones, his Majesty's Envoy at the Court of Persia.

By the former despatches of that minister, your Lordship will have been apprised how anxiously the Shah of Persia appeared to wish to encourage the best understanding between himself and the Ottoman Government, and particularly the reciprocal establishment of embassies between his Court and that of Constantinople. This latter point had been strongly pressed by Meerza Abdul Hassan, on his arrival at Constantinople, in his way to England; and in my No. XXXVIII. I mentioned that there was some appearance of its being acceded to.

About the middle of November the Vakeel employed by the Shah of Persia to transact his business at the Porte, announced to me the speedy arrival of an ambassador from his Court to the Sultan; and he added, that as the immediate object of his nomination was to establish a concert in the operations of the Persian and Turkish armies against Russia, the ambassador would afterwards, without loss of time, set out for that purpose to the camp of the Grand Vizir.

My anxiety to obtain some precise information on the subject of the armistice which had recently been concluded between the Persian and the Russian armies induced me to dispense with all ceremony concerning

visits, and to go privately to see this ambassador, whose name is Hussein Han, as soon as possible after he had reached Chalcedonia, the place appointed for his residence.

When I saw him, he presented me his letters from the Persian ministers, but I found he had none from Sir Harford Jones. He accounted for this, by supposing the despatches which announced his embassy to be still on the road. So singular an omission, however, coupled with the fact of the armistice, the origin of which is still very obscure, struck me forcibly. He repeatedly declared, indeed, that he had orders to act in all things in strict conformity to my advice. It would not have been fit for me, after such a declaration, to be the first to testify mistrust; but I thought proper nevertheless to confine our conversation to subjects on which my sentiments are already known. In expatiating on these, it was easy to give an air of confidence and cordiality to my communications, sufficient to obviate any sentiment of mistrust on his part.

Of the armistice he could give me no account. On the contrary, he asked for information about it from me, alleging *that it had been concluded with the knowledge and under the direction of Sir Harford Jones*. This by no means appears from Sir Harford's despatches. I had here, consequently, an additional motive for circumspection, if not for positive mistrust.

After going over many topics of general policy, he said that he was proceeding immediately to the camp, to present his credentials to the Grand Vizir; from whence he promised to inform me by letter of every thing that he might be able to effect towards establishing an union between Persia and Turkey; to



which he urged me in very strong terms to give the sanction of his Majesty's name.

The rest of his conversation expressed a thorough sense of the perfidy of Bonaparte towards Persia; deep regret at her having suffered herself to be duped by him in the treaty of 1807; the clearest and the justest views of her true interest in continuing united with Great Britain; and a strong and well reasoned exposition of the danger to which the Mahomedan religion would be exposed if Constantinople were to fall into the hands of either Russia or France. Such were the specious appearances under which this man sought to cover the profound duplicity of his court, of which a few days more were to bring me the fullest and the clearest proof.

As his residence was on the opposite shore of the Bosphorus, I was obliged to trust wholly to the vigilance of Mr. Pisani to superintend his proceedings. Mr. Pisani appears to have been ill served by the persons he employed, for, five days after this interview, Hussein Han was visited, unknown to him, by one of the French emissaries lately arrived from Tehran.

This visit took place on Friday the 1st instant. I heard nothing of it until Sunday the 3rd, when information was brought me that Hussein Han was at that moment on his way to the French Palace. On inquiring further, the circumstance of the visit of the 1st instant was disclosed to me, and then a strong suspicion entered my mind, that the Court of Persia was acting a double part towards Great Britain, that Hussein Han's journey to the Turkish camp was a mere pretence, and that, not Constantinople, but Paris, was his real destination.

Firmly persuaded that treachery of some sort would

be found at the bottom of this embassy, I lost not a moment in despatching a Tartar to Sir Harford Jones, with two letters, of which I have the honour to enclose the copies. The one (marked A) your Lordship will perceive to be ostensible; and as the matter of complaint there stated against Hussein Han was sufficient of itself to authorise my asking for his recal, even admitting that he had been appointed to reside permanently at the Ottoman Court, I thought it advisable to reserve the communication of my suspicions for my private letter (B), and to leave it entirely to Sir Harford Jones's discretion to acquaint the Shah with them or not, as he might judge proper.

After despatching my Tartar, and allowing sufficient time to prevent his being overtaken, I sent Mr. Chabert to the Persian envoy to require some sort of explanation of his strange behaviour, but chiefly to retard, if possible, his journey until I could receive advices from Sir Harford Jones. With this view I instructed Mr. Chabert to tell him plainly that if he ventured to pass the frontiers, I should take upon myself to withhold the ratifications of the treaty with England, which must pass through my hands, until I could receive his Majesty's commands. The consequence of this step would be, that the Shah his master would lose his money, and he himself, most probably, after the warning I then gave him, his head. I enclose Mr. Chabert's two reports of what passed at these interviews.

It was my next business to discredit this agent at the Porte, and to throw difficulties in the way of his setting out upon his journey; and for this purpose I had a special meeting with the Reis Efendi. I represented the danger of suffering such a person to proceed to the Turkish camp, where nothing else could

be expected from him than that he would act as a spy for the French and the Russians. In stating my sense of his behaviour to myself, however, I took care to mark my thorough conviction that the Shah himself, the moment he heard of it, would infallibly recal and punish him. The Reis Efendi expressed a similar sense of the necessity of preventing this man's journey to the Vizir's head quarters; and he promised me also to find out, and acquaint me with the fact, whether he had or had not a secret commission for Paris.

The Reis Efendi, in the course of our conversation, informed me that a Turkish envoy was speedily about to set out for Tehran; that the object of his mission was to discover what were the real intentions of Persia, and what was the truth respecting the armistice. He said that the Ottoman Government was convinced of the necessity of establishing a cordial understanding between Turkey and Persia, under the sanction of Great Britain; and he assured me that the Porte would readily agree to make no peace separate from Persia, if it were possible to place any dependence on so light a people. The Porte had resolved, therefore, to send a man of their own to ascertain this very necessary point. The Reis Efendi promised me that this person, who is an Ulema of the first distinction, should be instructed to act cordially and confidentially with Sir Harford Jones; and of this he requested me to apprise Sir Harford in my first despatches. Finding him so well disposed, I earnestly pressed that this envoy might be distinctly instructed to co-operate with Sir Harford Jones in preventing the re-establishment of the French mission at Tehran; but as some difficulty was expressed, and a fear that the French would consider this as a breach of neutrality, I have

since returned to the question, and urged, in writing, all those reasons which render the existence of a French mission at Tehran so dangerous to Turkey under the present relations between France and Russia, and especially after the proposals recently made by Russia, to which it is morally impossible that France should not be privy, namely, that Persia should indemnify herself on the neighbouring provinces of Turkey for the cession of Georgia to Russia. It is singular that there should have been any hesitation in agreeing to so simple a matter as a secret instruction to the above effect; but such notwithstanding is the fact, and it was with the greatest difficulty that I obtained the promise.

In the course of my endeavours to ascertain the truth respecting this mission of Hussein Han, and also whether my suspicions of his ulterior destination were sufficiently well grounded to authorise my stating them more positively to Sir H. Jones, I have at length, by means of some pecuniary sacrifice, discovered the most important particular of this dark transaction. The journey to the Vizir's camp is not absolutely a pretence; but I have ascertained beyond a doubt, as your Lordship will see by the annexed enclosures, that Hussein Han, when he left Tehran, had eventual instructions to proceed to Paris. The moment I was sure of this fact, I sent off the above letters to Sir Harford Jones; and my Tartar being accidentally delayed until the 25th, I was enabled to add, in consequence of a notice sent me privately by the Reis Efendi, that Hussein Han had actually applied for firmans to pass the frontiers after visiting the camp.

I have been thus particular in my account of these transactions, as his Majesty's Government may deem

the re-establishment of the French mission at Tehran an event of sufficient importance to call for the issue of fresh instructions to Sir Harford Jones for his guidance under the new circumstances to which it may give rise.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. III. One Inclosure.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, December 26th, 1809.

MY LORD,

My letter No. XLIX., to Mr. Canning, enclosed the copy of a note, in which I communicated to the Turkish Government the deliverance of Zante and Cephalonia from the enemy by his Majesty's arms, and in which I also demanded categorically whether the Porte did or did not *then* recognise the Sept-insular Republic.

Since Dendrino's release I have been frequently requested to withdraw this note. I have declined acceding to the request, for the two reasons which follow:—

First, it has been declared to me officially that the Ionian flag will not be admitted into the ports and harbours of Turkey. Some vessels from Zante and Cephalonia having entered the ports of the Morea under Sept-insular colours, strong representations were made to me against this conduct, with an intimation that the practice must be discontinued. In the face of this positive and overt act of non-recognition, your

Lordship will I trust agree with me that the note cannot be withdrawn.

But secondly, when I presented this note, I had an ulterior and a very material object in view, which every day that it remains unanswered assists in promoting. I have always been willing to flatter myself that his Majesty's Government would see the importance, I may say the necessity, of our getting possession of Corfu, if we mean to defend Sicily, to retain Malta, and to oppose the projects of France on the Morca and the Greek Islands. It is clear that we never can hope to succeed in this object except with the good will of the inhabitants; and as nothing is so odious to them as the Turkish government, any change in their present situation which could in the remotest degree be thought to lead to the re-establishment of even the nominal supremacy of the Porte, would not only be rejected, but, I am convinced, resisted with the utmost energy by the Corfiots. The French, in their government of the Seven Islands, have thoroughly understood this principle; and by insisting on all occasions upon their being considered by the Porte as French territory, and their inhabitants as natural-born French subjects, — a principle never once shaken since their occupation by France, except in the affair of Dendrino, — they have effectually secured the good will of the natives *against the Turks*. If it be meant, therefore, to make any serious effort for Corfu, we must of course hold out to the inhabitants the prospect of a better situation than that in which they stand at present. In this, indeed, there would be no difficulty; but your Lordship may rely upon it that no prospect of superior advantages, not even the benefits of the British government itself, would induce them to think the

change worth a struggle, unless accompanied by a certainty, equal at least to the certainty they have at present, that they would be secured against the power, the influence, nay, even the very name of Turkey.

The policy which the Turks have followed with regard to the Seven Islands, ever since I first stirred the question of their independence in the affair of Dendrino, and particularly their recent communication to me respecting the flag, affords us the means of completely satisfying the Corfiots on this point, and will also greatly facilitate any arrangements which, in concert with his Majesty, may be adopted to secure to them the complete establishment of their independence. Turkey can have no pretensions to interfere in such arrangements. Turkey, as far as it depended on her, has abolished the Republic. She has done this while its territories were in the possession of his Majesty's enemies, and in order to favour that possession. His Majesty, therefore, whenever his arms shall have driven out those enemies, will in no sense be bound to respect the rights of a power by which the compact that acknowledged them has been expressly renounced. Under these circumstances I have thought it best not to withdraw a note which, while it remains unanswered, strengthens and perpetuates the evidence of a renunciation so material to the future security of the Republic.

I cannot conclude this subject without entreating your Lordship's most serious attention to the enclosed memoir, in which the importance of Corfu, in the present state of the Continent of Europe, is ably and conclusively demonstrated. It was drawn up at my request, by Mr. Meyer, whose residence on the Island

in an official capacity has enabled him justly to estimate its value.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure in No. III.

France having obtained possession of nearly the entire coasts of Continental Europe, is at length arrived at that stage of her war against Great Britain and the world which makes it indispensable for her to establish a command at sea, if it be her policy either to secure or extend the power she has already acquired. She has well provided for the attainment of this important object by her provident seizure of Corfu. She will now lose no time in bringing into immediate activity the entire maritime resources of Continental Europe, which, under its present circumstances, therefore, ought to be regarded by Great Britain as presenting only one hostile line of almost inaccessible maritime posts, in which the enemy may construct and equip in security the most powerful armaments for the accomplishment of his projected conquests.

The first object therefore of Great Britain, in reference to the permanent interests of the Empire, should now be *to occupy immediately the key-islands, among the different chains of islands lying more or less contiguous to the hostile line of Continental maritime posts.* Great Britain will thus easily oppose to the enemy *another line of insular posts*, which, with her actual naval superiority, would enable her to bid defiance to the greatest efforts of her enemies to subvert her power.

In the Mediterranean, among the chains of islands



in question, that of the Ionian Islands is in all respects the most important.

Corfu, the principal of these islands, as well from its geographical position as physical structure, must be considered as one of those few commanding places on the globe which necessarily secure or enlarge the empire of those who possess them. Corfu is indispensable to any power that moves in a great military sphere. Possessing an excellent and capacious arsenal, for the construction of ships of the heaviest burden, and an harbour capable of containing the navies of Europe, secure from any attack of enemies or injury of weather, with a double entrance at the north and south; it has also the rare advantage of having the strongest natural fortress, commanding at the same time the harbour. The island, as to its agricultural resources, offers the means of establishing a rich and flourishing colony, enjoying one of the finest climates. These natural advantages are so constituted as not to be impaired by any human efforts.

This island, by its position, commands absolutely the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, controls both the south of Italy and the western provinces of Turkey, and is independent of them both. The British influence over the Pachas of the important province of Albania will be little more than nominal while France governs on the *Save*, at *Cattaro*, and at *Corfu*.

*The whole of the Adriatic Sea*, since the late treaty at Vienna, *is become one vast arsenal of France*; comprising the ports and dockyards of *Cattaro*, *Ragusa*, *Zara*, *Curzola*, *Fiume*, *Trieste*, *Venice*, *Ancona*, *Taranto*, &c., possessing every facility of mutual communication, and abounding with the best materials

for building and equipping fleets and naval armaments of all sorts.

The Republic of Venice owed its naval greatness to those very resources which have just been brought into the exclusive possession of the usurper of Italy. Of this immense French arsenal Corfu is the key. Yet with this key in the possession of Great Britain, that now powerful arm of the Mediterranean would be at once reduced to little more than a choked harbour. But when united *with Corfu*, it becomes at once capable of sending forth such armaments as will, in concert with the enemy's other resources at Toulon, Genoa, &c., effect the conquest of Sicily, secure the dismemberment of the Turkish provinces, and the colonisation of Egypt; control the Barbary states, command the fortunes of Greece, enable France to leave Europe in the rear of her projected conquests in the East, and eventually secure to her the supremacy over the Mediterranean Sea.

From the actual organisation of the power of France, Corfu is *now* the fulcrum on which these great and decisive movements of the enemy depend.

The conviction of these truths in the minds of the well-informed in the Mediterranean States, but more particularly of the inhabitants of Greece and the *Levant Islands*, obliges them, however reluctantly, to respect the power of France or to seek protection under it; a subjection to which they will be condemned so long as Corfu, this *conditio sine qua non* of their real independence, remains in the firm grasp of France.

The daily experience of the commercial classes and of the numerous train of their dependents, belonging to the various nations and communities in the Levant,

as well as to Sicily, to Naples, &c., convinces them of this predominant influence of France. Hence their indifference to change their situation, or to persevere in their opposition to France, until this strong-hold of French power in the south of Europe be wrested from her. They are well aware that while Corfu remains in the possession of France, there could be no sure point of communication and contact for Great Britain with Italy or Germany, *in the event of any interruption of the good understanding subsisting between Great Britain and Turkey*; the fear of which is constantly kept alive in their minds, as well from the actual possessions as the ceaseless intrigues of the enemy to that effect. Whereas, on the other hand, if Great Britain possessed the arsenal, the port, the fortresses, and the communications of the Island of Corfu, they discern, with equal clearness, that the eventual territorial conquests of the enemy in Turkey, Egypt, &c., could be of no permanent benefit to his empire. His trade and squadrons proceeding from his Levant possessions could never pass to his Western Empire *through the channel of Malta*; nor could they have any passage to his Adriatic possessions *through the channel of Corfu*.

The enemy, too well convinced of the immense advantages he derives, and could derive, from this possession, has made, and continues to make, efforts and sacrifices to maintain it, corresponding to its vast importance.

French engineering, during the last three years, has rendered the fortress of Corfu impregnable to every power in Europe but Great Britain, owing to her naval superiority.

But difficult as the reduction of it assuredly is, the

naval and military forces requisite for it will, if employed without further delay, be comparatively small to that which must otherwise be ultimately consumed in counteracting those designs of the enemy, which will be, of necessity, in a course of gradual accomplishment, so long as France retains Corfu. Without this station in the Mediterranean, powerful reinforcements must be sent out by Great Britain to secure Sicily and Malta ; and numerous squadrons, which, by being remote from any convenient port of refit or refreshment, must be double in number to what would otherwise be required, must be employed to cruise incessantly in the Adriatic, to cover Sicily, the Morea, &c., and to protect British commerce from the depredations of the Levant pirates, now systematically encouraged by the French Government. While Corfu remains in the enemy's possession, Cephalaria cannot be considered as secure without a much stronger garrison than that post would otherwise demand. It may be safely asserted, that no zealous co-operation will be afforded to Great Britain, either by the Greeks in the islands or those on the continent, *until Corfu be brought under her sovereignty*. For in that case, the Greek nation and the islanders perceive, that no power could then so readily and so effectually confer on them the real benefits of emancipation or *protection*, as Great Britain. The late conduct of France and Russia towards the world, and the Greek nation in particular, has been of such a description as to dispose the latter more than ever to cultivate British interests. As to the disadvantages arising from difference of religion, England has an obvious advantage over France, the Greek tenets approaching more to those of the Anglican than the Catholic church.

The influence of the French over the Greeks would be reduced to nothing as to political connection by their loss of Corfu. The French would have no commanding point of contact with them, nor plausible arguments for intrigue; causes by which they have hitherto maintained, and still maintain, so considerable a portion of their influence over the Porte.

But independent of these considerations of foreign policy, the supremacy of Great Britain over the Mediterranean would be rendered complete and permanent by the possession of Corfu; nor could it be shaken even by the fall of Sicily or Sardinia, which islands, however, by the occupation of Corfu, would be so much more strongly secured to their lawful sovereigns.

The points of *Minorca, Malta, Corfu, and Cerigo*, independent of the Island of Elba, would enable Great Britain to traverse effectually all the arsenals and maritime communications of the enemy. These insular posts are, by their nature and position, the citadels of the Mediterranean Sea. If possessed by Great Britain, as her naval sovereignty and dignity seem to demand, they will enable her to defeat, or counteract, all the enterprises of the enemy in the south and in the east of Europe; and will afford the surest pledges for the indemnification of the immense expenditure to be incurred in the counteraction of the future hostile enterprises of France.

Corfu, considered as affording a sure channel for the introduction of British merchandise into the continent; as a *channel of correspondence with Turkey, Germany, and Italy*; as a *dépôt* of naval and military stores; as an asylum for the loyal and firm opposers of French despotism: these advantages, however im-

portant in the present state of Europe, are but of secondary consideration when compared with the advantage that the possession of Corfu would afford to Great Britain of stopping the progress and annulling the effects of the actual power of France; and of maintaining a control over the south of Europe, which nothing but her own will could compel her to limit or relinquish.

It is on these grounds that it is now recommended, as an indispensable measure of British policy, that no time be lost in fitting out an expedition for the reduction of Corfu, the success of which is already so materially promoted by the occupation of the other Ionian islands.

Such a measure would at once establish the British influence throughout the Mediterranean on a durable and solid basis. Nor could the enemy venture to leave Europe in the rear of his projected conquests towards the East, on any principle of military policy, if the great resources arising from the possession of Corfu were duly turned against him by the energy of Great Britain.

(Signed)

WILLIAM MEYER.

Pera, 26th December, 1809.

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No. IV.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, December 26th, 1809.

MY LORD,

THE instructions with which your Lordship has honoured me in your No. 2. shall be punctually fol-

lowed on every occasion to which the circumstances of the Ottoman government, and our subsisting relations, may render it possible to apply them.

With regard to the case first supposed by your Lordship, namely, a disposition on the part of Russia to conclude a peace on reasonable terms with the Porte, without any interference on the part of France, I have no hesitation in saying, that I do not believe any consideration would induce Russia to desist from the demand of Moldavia and Walachia, under the present circumstances of Europe.

With regard to negotiation through the intervention of France, it is proper that I should lay before your Lordship the actual state of affairs at the Porte, as far as I can learn them with any certainty, in order that your Lordship may judge of the probability of such an event.

In every turn of events during the Austrian war, and still more since the peace, my endeavours have been directed to discover the intentions of this Government with regard to Russia. In the course of my inquiries among the ministers, they always promised me that I should be consulted upon any proposition made, or to be made, by either power to the other. If I were even now to trust to assurances repeated and renewed in all the forms which it is possible for asseveration to assume, Turkey is no less determined than ever to accept no terms from Russia short of the restitution of her provinces on the Danube. But if appearances do not much deceive me, I should say that negotiations for peace, or at least some communications of a pacific tendency, are going on. How far this conjecture may be just, and how far such communica-

tions are made with the privy, or by the intervention of France, your Lordship will judge after examining the facts which I have now the honour to communicate.

There is not the smallest doubt that during the war with Austria the French Minister at this place endeavoured more than once to induce the Ottoman Government to admit of his intervention with the Russian commanders on the Danube for the renewal of conferences for peace. The means were open to him through the agents of Baron Hubsch at Bucearest; and when his own offers were rejected, Baron Hubsch was himself put forward on one occasion for the same purpose. Whether Bonaparte may still feel the same interest in effecting a peace between the Porte and Russia may be matter of doubt: in negotiations we know that he has always an interest; and what to the present point is certain, is, that on the 21st of November, immediately after a conference in which the French Minister communicated to the Porte the news of the peace with Austria, a son of Baron Hubsch was despatched from hence in all haste, ostensibly to Warsaw, but, in reality, to St. Petersburg.

While I was endeavouring to discover for what purpose this person was sent, I received a letter from Lord Collingwood in answer to one I had written to his Lordship during the summer, in which I had recommended, in strong terms, the sending a squadron to the Black Sea. In this letter his Lordship (to whom I had communicated my having written to his Majesty's Government to the same effect), under the supposition that re-inforcements might be sent out to him, together with instructions to employ them



on that service, desired me to apply for, and to send to him the necessary firman for the passage of a squadron, in order that it might not be delayed at the Dardanelles. This letter was dated the 6th of October. I received it on the 29th of November. A diversion in the Crimea had ceased, it is true, to be an object after the Austrian peace; but it struck me that the authority I had received from Lord Collingwood to ask for the firman in question might be used as an instrument to force the Turks to enter into some more precise explanations with me on the subject of Russia. I gave Mr. Pisani his instructions, therefore, ordering him, in the first instance, simply to ask for the firman, and reserving all further explanations for an interview with the Ministers.

This demand of a firman greatly embarrassed the Reis Efendi. He could not indeed avoid thanking me for having (as he supposed) prevailed on Lord Collingwood to send the succours; but he said that the time for their employment was now passed, and that it was wished that no British squadron might appear at the Dardanelles.

To try him a little further, I sent a second time to say, that although the Porte declined for the present the proffered assistance, still I should write to Lord Collingwood to hold a fleet in readiness to come up on the first intimation.

The answer to this message was an earnest entreaty that I would abstain from making even that communication to Lord Collingwood, until specially requested by the Porte so to do.

The peremptory refusal of succours after the frequent, I may say the importunate, demands for them during the summer, and which had been even re-

newed but a few weeks before, — a refusal, the determination to which, as your Lordship will perceive, was taken under the impression that a squadron was actually within call, leads to many reflections. I will trouble your Lordship with but one, which is to the point, however, in our present inquiry. If the Porte were negotiating with Russia alone, the rejection of such an instrument of negotiation would be scarcely credible: it is intelligible enough, if we suppose her to be negotiating through the intervention of France. I have been informed, from a quarter on which I can rely, that during the whole of the late negotiations with Austria, Bonaparte made it a *sine quâ non* of peace that he should have the Save for his boundary, professedly for the purpose of dictating his own conditions at Constantinople. In the spirit of that policy which suffers nothing to be done in Europe without his interference, it is not improbable that he should again have offered his mediation to the Porte, and after obtaining a consent which she could not refuse, that he should have made it a condition of his pretended good offices, not only that the whole negotiation should be left to him, but that the Porte should deprive herself of every other means of negotiating; and, consequently, that during the discussions she should not suffer a British squadron to come to the Dardanelles. It is certain that by such a stipulation he might be able to pretend to Russia that he was acting for her interests, while he rendered Turkey wholly dependent upon himself for the terms of the peace.

But whatever may be truth in this case, whether the Porte be negotiating singly, whether she be nego-

ciating through France, or whether she be not negotiating at all, it will answer, I doubt not, the general purpose of your Lordship's instructions, if I continue to place under the view of this Government those strong and striking facts which prove to demonstration that whether it be a year sooner or a year later, Bonaparte has doomed the Turkish empire to destruction.

Among these facts, his proposals to the Emperor of Austria, both before and during the war, to join in the plan of partition projected at Tilsitt and at Erfurt, stands naturally in the first rank. To this project of partition I endeavour to make it clear to the Ministers that every movement of France, even in matters apparently indifferent and remote, is steadily directed. When I have to complain, for instance, which is frequently the case, of a breach of neutrality, of the capture of a vessel with a cargo of British property, of the equipment of privateers, or of the encouragement given to French cruisers by the Turkish governors in the islands of the Archipelago, in calling on the Porte to repress these acts, I never cease to represent that they are encouraged by the French, not so much with a view to captures as to the chance of provoking a quarrel with England by compelling me to order reprisals. To the same cause I trace the exertions made by the French Minister to procure the expulsion of Monsieur d'Havat, the Spanish Plenipotentiary, to prevent the recognition of the Sept-insular Republic, and to engage the Porte to furnish Corfu with provisions; and, to sum up all in a word, by driving the Porte again into a quarrel with Great Britain, to leave her without a friend on earth, as the

first and most necessary step towards effecting the long-meditated dismembering of her territories.

I have also been furnished with an opportunity of exposing to the Porte the artifices by which France was endeavouring to separate her not only from Great Britain but from every other neighbouring power to which in the hour of calamity she might look for aid. The most groundless suspicions were now to be excited with regard to the intentions of the House of Austria. I had received intimation from Buda which authorised me to state to the Reis Efendi some strong facts on this subject, which I did in a written paper to the following effect: — “That an instruction had been sent to the French Minister at Constantinople to insinuate to the Ottoman Government that Austria had made a peace, which she was under no necessity of making, in order to preserve her forces for an attack on the Ottoman provinces; that to procure credit and countenance to these insinuations, Bonaparte, having forced Austria to cede Croatia as far as the Save, now insisted upon receiving the ceded country *clear of all encumbrances*; in other words, that Austria should drive out by force of arms those very Turkish troops (the Bosniaks) whom he himself had stimulated to invade Croatia, and against whose invasion both the Internuncio and myself had so frequently but so ineffectually remonstrated. Thus, if Austria should use force to get back these provinces, the French at Constantinople would adduce it as a proof of her designs against Turkey, and if she should not use force, Bonaparte would accuse her of treachery, and make it a plea either for breaking the treaty, or for keeping a large army on the Turkish frontiers. That I did not make this communication merely with

a view of putting the Turkish Government upon its guard, but to take the opportunity of assuring it, in the most solemn manner, that the Emperor of Austria had not in the slightest degree altered the system which he had constantly pursued with regard to Turkey; that he detested the system of partition, and had again utterly rejected the proposals made to him to fall in with it."

After assuring the Reis Efendi of the inviolable honour and fidelity of the Emperor of Austria, I concluded by telling him, as the representative of a Power whose interest in the preservation of Turkey could not be suspected, "that to my certain knowledge the attack on Turkey by France was only suspended until the contest should be over in Spain; that all their submission and deference would not retard their fate for a single hour; and that their only hope was in resistance, and in a system of preparation very different from any that had hitherto been adopted."

I can with the utmost safety assure your Lordship that there exists not a man in the Turkish Government with whom either I myself or the Internuncio have ever conversed, or whom Mr. Pisani or the Austrian dragoman has ever seen since the peace with England, who does not declare himself thoroughly and unalterably convinced of the truth of what I have stated above as to the designs of France. The Sultan is convinced of them himself. What, then, can be the reason that nothing is done to show this conviction? Why is France suffered at Constantinople? The answer is in one word — Fear. France is a power that nobody trusts, but before which every body trembles.

be acceded to by the Porte until a general peace, if he should then be in possession of Spain.

But with all my persuasion of the stability of our situation at Constantinople, I have not thought it right to trust either to the good faith and firmness of the Turks, or to the sense of their own interests in keeping well with England, which they are the first always to acknowledge whenever our intercourse is a little quickened on my part by complaints of their partiality towards France. Convinced of the impossibility of acting to any effect upon this temporising spirit, I am obliged to convert it to the same ends to which it is used by the enemy. I have made them sensible, accordingly, that as I could in no instance dispense with the most exact observance of neutrality within the Turkish seas and territories, if the rigorous enforcement of this principle were desisted from on their parts for fear of offending the French, I should be under the necessity of adopting measures, always within the reach of a Power that commands the seas, to redress the just grievances of our merchants. In giving effect to this declaration, I have been favoured by an accident, of which the various benefits that it offered were too tempting to be renounced, although neither my instructions nor the fact will allow me to avail myself of them beyond a certain degree.

The Gleaner, with your Lordship's despatches, sailed from Portsmouth on the 9th of November. Several English newspapers of about that date, repairing, by their lucky ignorance on this occasion, the mischief too frequently produced by their knowledge on others, announced the speedy sailing for the Dardanelles of a British fleet under the command of Sir Samuel Hood. I am unable to describe to your

Lordship the effect which the belief of this article produced on the Turkish Government, and particularly on the French mission. It will be enough to say, the impression was so eminently useful to me, that I most earnestly entreat his Majesty's Government to enable me to sustain a corresponding language by giving it a foundation, and by sending out without delay a considerable reinforcement to Lord Collingwood. The fact being taken for granted as well by the Turks as the French, I was called upon for an explanation. I suffered myself to be repeatedly pressed before I would answer; when, finding the matter to be growing serious, I sent Mr. Pisani to the Porte with the following instruction in writing, which I ordered him to translate to the Reis Efendi:—

“With regard to the question of the Reis Efendi relative to the supposed destination of an English squadron for the Dardanelles, you will observe that in my despatches from H. M.'s Government I have no orders to communicate to the Porte the eventual destination of any part of the naval force which H. M. may think proper to send to the Mediterranean; but you will at the same time tranquillise the Reis Efendi upon the subject of his alarms, by assuring him that no British squadron will come to the Dardanelles *without my directions*, and that I trust that the vigour and resolution of the Sublime Porte in causing its neutrality to be respected will render such directions wholly unnecessary.

“You will, at the same time, tell the Reis Efendi, that after the signature of the Armistice between Austria and France, and with the knowledge I possessed of the motive by which Bonaparte was actuated in demanding the Save for the boundary of his Italian

territory, I had thought it advisable to recommend that *a very considerable augmentation* should be sent out to the fleet under Lord Collingwood."

I am assured from many quarters that this communication has greatly assisted our interests without either offending the Porte by the seeming menace, or awakening its jealousy with regard to other objects. If the declaration had produced no other effect than the negative one of being received without awakening that jealousy, I should not repent having made it; as the time is fast approaching when the attention of his Majesty's Government will inevitably be called to the situation of the Morea, of Candia, and of the islands in the Archipelago. The Turks cannot now pretend to object to any augmentation, or to be surprised at any disposition, which his Majesty may think fit to order of his naval forces in the Mediterranean, whether with a view to the political condition of those parts of the Ottoman Empire, or to counteract that overbearing influence which Bonaparte is preparing to exercise over its capital through his projected kingdom of Illyria.

Your Lordship, after what I have the honour to state, will perceive that fortunately there is but little fear that I shall find it necessary to recur to the instructions contained in the last paragraph of your despatch. So much the reverse, and so confident do I feel of the present strength and solidity of the peace, that it is my intention, if matters continue in the same favourable situation from this period to the end of February next, then to avail myself of his Majesty's gracious permission to return to England signified to me by your Lordship's predecessor in his No. 8., leaving Mr. Stratford Canning, whose ability,



vigilance, and competency to the performance of the duty I have had many opportunities of appreciating, in the character of his Majesty's Minister Plenipotentiary.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. V.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, December 26th, 1809.

MY LORD,

ALTHOUGH there are no present appearances which justify a belief that Russia is ready to make peace with the Turks on reasonable terms, or that she will convey any intimation to me that with a view to oppose the encroachments of France on the Turkish dominions she is ready to make peace with Great Britain, I should deem myself greatly negligent of the public interests if I had omitted any fair occasion of encouraging the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to testify such dispositions.

The discovery of a fact so important as the existence of a letter from Bonaparte to the Shah of Persia containing fresh assurances of assistance against Russia, and an invitation to renew the Treaty of Alliance of 1807, appeared to me to afford a fair opportunity of awakening the little that might remain of sensibility to his own danger in the mind of the Emperor Alexander, or at least of discovering the extent of his unhappy infatuation.

I determined therefore to make his Imperial Majesty acquainted with this fact the moment I could

find a safe and unsuspected channel through which it could be communicated to him.

It happened that soon after I had become acquainted with it myself, I received a letter from Buda informing me that the Comte de St. Julien was about to set out on an embassy to St. Petersburg, the object of which was to induce the Emperor Alexander to desist from that article in the treaty between Austria and France, which assigns him a share of Galicia; and it appearing from the letter of my correspondent that Austria (on what grounds it is difficult to guess) had formed some hope of prevailing on that sovereign not only to desist from his pretensions, but to carry his favourable dispositions even further, it seemed to me that I should render a service to Austria by making her the instrument of discovering to H. I. M. the treacherous contrivances of his pretended friend and confederate.

With this view I stated in writing to the Intercuncio the principal facts connected with the mission of Hussein Han, as detailed to your Lordship in my No. 2, with a request that he would transmit them to his Court. I accompanied my statement with a copy of the treaty of alliance between France and Persia in 1807. These documents were forwarded to the Court of Vienna on the 23d instant.

But as I can by no means be sure that Comte de St. Julien, on his arrival in Russia, will find matters in such a situation as may make it expedient for him to be the channel of communicating any intelligence unfavourable to France, I have adopted another method of conveying the fact, simply as it is, to the Emperor.

Your Lordship is aware of the business on which

Mr. Mair is employed for the Navy Board. It had not been found possible for him hitherto to make his way into Russia; but all difficulties are now removed, and he will proceed to Odessa in the beginning of January. Mr. Mair is well acquainted with the Duc de Richelieu, the Governor of that town. The sentiments of that distinguished French emigrant are known to be those of fidelity to Louis the XVIII. To him, therefore, I have instructed Mr. Mair to deliver a copy of the treaty of 1807, together with a brief statement of the contents of the letter from Bonaparte to the King of Persia, but with a strict injunction not to deliver them unless the Duke can answer for their reaching the hands of the Emperor himself.

The double motive of attachment to the sovereign under whom he was born, and the sovereign whom he serves will, I have no doubt, prevail upon the Duc de Richelieu to undertake the transmission of the above papers.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. VI.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, January 8th, 1810.

MY LORD,

NOTWITHSTANDING the solemn assurances which I have received, and continue to receive, from the Porte that there is no intention whatsoever of acknowledging the title of Joseph Bonaparte, I cannot but believe

that if the French should unhappily obtain possession of Spain, the Turkish Government will recognize without scruple either that usurper, or any form of administration which Bonaparte may establish in that country.

I think it my duty therefore to request that your Lordship would signify to me his Majesty's pleasure as to the conduct I ought to adopt towards the Turkish Government, if it should render itself guilty of so flagrant a breach of neutrality.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. VII.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, January 10th, 1810.

MY LORD,

By a delay in the sailing of the *Entreprenante* I am enabled to forward to your Lordship, which I do with infinite satisfaction, fresh advices from Sir Harford Jones, from the 10th to the 14th of December, received this day, by which it appears that he has again defeated the attempts of the French to re-establish themselves at Tehran.

The value of this service, in the present posture of our affairs, cannot, in my opinion, be estimated too highly. To your Lordship it will appear still more important than it can even to me, from your opportunities of knowing, in all its detail, the degree to which a close alliance between Persia and France would affect the immediate security of our Indian frontier.

This consideration alone would, I should think,

induce your Lordship to be of opinion that the money advanced by Sir Harford Jones is well spent in preventing a measure so dangerous to our power in Asia. And when I add to this consideration the advantage which the second expulsion of the French mission has given me in removing the obstacles on the side of Turkey to an understanding with Persia, in facilitating the adoption of the principle of joint war, or joint peace, by those powers, and in thus strengthening ourselves against France at the Porte through the ties of her Asiatic and of her religious interests, I feel persuaded that your Lordship will think that even the chance afforded to us of accomplishing objects so desirable, is of itself a service, which not only ought to relieve the able and meritorious officer, by whom it has been executed from all anxiety, in regard to the responsibility in which he has involved himself, but which entitles him also to the public thanks for having incurred it.

I have been enabled, by the assistance of the Reis Efendi (who in the affairs of Persia has acted hitherto with sincerity) to retard, under one pretence or another, the journey of Hussein Han. I am in hopes within a fortnight from hence to obtain an answer to my letter to Sir Harford Jones, of the 4th of December. The conduct of the Court of Persia, on the complaint exhibited by me against Hussein Han, will be the touchstone of its sincerity; for great as is the advantage afforded us by this second expulsion of the Sieur Joannin, I cannot persuade myself, after the circumstances which have come to my knowledge respecting Hussein Han's instructions, to receive it for more than its value, which is simply the price at which it was purchased.

I have the honour to be, /

No. VIII.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, January 13th, 1810.

MY LORD,

THE presents which the Sultan has been so long preparing for his Majesty, in return for those which I delivered to his Highness, and to the different officers of his Court, in his Majesty's name, were at length put on board the *Entreprenante* cutter this day. They are directed to the Ottoman Chargé d'Affaires, Sidki Efendi, and are accompanied by a dispatch to him, containing, as I am informed, the usual letter from the Grand Vizir to his Majesty, of which I am promised a translation.

No list of these presents has yet been furnished to me. One has been promised, indeed, but I do not think it expedient to detain the cutter for it.

The Porte having on this occasion thought proper to depart from the course it followed on the exchange of the treaty of alliance, although his Majesty was graciously pleased to adopt that precedent for the measure of his bounty towards the Ottoman Ministers, and having in a manner very little becoming its dignity declined to send any present to his Majesty's under Secretaries of State, and the Clerks in the Foreign Office, I have declined accepting the present destined for myself.

The packages having been put on board the cutter, without passing through my hands, I have desired Lieutenant Williams, of the *Entreprenante*, to accompany the messenger Ruffe with them to your Lordship's office; and if it should not be passing

beyond the line of my duty, I should beg leave to recommend this officer to your Lordship's protection. During the time that I have been obliged, unavoidably, to detain him, he very readily undertook, at my request, a voyage to the Island of Scio, to watch the motions of an enemy's privateer, who has been greatly distressing our trade to Smyrna and this port.

I have the honour to be, &c.

P. S. — It has since been intimated to me, that the determination of the Porte, respecting the presents to the gentlemen of the Foreign Office, is not finally taken.

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No IX. Two Inclosures. By the Messenger Robinson.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, February 10th, 1810.

MY LORD,

I HAVE great satisfaction in being able to confirm by a fresh proof the statement I had the honour of making to your Lordship in my No. 4., of the firm determination of this Government to maintain its engagements with Great Britain.

The neutrality of the Porte having of late in many instances been violated, I felt myself under the necessity, notwithstanding the apparently critical situation of our affairs, to remonstrate with some warmth against the indifference with which those acts were tolerated by the Government. Two instances more flagrant than the rest compelled me to demand

faction. The one was a case of capture within a mile of the harbour of Scio, by a French privateer called the Aigle. This prize was carried into Scio, and the goods put up publicly to sale. The other was an attack made in the very port of Scyra by the same privateer on an English bombard at anchor. It is needless to trouble your Lordship with the details concerning the first of these cases, which is still in a train of discussion; and with regard to the latter, the question has been settled by Captain Ferguson of his Majesty's sloop Pylades, who, upon a fresh and still more outrageous provocation from the same privateer, has taken possession of him, and brought him into Smyrna. In the two enclosed notes (A, B) presented by me to the Porte, enough of these transactions will appear for the purpose for which I now lay them before your Lordship.

It happened during the course of my representations on these two subjects, that a large American trader, painted exactly like a frigate of twenty guns, passed the Dardanelles under his own colours, and came up to Constantinople. I cannot describe to your Lordship the degree of offence which this proceeding has given to the Turkish Government. America, having no treaty with the Porte, has no right to frequent even the Straits under her own flag. But to pass the Dardanelles with a pennant flying at the main, and with all the parade of a ship of war, (as the Turkish report complains) was taken as an affront which deserved to be punished by the instant confiscation of ship and cargo. I succeeded, although not easily, in preventing this act of violence; but I could not prevent, in the first moment of anger, the issuing an order to the pacha of the Dardanelles to stop all



vessels of what description soever carrying arms, and to compel them to anchor at Tenedos until firmans should be sent them to pass on.

This order, which from the inconvenience of the anchorage at Tenedos, its exposure to privateers, and the delays attendant upon a compliance with it, amounted almost to a prohibition to trade to Constantinople, was fruitlessly resisted by me in the first instance; but an event soon happened which compelled me to add it to the other grievances of which I had to complain. An English schooner, armed with only four guns for her protection against pirates, was stopped by signal when she came abreast of the castles, and after she had obeyed it was saluted with a shot.

This obliged me to bring on an explanation respecting the order in question, and to demand a conference, without which nothing effectual could be done towards its revocation.

I will not trouble Y. L. with all that passed at this conference. It will be sufficient to state, that I obtained what I asked, namely, a repeal of the order; an agreement to restore the ancient regulations concerning the passage through the Straits, and a written disavowal of the offence in firing the shot at the schooner.

I am thus particular in my narrative in order to give Y. L. a tolerably just notion of the footing on which our affairs stood at this period. Our cause had been bettered, it is true, by the speech pronounced by Bonaparte to the French legislative body, but it was not strengthened by what I have now to add.

An unfortunate affair, attended, it is to be feared with the loss to the service of a very gallant

man and approved officer, Lieut. Branch, of the *Pylades*, had happened but a few days before in the Archipelago. It appears that a large Greek polacre, mounting several guns and full of men, was met by the *Gleaner* armed ship, then under the command of Lieut. Branch, and that on an attempt to search her, resistance was made, an action commenced, in which Lieut. Branch and a seaman were severely wounded, and the polacre was captured. She was found to be laden with corn for Smyrna, where a great and alarming scarcity prevails as well as at Constantinople, and unfortunately was navigated under an express firman; — circumstances which, although in no respect altering the nature of the case, enabled the French agents at Smyrna to inflame the public mind to a very high pitch against the proceedings of his Majesty's navy.

The French Minister now demanded a conference in his turn. He had received dispatches through Corfu, which appear to have induced him again to try at the Porte the question of a rupture with England. He began this enterprise by exhibiting, in very high phrases, his complaint for the capture at Scyra. This grievance he endeavoured to connect with the affair of the *Gleaner*, which he brought forward with all the aggravations of which it was susceptible, representing his own cause as the cause of the Porte itself. Yet, notwithstanding all his advantages, assisted by the real anger which I lament to say the affair has excited at the Porte, he has found it impossible to make the slightest impression, or to obtain a favourable, or even a dubious answer to any one of his demands. On the contrary, I am credibly informed that very angry as well as very resolute lan-

guage was used towards himself by the Turkish Ministers ; and particularly that he was himself asked for an explanation on two points which have given high and general disgust to the Government.

The first of these points, as your Lordship will naturally conclude, was the speech of Bonaparte to the French legislative body. The second was the reported assemblage and incursions into the Turkish territory of various bodies of men on the side of the newly ceded Austrian provinces.

Much angry discussion took place on these topics. The speech of Bonaparte, in which, besides his good wishes towards the enemy of the Porte, he talks of protecting and punishing her, was reprobated in the most spirited terms by the Ottoman Ministers. On his part the French Chargé d'Affaires was equally firm. He would give no explanation of the alleged incursions into the Ottoman territory. The fact was neither admitted nor denied. It was merely said that the offenders, if there were any such, could only be rebels. This expression has not been lost. The Porte has been made to remember, that the expedition to Egypt was disavowed by the French Directory, and that the blame of it was cast on the "rebel" Bonaparte.

But the great subject of contention was the renewed demand that the Porte should declare against Great Britain. On this point the Ministers were again distinctly informed, that although the reported speech of Bonaparte were a misrepresentation, the substance of it was correct, namely, that the Porte must break absolutely with England to avert the ruin impending over its head.

The supposed speedy arrival of a British squadron

to act against Russia in the Black Sea was next brought forward. This was a measure which the French Minister declared his master would construe into a direct declaration of war, as he never would suffer his ally the Emperor of Russia to be molested by England on that side.

There can be little doubt that on this head the French Minister has received specific instructions. Your Lordship will recollect that the general public belief in England at the beginning of November was, that a squadron was coming out to the Black Sea under the command of Sir S. Hood. From the communications in my accompanying despatch marked Secret, you will see how confidently the same fact was credited at St. Petersburg on the 21st of the same month, and how greatly, too, it was feared. It may well, therefore, be believed that Bonaparte has been urged to interpose with his authority at Constantinople to save Russia from the danger to which her establishments in the Black Sea, and to which the Crimea itself, would be exposed by a judiciously concerted expedition for the destruction of the one and the recovery of the other: — a danger which receives an additional feature of seriousness from our growing relations with Persia, and from the means afforded through them of uniting that Power with Turkey in a system for the common defence. Comparing these circumstances with their dates; comparing them also with those passages in the speech to the legislative body which relate to Turkey, it will appear more than probable that the French Minister, who for some weeks had been absolutely silent, had received orders to remonstrate against the entrance of an English maritime force into the Black Sea.

Be this as it may, his menaces were disregarded. The required breach with Great Britain was rejected with indignation. The Ministers of the conference again peremptorily declared that the Porte had taken its line, and was resolved to stand or fall by its existing engagements.

They were no less steady in refusing to bind themselves not to accept naval succours from Great Britain to attack Russia in the Black Sea. Here, however, I have some reason to think, that although the Porte refused to give the French Minister any satisfaction, his threat of hostility has not been ineffectual. On my pressing to know what answer had been returned to this threat, it was told me that the French Minister had been informed that no British squadron was *then* coming up, but that an impression had been left on his mind that one was expected in the spring. It was at the same time intimated to me, however, as if in anticipation of an expected offer on my part, that no naval aid from Great Britain was wished for.

The issue of the above conference will add another to the various tokens by which his Majesty's Government may judge of the relative extent of the English and the French power at the Porte. That of France, as I had the honour of observing to your Lordship in my No. 4., is grounded solely on terror. To terror I might add corruption; but this instrument, all-powerful as it may be to carry a present point, is useless for remoter purposes over minds which are never determined by gratitude, nor influenced by expectation. Yet the sentiment of terror never reached the point at which it could affect the stability of the peace with England. The conference of which I have now given an account has had the happy effect of coun-

teracting in a great degree even this feeling, by throwing those of awakened anger and offended pride into the opposite scale. I trust, therefore, that the means of France to injure us have been diminished in a similar proportion, and that as she was not strong enough before to force the Porte into a renewal of hostilities, she will not hereafter be able to obtain an ascendancy over its councils injurious either to the interests, or to the dignity of the British embassy.

It is now given out with affectation by the French and their partizans that a speedy rupture with France is inevitable. I am by no means of this opinion. Until the affair of Spain shall have ceased to give him anxiety, Bonaparte will scarcely hazard a declaration which in the first instance would lose him the port of Constantinople, the centre of his Asiatic intrigues, would expose his forces in Dalmatia to considerable hazard, and would hasten the fall of Corfu, if Corfu be seriously and steadily attacked.

But to whatever period the rupture with France may be deferred, much is gained to Great Britain by the knowledge that, with her, none is to be apprehended. Precisely how long this may be averted no human foresight can pronounce ; yet it may not be hazarding too much to affirm that whenever the Turks shall be driven to a choice between Great Britain and France, they will be more influenced by the power we may possess to succour and support the empire, than by our power to distress and dismember it. In the mean time, notwithstanding the crisis to which its affairs are apparently tending, it is not yet too late for his Majesty's Ministers to determine how far they will assist it in its approaching, perhaps its expiring struggle. After the decisive manner in which it has

been declared to me that it is not the intention to venture a squadron in the Black Sea, I cannot again return to that subject. The question for his Majesty's Ministers now to decide is, whether they will afford pecuniary aid to Turkey in the war against Russia as well as in a war against France. This topic, I am desired by the Ministers of the Porte, with increased earnestness to press upon your Lordship's attention, and to recommend by every means in my power a compliance with their solicitations. The distress is undoubtedly great. Our interest may suffer much by a refusal; but how far these motives may not be counterbalanced by the public difficulties at home, is a consideration that must make me slow in recommending a measure on the expediency of which, in other circumstances, there could not be the smallest doubt.

I have the honour to be, &c.

Inclosure A in No. IX.

*Mr. A. to the Reis Efendi.*

THE undersigned, his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Sublime Porte, has the honour of transmitting to his Excellency the Reis Efendi the inclosed copy of a letter which he has just received from the British Consul at Smyrna, announcing the audacious behaviour of two French cruisers in the harbour of Syra.

These cruisers are under the direction of one Giustiniani, the same person who fitted out the privateer lying at Scio, and against whose conduct the undersigned has repeatedly but ineffectually complained to the Sublime Porte.

The constant and almost daily complaints which are transmitted to the undersigned from the Archipelago, respecting the conduct of the French in those seas, where every facility is afforded them in fitting out, manning, and arming their vessels, and afterwards in disposing of their captures, compel the undersigned to state plainly to the Ottoman Government, that, if the Sublime Porte be determined to abide fairly by the neutral system which she asserts herself to have adopted, it is her duty, without any further hesitation, to employ the ample means that are in her power to cause the laws of that neutrality to be maintained within her territories.

It is with regret that the undersigned has to observe to the Ottoman Government, that the excesses committed by the French, and the constant impunity that attends them, is the natural consequence of the connivance of the Porte itself in the criminal neglect of her commanders and servants in the Archipelago.

The affair of Scio furnishes so manifest a proof of the audacious demeanour of the French, and of the intolerable partiality and corruption of the Turkish governor of that island, and the dilatoriness with which the just complaints of the undersigned on that subject have been treated by the Porte are so opposite to what he had every right to expect, that he feels it his absolute duty now to declare, that, unless the Sublime Porte shall issue an order for that governor to be forthwith displaced and banished from Scio, for his venality, and disobedience to the Imperial firman sent on the first notification of the illegal capture of the ship *Madonna Calligata*, and unless she shall cause the commission of the French privateer, her captor, to be revoked and taken from the captain, and



thus give an example of due severity as well as a proof of her authority, and of her resolution to maintain the neutrality of her coasts and harbours, the undersigned will not be answerable for the conduct of the commanders of his Majesty's ships in the Archipelago, nor will he discourage those commanders from redressing the injuries sustained by British commerce, and the insults offered to the British flag, in such a manner as the maritime power of Great Britain has placed within her reach.

The outrageous proceeding of the French in the island of Scyra, as above stated, affords the undersigned an opportunity of giving this fair warning to the Porte; after which he will leave it to the calm and deliberate judgment of her enlightened ministers to determine whether the chief object of the French in this, and in numberless other acts of the same nature of which he has had to complain, be not to embroil the Porte with Great Britain by involving the two countries in angry discussions, and whether it would not become the dignity as well as the wisdom of the Sublime Porte to prevent that object, by a prompt and rigorous enforcement of the laws of neutrality throughout her dominions.

The undersigned requests his Excellency the Reis Efendi to accept the assurance of his distinguished consideration.

Pera, 16th January, 1810.

Inclosure B in No. IX.

*Mr. A. to the Reis Efendi.*

THE undersigned, &c. has the honour of laying before the Ottoman Government a statement which he

has just received from the commander of his Majesty's sloop *Pylades*, together with the depositions of the boat's crew of the said English sloop, and that of an impartial witness and spectator, relative to one of the most flagrant and impudent infractions of neutrality, by the crew of a French privateer, that ever was heard of among nations who live under the government of laws.

The above sloop, the *Pylades*, was sent to protect the trade of his Majesty's subjects, and of the subjects of the Sublime Porte itself, against the swarms of privateers and pirates which infest the Archipelago. It is known that one of these pirates, called the *Aigle*, had the audacity, not many days ago, to attack, and endeavour to make prize of, an English vessel then lying at anchor in the port of Scyra. The said vessel, to escape capture, was compelled to land her cargo, and to remain blocked up in the harbour, to the great loss and detriment of her owners. The captain of the *Pylades*, in execution of his duty, proceeded therefore to Scyra, to liberate such vessels as might be detained there, among others the vessel so attacked by the *Aigle*, and to convoy them to Smyrna.

Immediately on the appearance of the *Pylades* the privateer landed his guns, took forcible possession of the island, in open contempt of the sovereignty of the Sublime Porte, erected batteries, and pointed his cannon towards the beach.

At this time he had received no provocation from the captain of the *Pylades*, who, not intending to come to an anchor, remained at the distance of a mile from the shore.

Nevertheless, the crew of the said privateer, on perceiving the boat of the *Pylades*, which had been sent

to the English vessel, with an order to the captain to put to sea, and for no other purpose, instantly, and without further notice, fired into the said boat with loaded muskets.

The captain of his Majesty's sloop having been thus wantonly insulted and attacked, did what it was his duty to do under such circumstances. He drove the pirates from the battery they had erected on the shore, and took possession of the privateer.

The undersigned cannot doubt that the Sublime Porte will, after this last outrage committed by the French, feel the absolute necessity of rousing itself from that indifference with which it has hitherto viewed their proceedings in the Archipelago.

In the present instance these eternal enemies of all peaceful states have proceeded a step beyond their former outrages, and to a piratical violation of the neutrality of the Sublime Porte have added a daring usurpation of its sovereignty.

The offender, it is true, has been punished, but the example will be of no effect unless the Sublime Porte resolve to assert her dignity, and to maintain her neutrality, seriously and with vigour. The undersigned asks but for neutrality. He asks, but for a state of things which would be advantageous to France herself, as she is the weaker power by sea, if deeper and more dangerous designs than the capture of a few merchant ships did not direct her conduct? The truth is now glaring as the day. Bonaparte wishes to embroil the Porte with Great Britain, and thus to leave her without a friend in the world, preparatory to his invading her territories in concert with Russia. He has at length thrown off the mask. Openly, and before the assembled people of France, he has proclaimed

his joy that the Emperor of Russia, his friend and ally, has added Walachia and Moldavia to the Russian empire. These are his own words, in his speech to the Legislative Assembly at Paris, on the 3d of December, 1809 :—

“ Mon ami et allié l'Empereur de Russie a réuni à son vaste empire la Finlande, la *Moldavie*, et la *Valachie*, et un district de Galicie. Je ne suis jaloux de rien de ce qui peut arriver de bien à cet empire. *Mes sentimens pour son illustre souverain sont d'accord avec ma politique.*”

Such are the sentiments, and such the manifest views, of the French ruler. The undersigned calls on the Ottoman Government, in the name of all it holds valuable and venerable, to co-operate with him in disappointing these insidious designs; to adhere resolutely and fairly to its neutral system; and to show, as he is ready to show on his part, to all the nations of the universe, whether enemies or allies, whether inhabitants of Europe or of Asia, that the friendship between the Sublime Porte and Great Britain is indissoluble.

The undersigned requests his Excellency, &c.

Pera, 26th January, 1810.

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No. X. Four Inclosures.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, February 10th, 1810.

MY LORD,

THE papers (A, B) which I have here the honour of enclosing to your Lordship relate to matters of such

high importance, and touch so many points of our national policy with regard to both Russia and Turkey, that, although some of the opinions expressed in them vary from the system apparently adopted by his Majesty's Government towards the first of these powers, especially with regard to the employment of a British squadron in the Black Sea, I feel it my duty to lay their contents before his Majesty's Ministers, with every sentiment of deference to their more accurate information and to their more discriminating judgment.

For the motives which originated this correspondence, I must beg leave to refer Y. L. to the negotiation at the Dardanelles. One great benefit of restoring peace between Great Britain and the Porte was the chance which it afforded of profiting by events that might arise to detach Russia from France. At a very early period, therefore, I endeavoured to lay a foundation for carrying this object into execution. Your Lordship may remark, in my correspondence of that period\*, that, at my first meeting with the Ottoman plenipotentiary, I intimated a readiness to become the mediator of a peace between the Porte and Russia, if properly invited. To this suggestion I frequently returned at our other conferences; and soon after my arrival at Constantinople I began to take measures for giving it effect, by addressing the letter to Prince Prosorowsky, commander of the Russian forces on the Danube, of which a copy is enclosed in my No. XII.

Prince Prosorowsky had just been nominated plenipotentiary to a congress appointed to assemble at Jassy, to treat of peace: the letter above alluded to

\* Of the year 1809.

was put into the hands of Galib Efendi, the Turkish plenipotentiary appointed to meet him; and another copy was sent to Count Stadion, to be made use of at St. Petersburg as occasion might serve.

But in order to have nothing untried which might afford a chance of effecting the good I had in view, I addressed about the same time the enclosed letter (C) to Count Ludolf, his Sicilian Majesty's envoy at this court, with a request that it might be communicated to his colleague the Duc de Sierra Capriola, at St. Petersburg.

In opening a communication with the Duc de Sierra Capriola, I had the further view, if my overture should fail of reaching the Emperor Alexander either through Prince Proserowsky, or through the Court of Vienna, that it might by the Duke's means be made known to that great and powerful party at St. Petersburg, who are understood to remain attached to the principles by which Great Britain and Russia had so long and so happily been united.

Owing to the interruption of all correspondence by safe channels between St. Petersburg and Constantinople, I have remained ignorant until now of the effect of these communications. A courier despatched by the Duc de Sierra Capriola to Palermo through Vienna, has at length brought the two letters to Count Ludolf, of which the material parts are now submitted to your Lordship in the enclosures referred to in my first paragraph.

Whether the opinions expressed in them, and stated to be the opinions of our friends in Russia with regard to the conduct of the war, be or be not correct; whether the Emperor Alexander would make peace upon the conditions presumed; whether such a peace would

really detach him from France; whether it would produce the next best effect, namely, to make him content with what he has got, and ready to become guarantee for the remainder of the Turkish dominions; and whether it would be advisable for me to recommend such a peace simply, and without a reference to the war with Persia, are considerations immediately to the purpose. The first, and most material point to be ascertained on the receipt of these letters, was, whether Turkey could be brought to listen to the proposal contained in them, and, above all, whether it could even be made without creating some degree of mistrust towards the proposer.

It was by no means an easy matter to discover the dispositions of the Porte on this subject. A determination to reject with disdain all overtures towards negotiation on the basis of ceding the provinces had, it is true, been frequently and resolutely announced to me; but it was to be considered that this had been declared when the Porte was aware that I had an object in preventing a peace with Russia. There was a possibility that, in addressing myself to the ministers under a different form, they might be induced to develop their real sentiments, and thus leave me a way open to advance in this business (should there be no objection to it on other grounds), without exposing either my views to doubt or my conduct to misrepresentation.

The necessity of guarding all my steps with a more than ordinary caution will fully appear to your Lordship, when I inform you that the Turks, who never can be made to comprehend that governments must act on a balance of advantage and inconvenience, have been constantly impressed with the belief that Great

Britain was not in earnest in the war with Russia, and that she had some latent motive of partiality, and even of agreement, for not putting forth her force against that power.

In transmitting, therefore, to the Reis Efendi what was proper to be communicated to him of the above papers, I thought it necessary to accompany my statement with the enclosed declaration (D), which I left to be translated by the dragoman of the Porte.

I charged my own dragoman at the same time distinctly to inform the Reis Efendi, that the interests of Turkey being my first and only object in this transaction, if the Porte should wish, through me, to enter into any discussions with the parties in correspondence with me, I would pledge my honour to send no answer to their letters other than the answer which the Turkish Government might dictate. I begged to be considered as their mere instrument and channel of communication (if they thought fit to keep one open) until such time as they themselves should require my advice with regard to the policy of negotiating on the basis proposed.

The fairness of this offer, and the evident intention with which it was made, have obviated all mistrust with regard to my motives. My whole proceeding, indeed, has been taken as it was meant—as an attempt to reconcile two powers who were mutually consuming their strength in a destructive contest, by which the common enemy of all independent states would be sure to profit in the end. This acknowledgment, which I am happy to say has been conveyed to me in such a manner as to denote an increase of confidence in the good dispositions of Great Britain, has been accompanied, however, with the renewal of all their former



declarations against negotiating on the terms proposed. This time the Reis Efendi entered more into the reason of the case with me than he had ever done before; nor is it possible to combat the objections to the cession of these provinces by any other arguments than such as are grounded on the want of means to recover them. To all such arguments, however, an enumeration of the inexhaustible resources of the Ottoman Empire is the only, but the constant answer—an answer delivered in the very same breath in which I am implored to throw myself at his Majesty's feet in the name of that empire for pecuniary succour !

The resolution against surrendering the provinces, however, had been so often declared to me during the course of the late war between Austria and France, that I could not help remarking on the present occasion some variation of phrase in the repetition of it. After detailing the immense preparations which were making for the ensuing campaign, the Reis Efendi concluded by this remarkable expression : — *That the effect of the present exertions must be tried before the ministers could dare to propose the cession to the Sultan, or the Sultan could dare to propose it to the people.*

From these declarations, repeated in all ways and at all times, and not to myself only but to the Internuncio, who by order from his court is unremittingly employing himself to discover the truth, it would appear, — first, that notwithstanding the inference which might reasonably be drawn from the refusal of British naval succours, mentioned in my No. IV., no secret negotiations are actually on foot between Turkey and Russia through France.

It would appear, secondly, that after another campaign, which we may be sure will be unsuccessful, the

Turks will be ready to listen to peace on the terms proposed. The part to be taken by France in the mean time scarcely seems to enter into their view. As an influencing motive, it is totally rejected from the present question.

It is also worthy of remark, that I have been solicited by all means to keep open the correspondence from which the overture now rejected has originated. I have agreed very readily to this request. Nothing is lost by such an intercourse, and great good may result from it on the first sign of returning reason which may be exhibited in the Russian councils. Here it will strengthen our peace by another tie. The turn which these communications will naturally take, besides rendering it extremely difficult to the Porte to carry on any negotiations with Russia without the participation, or at least the knowledge, of His Majesty's ambassador, must lead to an habitual recurrence to his assistance and advice, than which nothing can more strengthen his hold on the Turkish government. Amidst all their oscillations, all the inconsistencies, perverseness, and double dealing of their ministers, which it would be difficult indeed to exaggerate, in whatever relates to Russia, their principle of action is uniform; and whoever can make himself master of the line of their negotiations with that power will assuredly guide to a great degree, if not govern, the councils of the Turkish Empire.

I have the honour to be, &c.

## Inclosure A. No. X.

“ LES mêmes personnes qui se sont donné la peine avec zèle et empressement de faire valoir la lettre de Monsieur Adair\*, parcequ'ils sentent l'avantage infini qui résulteroit d'une paix avec la Turquie pour l'empire Russe, croient, que la Porte doit d'elle-même ouvrir une négociation directe entre les deux armées, et sans que les Français le sachent, et proposer un armistice *pour traiter la paix*; ces mêmes personnes disent que *pour base de la négociation il faut établir la cession de la Moldavie et la Valachie avec les forteresses de la rive gauche du Danube*. Ils sont d'opinion que cette proposition pourra amener la paix entre les deux empires, parcequ' *hors cette conquête* (disent-ils) l'empereur n'en veut pas d'autre, et que tel est son désir de faire la paix avec les Turcs qu'il s'y prêteroit à cette condition.

“ Il est sûr que ce désir s'est manifesté au point *qu'on a remis les fêtes de la paix Suédoise à l'époque de celle qui seroit conclue avec la Turquie*, et qu'on espéroit d'autant plus prochaine que le nouveau général des armées Russes, Prince Bagrathion, a mandé que bientôt toutes les forteresses se seroient rendues et qu'il auroit battu le Vizir; ce qui est si loin de se vérifier qu'on a appris par les derniers rapports que l'armée Russe a retrogradé, et que le plan du général étoit de repasser le Danube, craignant une diversion de la part des Turcs par Vidin en Valachie; ce qui l'obligeroit à recourir à la defense de cette province. *Ces nouvelles ont fait la plus grande peine*, et on a expédié des ordres au Général Bagrathion de ne pas repasser

\* To Prince Prosorowsky.

le Danube, mais de continuer la campagne d'hiver, et qu'on alloit renforcer son armée d'un corps de trente mille hommes de l'armée Russe qui est en Pologne : mais on croit que toutes ces dispositions arriveront trop tard, et que la retraite se sera effectuée pour prendre des quartiers d'hiver, d'autant que les armées Russes sont très affoiblies par les maladies.

A ces craintes se joignent celles que reveille la nouvelle arrivée hier\* que le *Traité d'Alliance entre l'Angleterre et la Porte* avait été enfin signé, et que les vaisseaux destinés à l'expédition de la Mer Noire étoient nommés. Tout cela fait une grande impression, et elle est produite par la différente manière de penser des uns et des autres : parceque les uns craignent les démarches de Bonaparte qui pourroit conseiller la continuation de la guerre contre la Turquie pour obtenir deux objets, celui d'affoiblir de plus en plus la Russie, et celui d'avoir pour lui le champ plus libre de mettre en exécution ses plans sur la Grèce, l'Albanie, et la Morée ; — les autres craignent que si les Turcs peuvent une fois battre les Russes, alors les malheurs de l'empire de Russie augmenteront au delà de ceux qui ne l'affligent déjà que trop, pour être trop docile à la volonté de Bonaparte. Toutes ces justes considérations se font par toutes les personnes éclairées en Russie excepté le petit nombre de ceux qui se conduisent aveuglément par le système Français.

“ Ce principe posé, c'est à vous à faire les réflexions qu'un objet aussi important vous offre, et à les combiner avec celles de M. Adair, pour décider *s'il convient à la saine politique de l'Angleterre de conseiller à la Porte de suivre les idées que je vous ai exposé ci-des-*

\* 20th November, 1809.

*sus, et pour l'engager à entamer une négociation directe entre les deux armées basée sur les susdites conditions, selon l'avis des personnes distinguées et bien pensantes; en y ajoutant l'autre condition bien importante que par cette paix entre la Russie et la Porte les deux Puissances se garantiront mutuellement leurs états.*

“ Si la Porte offre le sacrifice des deux principautés, elle ne perd rien du territoire Turc, et elle conserve ses forces militaires, qui lui sont si nécessaires pour s'opposer aux projets de Bonaparte; car il n'y a aucun doute que ses vues ne soient de s'emparer de l'Epire, de la Morée, et de la Grèce pour chasser les Turcs de l'Europe: aujourd'hui que Bonaparte s'est fait céder par la Cour de Vienne les provinces de la Croatie, cela prouve jusqu'à l'évidence l'étendue de ses projets ambitieux. Au lieu qu'en entamant une semblable négociation avec la Russie on s'appercvra tout de suite des dispositions de cette Cour; et si en concluant une prompte paix sur la base énoncée on verra clairement que la Russie ne veut pas se prêter aux projets de Bonaparte contre l'Empire Ottoman, alors la Porte pourra défendre les provinces menacées par Bonaparte, et elle y trouvera d'autant plus de facilité si l'Angleterre, comme je n'en doute pas, a déjà dans ces provinces de bons moyens pour consolider un plan de défense et de résistance. Si par contre la Russie ne se montrait pas disposée à accepter la proposition du Vizir pour une négociation directe, dans ce cas la Porte pourroit encore mieux s'entendre avec l'Angleterre pour les opérations de défense.

“ Tous ces objets doivent être entamés par M. Adair sans perte de tems; parceque tout le monde croit que la Cour de Vienne s'est laissé flatter de l'espoir d'avoir

part aux dépouilles de la Turquie, quand Bonaparte chassera les Ottomans de l'Europe : comme il importe cependant à l'Angleterre que la puissance Ottomane existe, il lui sera plus facile de la soutenir si la Porte parvient à faire sa paix avec la Russie, au moyen du sacrifice des deux provinces, qui ne lui ont donné que des embarras et ont été une pomme de discord continue depuis que la Russie a étendu ses conquêtes sur la Mer Noire. Une telle paix sera d'autant plus solide quand l'Angleterre pourra faire passer dans cette mer des forces maritimes qui tiendront en respect celle de la Russie, et la menaceront si elle ne fait pas elle-même la paix avec cette Puissance.

“ Il est inutile que j'étende plus loin ces réflexions ; vous devez sentir combien tout ce que je viens d'exposer est utile pour notre Cour et la bonne cause ; et elles ne peuvent échapper aux lumières de M. Adair qui doit les employer, et profiter de son influence auprès du Divan pour lui faire adopter la conduite la plus utile, soit pour la conservation de la Turquie, que pour le système que l'Angleterre doit adopter actuellement, qui est de soutenir la Turquie, l'Espagne, et la Sicile ; ces trois points sont à sa portée dans la Méditerranée, et peuvent faire espérer la meilleure réussite pour soutenir une guerre utile contre Bonaparte.

“ Les momens sont précieux, et les opérations politiques et militaires doivent se faire sans perte de tems. *Il faut éveiller la crainte pour faire valoir les négociations.* Il faut aussi que les peuples de la Grèce soient persuadé qu'ils seront plus heureux sous le gouvernement actuel, et en se battant pour l'Angleterre, qu'en se soumettant à la France. Aux grands maux il faut de grands remèdes ; sans cela tout est

perdu. Je prévois que vous me répondriez que cela est déjà arrivée. Je vous répond que si vous pensez ainsi vous vous trompez, parceque cette manière de voir les choses a rendu jusqu'à présent Bonaparte tout puissant; qu'en lui résistant avec des peuples doués d'un caractère Espagnol, Turc, Italien et Grec, Bonaparte ne soumettra pas aussi facilement les pays qui appartiennent à ces nations, et qu'en les soutenant et en s'opposant à ses vues, on parviendra à le battre et à consolider son indépendance.

"Je vous prie de faire agréer à M. Adair mes compliments; j'espère tout de lui pour la réussite des plans qui lui sont confiés, et qui feront le bonheur de sa patrie et des vrais et bons alliés." &c.

Inclosure B in No. X.

"L' INFLUENZA Francese, e le maniganze di Caulincourt sono talmente radicate nel Gabinetto Russo, che non v' è speranza di ravvedimento senza forzare quella Potenza con delle operazioni bene intese a riflettere ai casi suoi, ed accrescere con ciò il malcontento della nazione Russa ch' è ben pensante, e tutta contraria al sistema del suo Sovrano, e di quei pochi che influiscono il Gabinetto di Russia. Le vittorie ottenute dalle armi Ottomane, devono aver' certamente prodotto qualch' effetto; non bisogna rallentare le operazioni tanto per terra che per mare, d'unità alle forze navali Brittanniche, *poiche la suol' nuova pervenuta a Pietroburgo della prossima entrata nel Mare Nero d'una squadra Inglese, ha fatto gran sensazione, e la nazione spera sentire incominciate le operazioni contro quei stabilimenti, per così forzare la Corte alla pace, ed indurla a rivolgere quelli armi contro il vero*

*nemico del nome Russo.* Certamente è ben crudele, che dei buoni e degni cittadini debbino consigliare di far del male contro il proprio paese, per far ravvedere il Gabinetto, e toglierlo da sotto la sforza di Buona- parte; ma è altresì ben vero, che senza questi mali non si può rimediare al maggiore, qual sarebbe l'antica sommissione dell' Europa, se la Russia non si scuote dall' empia catena che cinge, e non si sveglia da questa sua fatale letargia. Posso assicurare V. E. che tutti li Russi sono sì persuasi, che da queste operazioni contro il proprio paese ne deve derivare un bene, per l'istessa Russia, et per la buona causa, *che sono furiosi contro il ministero Inglesi, che mai abbia voluto far nel Baltico delli operazioni salutari, ch' avrebbero certamente prodotto, e che produrranno un cambiamento di sistema.* Cio è stato scritto e riscritto da diverse parti e da persone interessate alla riuscita dei piani contro l' usurpatore generale.

“ Nel tempo stesso che la Porta con il suo alleato faranno tutti li sforzi per mare e per terra, per rendere trattabile la Russia, l'istesse persone ben pensanti desiderano per il ben commune, ch' Ella di continuo proponga la paco, ma con la cessione delle due provincie, perche senza di questa sarà difficile, anzi impossibile d'indurre il Gabinetto Russo ad accettarla; il quale farà nuovi sforzi, che non serviranno, che ad indebolire le due Potenze, unico e sicuro scopo della Francia, per esser poi più esposte ai colpi che le prepara Buonaparte. Ciocchè ho l'honore di dirle, è la pura verità, ed è interessante per l' Inghilterra di conservare le forze dei due Imperi, per poterle poi riunire contro il nemico commune, ciocchè ridonderà in beneficio dei reali interessi, e della buona causa.

“ Se la Porta non eseguisce tutto cio, e che le due



Potenze facciano dei nuovi sforzi l' una contro l' altra, ogni successo che ne risulti, sià a favore della Russia, o dell' istessa Porta, ed ogni azione che succederà, saranno due battaglie guadagnate per Buonaparte contro le due Corti Imperiali. Il Gabinetto Turco non deve perdere di vista la manigance della Francia in Albania, che datano da lungo tempo, come in tutto il Levante, li suoi piani, e le minaccie nell' ultimo discorso tenuto al Corpo Legislativo le 3 del passato mese, &c."

Inclosure C in No. X.

*Mr. Adair to Count Ludolf.*

Pera, ce 12 Février, 1809.

MONSIEUR,

LA confiance intime qui règne entre nos deux Cours, et l'intérêt qui les unit inséparablement, exigent que je m'ouvre à vous au sujet d'une démarche que je viens de faire, et qui par la suite pourrait devenir utile à sa Majesté le Roi des Deux Siciles.

Entre tant de motifs de guerre et de division qui existent malheureusement dans le monde, il est doux de pouvoir se fixer sur un sujet où toutes les Puissances doivent se trouver d'accord. La paix entre la Russie et la Porte sur des bases solides, paroît être de cette nature. Elle intéresse au plus haut point non seulement les parties belligérantes, mais aussi l'Angleterre, l'Autriche, et même la France. Je ne vous cacherai pas, Monsieur, qu'en arrivant à Constantinople, guidé par un zèle pour le bonheur commun de tant de peuples, et agissant d'après une discrétion très étendue que m'a laissée mon Gouvernement, j'ai notifié à la

Porte que loin de vouloir mettre aucune entrave aux négociations qui alloient s'ouvrir à Jassy, je ne désirois que leur terminaison heureuse et que d'y pouvoir prêter la main. Effectivement, quel intérêt auroit l'Angleterre dans la lutte qu'Elle soutient contre la Russie, à voir finir une guerre qui coûte tant à cette Puissance, et qu'Elle peut lui rendre si dangereuse par la paix que je viens de conclure, excepté cet intérêt majeur de l'humanité qui est audessus de toute autre considération, et qui même au bout du compte se trouve toujours d'accord avec la sagesse ?

Non seulement je me suis expliqué à ce sujet avec la Porte, mais passant par dessus toutes les formes diplomatiques, j'ai adressé une lettre dans le même sens au Feld-Maréchal Prince de Prosorowsky.

Mais afin de ne rien négliger dans une affaire de cette importance, je crois, M. le Comte, ne pouvoir mieux faire que de vous inviter à vous unir à moi pour faire parvenir l'objet de cette communication en droiture à St. Pétersbourg. M. le Duc de Sierra Capriola y est encore, et quoiqu'il n'exerce plus ses fonctions de Ministre, il n'aura pas de peine à s'en servir dans les dispositions personnelles qu'on lui témoigne toujours à cette Cour. Comme ce n'est que par une suite de la fidélité de S. M. le Roi des deux Siciles à ces engagements envers l'Angleterre que l'éloignement entre Elle et la Russie a eu lieu, c'est à M. le Duc que cette ouverture s'adresseroit le plus naturellement, et je ne serois pas fâché de lui fournir une occasion de rendre un service essentiel à la Russie, tout en remplissant un devoir envers le Roi, son auguste maître.

Je l'autorise donc à faire sentir au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg que la conclusion de la paix entre la

Porte et la Russie sera dans tous les tems un obstacle considérable de moins à la paix entre Elle et l'Angleterre, et présentera même des moyens de la hâter que les vrais amis des deux Empires sauront toujours mettre à profit.

J'ai l'honneur d'être, &c.

Inclosure D in No. X.

*Mr. Adair to the Reis Efendi.*

Pera, le 1 Février, 1810.

IL est nécessaire que la Sublime Porte soit avertie que ce qui est contenu dans l'écrit ci-joint relativement à la Moldavie et la Valachie, ne doit aucunement être considéré comme une proposition faite par l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, mais simplement comme l'exposé des opinions de quelques individus bien pensans en Russie qui croient ne voir d'autre manière de parvenir à une paix durable. L'Ambassadeur ne fait que remplir son devoir vis-à-vis la Sublime Porte en lui communiquant *tout* ce qui dans sa correspondance pourroit fournir à la Sublime Porte des renseignemens salutaires sur sa position : au reste, il lui renouvelle l'assurance de l'adhésion inviolable de son Gouvernement aux principes du 4<sup>me</sup> article secret du Traité des Dardanelles.

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No. XI.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, Feb. 12th, 1808.

MY LORD,

I HAVE the honour of forwarding to your Lordship, by the messenger Robinson, some despatches from Sir Harford Jones of the 27th December and of the 3d January.

Your Lordship will, I have no doubt, learn with satisfaction, that, on the receipt of my letter complaining of the ostentatious visit of the Persian agent, Hossein Han, to the French Chargé d'Affaires on the 3d of December, Sir Harford Jones immediately laid my representation before the Prince Royal of Persia, who, without a moment's hesitation, and with the strongest expression of displeasure, immediately despatched a firman for his recal. This mandate was received by Hossein Han before his departure for the Turkish camp, which the Reis Efendi had contrived from day to day to retard.

The readiness of the Prince Royal in attending to my just complaints speaks favourably, as far as it goes, for the Persian Government. It is accompanied, however, by a circumstance that has not removed my former doubts of their sincerity. With the firman from the Prince addressed to Hossein Han, and ordering him instantly to return to Tabreze, I received an intimation from the Prince's minister that it would greatly oblige H. R. H. if I would suffer this person to stay a few days longer at Constantinople to execute some commissions with which he had been charged.

These contradictory proceedings did not please me ; still less a further intimation conveyed in the minister's letter, that it was wished he might remain until the arrival of another Persian agent, said to be charged with a permanent mission to this capital. My suspicions may be unjust, but I confess that all does not appear fair and even in this transaction. The plea of commissions to execute is evidently a pretence, since Hossein Han was on the eve of his departure for Paris when the letter of recal was delivered to him ; and as to his remaining to meet the other agent, what can be the object of such a proposition, except that he may communicate to that agent all the offers of France, and that he may render him the confidant of his own intrigues, and the depository of his contrivances to serve the French cause ever since his residence at Constantinople ?

If there be any foundation for my fears, subsequent events are ill calculated to remove them. Not to refuse a personal request of the Prince Royal, I consented that this man should remain ten days to execute his supposed commissions. At the end of that period he flatly refused, and still continues refusing, to proceed upon his journey ; and this in the face of a Royal order, and after having been officially summoned by me to pay obedience to it.

Having found the Ottoman Government disposed to act fairly with me in all matters relative to Persia, I have not failed to manifest a proper return of confidence in my communications with the Reis Effendi concerning them. He has been regularly acquainted, therefore, with my first cause of complaint against Hossein Han, and with my demand for his recal. I

have now made use of his authority to shorten the residence of this very dangerous agent at Constantinople. A message has accordingly been sent to him from the Caimacan, to recommend his speedy departure. If necessary, it will be followed by a still stronger intimation of the sentiments of the Porte.

During the course of this business it seemed to me expedient to conceal from the Reis Efendi the doubts which had passed across my mind with regard to the sincerity of the Persian Court. To have imparted them would have alienated, almost beyond redemption, the minds of the Turkish Ministers from a Persian connection. I was careful, therefore, by attributing the strange behaviour of Hossein Han solely to personal views, in which he had been encouraged by the French, to keep the line distinct between this agent and his Government. Persia thus stands absolved for the present from all participation in his guilt; and the Reis Efendi is satisfied, by the facts before his eyes, by the second dismissal of Joannin in November last, and now by the recal of Hossein Han and the annihilation of his mission, that the Persian Government is cured of its French partialities, and is become sincere and steady in its alliance with Great Britain.

Under this persuasion the Porte is now greatly disposed to trust herself to an engagement with Persia for carrying on the war; and is satisfied that the relations between Great Britain and Persia will at all times secure the fulfilment of any treaty she may herself contract with that power. An opinion so useful to our interests in every point of view I have most assiduously cultivated and encouraged. The

result is the establishment of a thorough understanding between the Porte and myself on Persian politics.

To facilitate our mutual views, the Reis Efendi has permitted my chief dragoman to open a communication with the Turkish Minister appointed to reside at the Court of Tehran, and whose departure has only been delayed by the embarrassments of all kinds which occupy at this moment the attention of the Government. I am fully assured that this minister will be furnished with instructions to co-operate cordially with Sir Harford Jones in all measures which may be judged expedient for confirming and improving our common relations; and in particular that he will be ordered to use his utmost authority and influence with the Court to which he is accredited to prevent the re-admission of the French Embassy.

The execution of instructions framed in this sense must necessarily lead to a close concert with his Majesty's Minister at the Court of Tæhran in any negotiation which may be set on foot for a defensive alliance with Turkey. On the policy of encouraging a more extended system of connection, comparing its immediate benefits with its remoter possible evils, I am not sufficiently informed to pronounce. But I can venture to affirm, that in the actual dispositions of the Turkish Government, if a treaty with Persia, limited to the present exigency, and grounded on the simple basis of joint war or joint peace with Russia, could be negotiated, Great Britain would become mistress of its terms, and through them, and through the commanding situation in which she would be placed as the medium and link of such a connection, would

add a most powerful pledge to those which she already possesses for the maintenance of her own relations with Turkey to the last extremity.

I have the honour to be, &c.

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No. XII. One Inclosure.

*To Lord Bathurst.*

Pera, February 14th, 1810.

MY LORD,

IN compliance with a most earnest request from the Ottoman Government, addressed to me after many ineffectual endeavours to induce me to exchange the Secret and *Separate* Article of the Treaty of Peace, and representing the great and urgent distresses of their army for want of ammunition, I have been induced to apply to General Oakes\* for 5,000 quintals of gunpowder and 3,000 quintals of shot, to be sent up, if possible, without delay to Constantinople. I have the honour of enclosing a copy of my letter to General Oakes on this occasion.

At the same time I have distinctly informed the Turkish Government that I could not undertake to furnish this supply as a gift, although I would readily recommend its being so considered by his Majesty's Government.

I certainly have no hesitation, considering the extreme distress of the Government for want of money, — so great as in some instances to be supported in its daily expenses by private loans, — considering also

\* Governor of Malta.



the importance of keeping possession of the good will of the Turkish people by testifying a readiness to succour them in the hour of danger, to recommend that the supply in question be granted as an effect of his Majesty's regard, and as a proof of the interest taken by his Majesty in the preservation of the Ottoman Empire.

I have the honour to be, &c.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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